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 Abstract 
This thesis argues that vindicatory damages should be available in the child welfare tort cases against 
public authorities.  These are cases in which the plaintiffs sue public authorities either for not 
protecting them from harm when they were children, or where it is alleged that the authority’s 
employees abused the children while in its care.  Vindicatory damages would be intended to mark the 
wrong to the plaintiff, rather than attempting to compensate the consequences.  This thesis argues in 
support of the availability of a separate head of vindicatory damages in tort law, including negligence, 
and explores some of the liability issues which arise in these cases, including vicarious liability, 
liability for omissions and liability in negligence for the way in which a statutory power is exercised or 
for a breach of a statutory duty.  New Zealand's accident compensation scheme is also discussed: it is 
argued that vindicatory damages in tort law should not be barred by the scheme. 
Word length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 46,200 words. 
 
 












This thesis argues that non-loss based vindicatory damages should be available in tort law.  It 
does this by analysing cases in which children have sued public authorities, either for failing 
to protect them, or because the authority’s employees abused them.  The reason for using 
these cases is that they do not fit the way in which tort law is most often thought of, as a 
vehicle for shifting loss from the plaintiff to the defendant.1  In these cases, therefore, an 
award to mark but not to compensate the wrong is appropriate. 
One example of the difficulty which arises from thinking of these cases as concerned with 
shifting loss is the 2005 Supreme Court of Canada case HL. 2  The plaintiff had been sexually 
abused as a child on a federal reserve by the government’s residence administrator. The 
plaintiff claimed that his inability to maintain employment as an adult had been caused by his 
alcoholism, which the trial judge found was caused by the abuse.  The Court upheld the 
judge’s award for loss of income, although it set aside the part of the award for the lost 
income which might have been earned had the plaintiff not been incarcerated. 
HL was analysed by the Court as a typical tort case, in which damages are intended to put the 
plaintiff in the position in which he or she would have been “but for” the abuse.  In New 
Zealand, of course, loss caused by sexual abuse is usually recoverable under New Zealand’s 
statutory compensation scheme, and the plaintiff is barred from suing for additional 
compensatory damages in tort. 3   However, even in the Canadian case the plaintiff had 
received social assistance payments while he was unemployed, which were deducted as a 
“collateral benefit” from the damages award. 
Rather than allocating loss, the child welfare cases are better analysed as addressing public 
law concerns: the relationship between the state and vulnerable individuals, the role of the 
state as representative of the community, and the duties of the community to its children.  In 
order to reflect these public law concerns, separate non-compensatory damages should be 
available in tort law to “vindicate” the underlying obligation to protect children, without 
focusing on the loss caused by the wrong and, in New Zealand, without being barred by the 
statutory compensation scheme.   
It is not argued that tort law is the best mechanism for providing compensation against the 
state for child abuse, and this thesis does not deal with the claim that narrating their story in 
                                                        
1 This paradigm is explained in more detail in chapter two. 
2 HL v Canada (Attorney-General) 2005 SCC 25, [2005] 1 SCR 401.  This case is discussed is more detail in 
chapter three, at the text to footnote 69. 
3 Discussed in chapter two. 




court might be therapeutic for victims.
4
  Government controlled schemes such as the Care 
Claim and Resolution team (discussed below) and the more independent ombudsman, are 
arguably better methods for dealing with the cases discussed.5  This thesis makes the more 
modest claim that there is a place within tort law for an award through which the judiciary 
can recognise government wrongs, and mark them with an award of damages.  These 
damages would not be calculated by analysing the loss which the claimant suffered, but 
would be designed to vindicate the rights of the plaintiff or the duties of the defendant. 




Tort law is an ombudsman.  It can be used to apply pressure upon those who wield political, 
economic or intellectual power; in short, it empowers the injured … The damage sought in 
such a case may not be of primary concern to the plaintiff; the main goal may be to stimulate 
administrative action or expose wrongdoing.  Recent evidence of this tendency is that some of 
the 9/11 families, who rejected the US government compensation, and chose instead to sue, 
were partially motivated, at least, “by a strong sense of duty to act as an agent of the 
community to gain information about what happened, to hold people accountable and to play 
a role in prompting responsive change.” 
Tort law can be used to reveal facts, and through exposing wrongdoing may even prompt 
government inquiries, arguably a more useful way of addressing historic abuse.  It is the 
utility of tort law in uncovering wrongdoing and providing a marker through an award of 
damages which underpins the approach in this thesis.  Some wrongs need to be vindicated 
even though there is no loss, or the loss is impossible to quantify. 
A The Original Contribution of this Thesis 
The contribution of this thesis concerns the public law aspect of damages rather than the way 
tort law might help child abuse victims.  The child welfare cases are analysed as examples of 
the way tort actions, including negligence, fulfil a public law role within the common law.  
This raises the question whether tort law includes an appropriate remedy to reflect this public 
law approach.  Vindicatory damages have the potential to avoid problems associated with 
                                                        
4 There is a separate literature on whether tort law can be therapeutically beneficial to child abuse victims: see 
Bruce Feldthusen, Olena Hankivsky and Lorraine Greaves “Therapeutic Consequences of Civil Actions for 
Damages and Compensation Claims by Victims of Sexual Abuse” (2000) 12 Can J Women & L 66. 
5 A number of writers have suggested that the ombudsman is a more effective provider of remedies: Carol 
Harlow State Liability: Tort Law and Beyond (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004) at 122; Lord Hoffmann 
“Reforming the Law of Public Authority Negligence” (2009) The Bar Council <www.barcouncil.org.uk> at 
[15].  On the role of ombudsmen in general see Richard Moules Actions against Public Officials: Legitimate 
Expectations, Misstatement and Misconduct (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2009), at ch 10. 
6 Allen M Linden and Bruce Feldthusen Canadian Tort Law (9th ed, LexisNexis, Markham, Ontario, 2011) at 
22-23, citing G Hadfield “Framing the Choice Between Cash and the Courthouse” (2008) 42 Law & Soc’y Rev 
645, at 673.  An earlier edition of this chapter was cited by Cooke P in Re Chase [1989] 1 NZLR 325 (CA). 




causation and bringing the plaintiff’s suffering within a recognised head of “damage.”  They 
are not compensatory, and therefore should not be barred by the accident compensation 
legislation. 
In New Zealand, damages for personal injury are barred by the accident compensation 
scheme.7  This statutory scheme provides compensation for most personal injuries, and those 
who have “cover” under the scheme are barred from suing in tort.  The problem with this is 
that tort law has functions that cannot be replaced by a statutory compensation scheme, such 
as the way it enables child abuse victims to find out through discovery how the government 
failed to protect them.   
In removing personal injury claims from tort law, the accident compensation scheme also 
removed that part of tort law which helped control the relationship between public authorities 
and individuals.  As Carol Harlow has written, “public lawyers … have tended to overlook 
the significance of the transfer.”8 Gault J has described how before the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) was enacted, the rights in that Act were protected in the 
common law, including tort:9 
In our system, at least in the past, it has generally been the exception for rights to be defined 
solely in terms of the individual person's relationship with the state. So the tort of trespass 
applies equally to the citizen as to the state. Many of the fundamental cases establishing the 
principles of tort arose from the actions of government. The great trespass case of Entick v 
Carrington (1765) 19 State Tr 1029 concerned a warrant under the hand of the Secretary of 
State. That the Bill of Rights Act is limited to the actions of government and its agencies does 
not deny the fact that many of the rights enumerated are already protected in the general law. 
In this thesis it is argued that like cases brought under NZBORA, the child welfare decisions 
are about public wrongs.  Underpinning the cases are community duties to protect children.  
The New Zealand Court of Appeal in S v Attorney-General imposed liability on the Crown 
for the abuse of foster parents partly because:10 
… recognition of the special obligation of protection of children imposed on the 
superintendent as a surrogate of the New Zealand community, renders it fair that 
compensation for the innocent victim's serious and long-lasting injury should be borne by and 
distributed amongst the community; or else it will not be compensated at all and the 
community obligation will not have been recognised. 
                                                        
7 This is discussed in more detail in chapter two. 
8 Carol Harlow, above n 5, at 92. 
9 Simpson v Attorney-General [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA) [Baigent's Case], at 710.  Gault J was dissenting.  See 
also his judgment in Attorney-General v Chapman [2011] NZSC 110. 
10 S v Attorney-General [2003] 3 NZLR 450, at [70], emphasis added. 




In both New Zealand and in England there are statutory duties placed on public authorities to 
protect children. For example it is the duty of the Chief Executive of Child Youth and Family 
Services in New Zealand “to take such positive and prompt action and steps” as will 
“promote the well-being of children, young persons, and their families and family groups”. 11   
Vindicatory damages would be intended to mark the importance of this underlying 
community obligation, rather than attempting to compensate the loss caused by the breach.   
B Public and Private Defendants 
The child welfare cases analysed in this thesis involve both public defendants, in New 
Zealand usually the Crown, and private defendants such as the Catholic Social Services 
(although this is arguably public).12  Given the limits of this thesis, the arguments concentrate 
on public authority liability.  There are three reasons for this. 
First, much of the support for the vindicatory approach advanced in this thesis comes from 
the developments in the jurisprudence on damages for breaches of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA).  It is argued that explicitly vindicatory damages should be 
available in tort law in the same way these are available for breaches of NZBORA partly 
because similar interests underpin both actions.  This is most obvious when the defendant is a 
public authority, although vindicatory damages may also be useful to mark wrongs between 
private individuals. 
Secondly, where the defendant is a public authority, this raises a number of distinct issues.  
For example, in some of the cases, it is alleged that the defendant authority failed to 
investigate complaints it received that the plaintiff was suffering abuse.13  This involves an 
exercise of statutory power which is usually associated with public authorities.  It also 
concerns an omission, for which the common law does not usually impose liability.  There 
may be good reasons for this rule in relation to private defendants, but the issue is different 
where the defendant is a public authority.  This is discussed in chapter six. 
Thirdly, the state is representative of the community in a way which is not typical of private 
defendants.  When a public authority like New Zealand’s Child Youth and Family Services 
negligently fails to prevent child abuse, it arguably breaches not only its statutory duties, but 
                                                        
11 Children, Young Persons, and their Family Act 1989 (NZ) ss 7 and 4 (s 7 provides that it is the duty of the 
Chief Executive to promote the objects of the Act, which are in s 4).  See also the Children Act 1989 (UK) ss 22 
and 47.  The Crimes Act 1961 (NZ), s 152 includes a duty on parents and persons in the place of a parent to 
provide necessaries for any child in their actual custody and to take reasonable steps to protect that child from 
injury.  See also ss 150A, 195 and 195A.  The relationship between the statutory duties and liability in tort law 
is explored in chapter eight. 
12 See for example A v Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Wellington [2008] NZCA 49, [2008] 3 NZLR 289.   
13 Attorney-General v Prince and Gardner  [1998] 1 NZLR 262 (CA), D v East Berkshire Community NHS 
Trust [2003] EWCA Civ 1151, [2004] QB 558. 




the duties of the wider community to look after children.
14
  In England the provider of child 
welfare services is the local council, rather than central government, but this still has a 
representative function.  This “public” aspect of the cases is reflected in the role of 
vindication: it is not just the defendant’s wrongs which are being vindicated, but the failure of 
the community as a whole to look after its children. 
However, many of the arguments in favour of a vindicatory approach apply whether the 
defendant is private or public.  For example, it is argued that a non-compensatory award is 
useful where the claim would otherwise be struck out because there is no “loss” (especially in 
negligence), because litigation can help to reveal facts about how the wrong was caused:
 15
 
The adversarial process performs a valuable function in allowing individual victims – and the 
public, vicariously – an opportunity to confront large social institutions, express moral 
indignation, and achieve clear-cut vindication of rights. 
This applies whether the defendant is the Crown or the Catholic Social Services.  Some of the 
cases relied on as support for a vindicatory approach within tort law are also private.
16
  
Therefore it is not argued that a vindicatory approach should be applied only where the 
defendant is a public authority, but merely that these cases present a good example of where 
such an approach is appropriate. 
C Structure of this Thesis 
The structure of this thesis is somewhat counter-intuitive.  The remedy is discussed before the 
liability issues (although they inevitably overlap).  In the next four chapters, it is argued that 
the child welfare cases do not sit comfortably within the compensatory principle: the 
damages are better seen as vindicatory, awarded for the wrong rather than the consequences.  
There is a discussion whether the development of this approach in NZBORA damages can be 
incorporated into tort law (chapter four) and whether there is support within existing tort law 
for such an approach (chapter five). 
The remaining chapters focus on the wrong which is being vindicated.  In chapter six the 
developments in vicarious liability are discussed.  These have allowed child abuse victims to 
sue the employers of their abusers in tort, and in New Zealand for child abuse victims to sue 
the Crown for the torts of foster parents.  Although non-loss based damages may seem 
                                                        
14 For the argument that community does have duties to look after children, see John Eekelaar “Parental 
responsibility: State of Nature or Nature of the State? (1991) 13 JSWFL 37, “Are Parents Morally Obligated to 
Care for Their Children? (1991) 11 OJLS 340.  
15David Rosenberg “The Dusting of America: a Story of Asbestos – Carnage, Cover-up, and Litigation” (1968) 
99 HLR 1693, at 1705.  See also Scott Hershovitz “Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory” (2010) 63 
Stan L Rev 67, at 72. 
16 For example Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2004] 1 AC 309(HL).  Chapter five analyses 
whether there is support for a vindicatory approach within existing tort law. 




incongruous for vicarious liability because it is usually regarded as strict (non-fault), it is 
argued that vindicatory damages should be awarded where there is a relationship between the 
plaintiff and defendant. 
Chapters seven and eight deal with issues which arise when the public authority is sued 
directly, for example for failing to prevent the abuse which the plaintiff suffered as a child.  
The allegation in such cases often concerns an omission (chapter seven) and the way in which 
a statutory power is exercised (chapter eight).  An orthodox application of negligence rules 
might prevent liability being established in these cases, partly because it requires treating 
public authorities differently from private individuals (something not traditionally done in 
tort law).  However, this recognises the special position of such authorities, which are 
entrusted with powers specifically designed to help prevent the wrongs which the plaintiffs 
are complaining about.  The development of negligence law in these cases can be helpfully 
understood as vindicating the underlying obligations discussed in the first half of the thesis. 




II Vindication as an Alternative to Compensation 
In 1997, the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Prince refused to strike out a claim that 
the Department of Social Welfare had negligently failed to investigate a complaint 
they received that the plaintiff was being ill-treated by his adoptive parents. 1  This 
decision marked the beginning of what is arguably a sui generis body of tort case law 
concerning child welfare.  The English Court of Appeal made a similar decision in 
2003 in D v East Berkshire.2 
As well as claims like Prince which allege that a public authority through its own 
negligence failed to prevent the plaintiff from being neglected or abused, many cases 
have been brought alleging that the defendant’s employees abused the plaintiff.3  
These last cases are usually brought vicariously.  In New Zealand, cases in tort 
against the Crown must be brought vicariously, under s 6 of the Crown Proceedings 
Act 1950.  This means that a particular wrongdoer must be identified, making 
systemic negligence claims problematic.  However, in practice New Zealand courts 
have not always strictly applied the Act, and in some cases, including some of the 
child protection cases, they appear to have allowed claims brought directly against the 
Crown.4 
In both the direct negligence cases like Prince and East Berkshire and the employee 
abuse cases the allegations are difficult to frame in orthodox tort law terms.  The 
traditional focus of tort law damages is predominantly compensatory: the damages are 
intended to put the plaintiff in the position he or she would have been but for the 
wrong.  In this chapter an alternative approach is developed, in which damages would 
be intended to mark the wrong rather than to compensate the loss caused by the abuse. 
A Are These Cases about shifting loss? 
So far, the child welfare cases have mostly been brought as loss-based claims.  This 
fits with a widespread ideal that tort law is primarily focused on shifting loss between 
parties.
5
  Under this paradigm, child abuse victims bring complaints against the state 
                                                        
1 Attorney-General v Prince and Gardner  [1998] 1 NZLR 262 (CA). 
2 D v East Berkshire Community NHS Trust [2003] EWCA Civ 1151, [2004] QB 558.  
3 S v Attorney-General [2003] 3 NZLR 450 (CA) is an example of this, although in that case the Crown 
was held liable for the torts of foster parents, not employees.  This issue is discussed in chapter six. 
4 Stuart Anderson “'Grave injustice’: the insecure foundations of crown liability for torts in New 
Zealand” (2009) 12 Otago LR 1, at 20.  Anderson cites Prince, above n 1, as an example of direct 
liability against a government department. 
5 Adherents of this ideal include Allan Beever Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2007) and Lord Hoffmann “Reforming the Law of Public Authority Negligence” (2009) The 
Bar Council  <www.barcouncil.org.uk>.  For an argument to the opposite effect, see Dan Priel “A 
Public Role for the Intentional Torts” (2011) Social Science Research Network  <www.ssrn.com>. 




for having failed to protect them, claiming damages representing the loss that they 
suffered.  For example, in a 2008 English case B v London Borough of Ealing the 
judge calculated that the plaintiff’s loss caused by the abuse she had suffered as a 
child totalled £50,372, divided into the following heads: past loss of earnings, future 
loss of earnings, medical expenses for therapy (including travel) and pain and 
suffering.
 6
  He also awarded £1,072 for a proportion of the money spent on alcohol 
caused by the plaintiff’s alcohol addiction which the judge held was partly caused by 
the abuse.  
There are at least three difficulties with this loss-based approach.  First, it is not clear 
that tort law does this very well.  Such loss is often deducted anyway for benefits 
received through social welfare, which arguably represents a better means of 
compensating such harm.7   
Secondly, cases like Prince and East Berkshire are brought in negligence, and it is 
arguable that child abuse victims have not suffered the type of “damage” necessary to 
establish a claim in this tort.  For example Henaghan has criticised those involved in 




A big gap in how this case was argued is that the Crown seems to have overlooked 
that for an action in negligence there must be some recognisable damage. The only 
specific damage that was claimed here was "impairment of personal and intellectual 
development" and "emotional abuse". Neither of these are currently recognisable 
damages for a tort action in negligence. Unwittingly, the majority of the Court of 
Appeal by not striking out the action have opened up the doors to new areas of claim 
in negligence -- areas which are wide and vague that will create a field day for social 
scientists debating the nature/nurture argument in Courts and trying to quantify 
"impairment" and "emotional abuse". 
This criticism might seem odd when applied to the victims of abuse or neglect: it 
should be possible to develop the tort of negligence sufficiently so that child abuse, 
for example, can form a “recognisable damage”.  However, Henaghan’s observation 
hints at a more fundamental problem with these cases.  The effects of child abuse are 
life-long and complex.  It may impair the intellectual and emotional development of 
the victim, as the plaintiff in Prince alleged, in ways which are impossible to 
disentangle from personality traits passed down in the gene pool or attributable to 
                                                        
6 B v London Borough of Ealing [2008] EWHC 1262 (QB). 
7 For a critique of the way tort law deals with compensation for personal injuries generally, see Peter 
Cane Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law (7th ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2006). 
8 Mark Henaghan “Editorial: Suing for an appalling childhood” (1997) 2 BFLJ 174, at 175.  




other factors in the child’s environment.  Should these effects of abuse be categorised 
as “loss” to be compensated by negligence, and how might the courts quantify this? 
The third problem with these cases is that the whole claim is usually barred in New 
Zealand by its statutory compensation scheme.9  If the child welfare cases are only 
about loss, this suggests that there may be no claim at all in New Zealand, where loss 
caused by sexual abuse and child abuse is usually compensated under the statutory 
scheme, and tort claims for additional compensation are therefore barred.  However, if 
it is recognised that the child welfare cases are not really concerned with shifting loss 
from one party to another but rather with the recognition of an important wrong, the 
argument that the accident compensation bar should not apply to this aspect of the 
damages award becomes more compelling. 
If the child abuse cases are not about “loss” in the tort law sense, should they be 
brought in tort law at all?  In this thesis it is argued that because tort law is not always 
about loss, non-loss based damages may be appropriate as a marker that an important 
community obligation has been breached.  Lord Wilberforce made a similar 
observation, in the context of a discussion whether exemplary damages are 
appropriate in “private” tort law:
10
 
It cannot lightly be taken for granted, even as a matter of theory, that the purpose of 
the law of tort is compensation, still less that it ought to be, an issue of large social 
import, or that there is something inappropriate or illogical or anomalous (a question-
begging word) in including a punitive element in civil damages, or, conversely, that 
the criminal law, rather than the civil law, is in these cases the better instrument for 
conveying social disapproval, or for redressing a wrong to the social fabric, or that 
damages in any case can be broken down into the two separate elements. As a matter 
of practice English law has not committed itself to any of these theories: it may have 
been wiser than it knew. 
B The Compensation Conception of Tort Law 
Despite Lord Wilberforce’s words, there is a widely held assumption now that tort 
law is chiefly concerned with compensating loss.  That assumption underpins two of 
the most important conceptions of tort law: the corrective and the distributive justice 
theories.   
                                                        
9 Discussed below in the last main section of this chapter. 
10 Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027 (HL), at 1114; quoted with approval by Richardson J in 
Taylor v Beere [1982] 1 NZLR 81 (CA), at 90, Cooke P in Re Chase [1989] 1 NZLR 325 (CA), at 332, 
and Elias CJ (dissenting) in Couch v Attorney-General (No 2) (on appeal from Hobson v Attorney-
General) [2010] NZSC 27; [2010] 3 NZLR 149, at [20]. However, Tipping J in the majority in Couch 
(No 2) was critical of this passage, at [142]. 




In the first theory, tort law is described as a way of protecting certain interests, such 
as bodily integrity or the right not to be lied to.  When those rights or interests are 
violated by the defendant, he or she must compensate the plaintiff for the loss which 
that violation has caused.  Beever has written that:11 
… when one of the rights of the wrong-sufferer is violated, corrective justice 
sees this as an injustice and aims to correct the injustice … the wrong consists 
in the wrongdoer interfering with the wrong-sufferer’s right, the remedy in 
requiring the wrongdoer to undo that wrong, typically by compensating the 
wrong-sufferer. 
An alternative conception of tort law, distributive justice, views tort law as allocating 
loss to those who can best pay for it or who enjoy the benefit of the risk which led to 
the loss.  Fleming described this approach as “not simply a redirection of losses from 




In both theories, the focus is on the loss suffered by the victim.  This is consistent 
with the rule that tort law puts plaintiffs in the position they would have been in if the 
tort had never occurred.
13
  This is the foundation for the distinction often drawn 
between tort and contract damages, that in contract the plaintiff “is entitled to be put 
into the position he would have been in if the contract … had been performed” but in 
tort the plaintiff is only entitled to be put in the position he or she would have been 
had there been no tort.14  However, the compensatory rule of tort law does not give 
the whole picture.   
Beever’s approach can be compared to that adopted by Cane, who has also analysed 
tort law in terms of protected interests but does not argue, as Beever does, that 
damages for a violation of an interest must be compensatory.  The difference between 
the two writers is highlighted by the way they treat exemplary damages, which are not 
compensatory, but are intended to punish the defendant.15  Beever would abolish 
exemplary damages because “punishment is foreign to the structure of private law”.16  
This reflects his belief that tort law is solely private law, focused on the relationship 
                                                        
11 Beever, above n 5, at 45.   
12 John G Fleming The Law of Torts (9th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1998)  at 11; see also the 
discussion of Fleming’s theory by Harold Luntz in “Liability of statutory authorities for omissions” 
(1998) 6 TLJ 107. 
13 Livingstone v Reywards Coal Co (1880) LR 5 App Cas 25 (HL). 
14 McGregor on Damages (18th ed Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2009) at 766. An earlier wording of 
this passage was approved by Gault J in Cox & Coxon Ltd v Leipst [1999] 2 NZLR 15 (CA) at pp 19-
20, see McGregor on Damages (16th ed Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1997) at 810. 
15 Couch (No 2), above n 10.  Exemplary damages are discussed in chapter five. 
16 Allan Beever “The Structure of Aggravated and Exemplary Damages” (2003) 23 OJLS 87, at 105. 




between the plaintiff and defendant, to the exclusion of the interests of the wider 
community, which may include seeing the defendant punished.  Cane writes, 
however, that arguments to abolish exemplary damages are based on a fundamental 
mistake:17 
[This] is an assumption that compensation for loss is the only function of tort law 
[however] tort law is not just about making good losses, but is also concerned to 
protect certain rights irrespective of whether interference with the right causes 
damage. 
As this debate suggests, the difference in approach is more fundamental than whether 
tort law remedies are chiefly compensatory: it concerns the issue whether tort law can 
include public law purposes.  Beever might argue that private law has no place for a 
non-loss based remedy such as vindicatory damages, because they do not relate to the 
relationship between the parties but to public law notions such as vindicating rights 
and duties in the sight of the community.  Such a remedy has one eye to the audience: 
it ensures that others outside the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant 
realise how important the right is.  In chapter three, the child welfare cases are 
analysed in respect of how the plaintiffs have tried to frame the “loss” which they 
have suffered.  It is argued that their suffering does not fit easily into the traditional 
tort conceptions of “damage”, and that the compensatory principle should not control 
these cases. 
The problem is not simply that the loss is difficult to calculate: that is a familiar issue 
in tort law.  There is a more fundamental problem with these cases: they are 
concerned with the wrong suffered, rather than the subsequent loss.  Tort law, 
however, has usually been developed as a response to the loss caused by the wrong.  
An alternative non-loss based approach in which damages could be awarded to mark 
the wrong rather than to compensate would be controversial.  However, in this thesis 
it is argued that the advantages of such an approach outweigh this difficulty. 
C Vindication 
Vindication as a purpose of a damages award has begun to be explored in the last 
twenty years, particularly in the human rights damages context.18  It has at least two 
meanings, both of which can be utilised in the search for an appropriate remedy for 
the breach of a community obligation to protect children.  The first is that vindication 
                                                        
17 Peter Cane The Anatomy of Tort Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) at 116. 
18 See Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 SCC 27; [2010] 2 SCR 28 (Charter damages); Taunoa  v Attorny-
General [2007] NZSC 70, [2008] 1 NZLR 429 (NZBORA damages).  See also Fose v Minister of 
Safety and Security, [1997] 3 SA 786 (CC). 




focuses on the wrong suffered rather than the consequences.  A vindicatory remedy 
will be designed to remedy the wrong whether or not the plaintiff suffers loss: 19     
Essentially, the word ‘vindication’ is used to mean making good the plaintiff’s rights.  
To do that, a person whose claim has been upheld will need to be granted an effective 
remedy. 
A second meaning is found in the judgments on damages for breaches of human 
rights legislation.  This is that when human rights are breached (and arguably the 
logic extends to important community obligations) the whole community suffers, as a 
secondary victim.20   
1 Damages for the wrong rather than the loss 
Vindication in the first sense implies a focus on the wrong rather than the subsequent 
loss.  The emphasis is on the public recognition that the defendant has wronged the 
plaintiff, rather than any loss which the wrongdoer has caused the victim.  Priel has 
written that vindication provides “a public and impartial … forum for declaring that a 
claimant’s rights … have been infringed.”21 
The difference between damages which are awarded to recognise a wrong and those 
which compensate a loss became important in Donselaar v Donselaar, when the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal had to decide whether New Zealand’s accident 
compensation scheme barred claims for exemplary damages.
22
  While exemplary 
damages are usually described as concerned with punishment rather than vindication, 
the case is useful for the way the judges distinguished between the wrong and its 
consequences, and held that the accident compensation bar applied only to damages 
for the latter.   
Donselaar concerned a long-running feud between two brothers, one of whom had hit 
the other across the head with a hammer.  The Accident Compensation Act 1972 
barred “proceedings for damages arising directly or indirectly out of the injury or 
death” of the victim.
23
  Although the Court of Appeal held that the provocation which 
led to the assault made exemplary damages inappropriate, they ruled that such 
damages were available for personal injury in New Zealand despite the accident 
compensation bar, partly because of the distinction between the wrong and the 
                                                        
19 Norman Witzleb and Robyn Carroll “The role of vindication in torts damages” (2009) 17 Tort L Rev 
16, at 18.  See also David Pearce and Roger Halson “Damages for Breach of Contract: Compensation, 
Restitution and Vindication” (2008) 28 OJLS 73. 
20 Taunoa v Attorney-General, above n 18, at [317] per Tipping J. 
21 Dan Priel, above n 5, at 20, emphasis in original. 
22 Donselaar v Donselaar [1982] 1 NZLR 97 (CA). 
23 Section 5. 




consequence.  Richardson J said that “it is the quality of the defendant’s conduct 
which is in question not whether the plaintiff has suffered a particular type of 
harm.” 24   Cooke J quoted from O’Regan J in Howse v Attorney-General, that 
exemplary damages could be awarded because they arose “from the acts done 
contrary to law and not from the harm caused to the plaintiffs by such acts.”25 
Like exemplary damages, it has been held that vindicatory NZBORA damages are not 
necessarily barred by accident compensation because they are not loss-based.  In 
Wilding, the New Zealand Court of Appeal decided that although NZBORA damages 
for personal injury were barred by the accident compensation scheme, there could be 
an award beyond compensation to recognise the affront to the plaintiff’s rights.26  The 
plaintiff in Wilding alleged that police had ordered a police dog to bite him while he 
was lying on the ground hand cuffed.  Blanchard J, writing for the Court, observed 
that any compensation: “would be for the affront, not for its physical consequences.  
Putting it another way, there could be damages for the assault, but not for the 
battery.”27  Damages would be “directed at compensating only for the breach of the 
right.”28  The remedy would focus on the wrong, not the consequences. 
Damages which are awarded for the wrong rather than the consequential loss are 
usually thought of as vindicating the plaintiff’s rights, as occurs when the concept is 
used in the jurisprudence on the NZBORA.  A vindicatory award could also be used 
to mark the importance of the defendant’s duty, however.  There is a suggestion of 
this in the reasoning of the New Zealand Court of Appeal’s decision in S v Attorney-
General.  The Court held that the Crown was vicariously liable when foster parents 
abused the foster children in its care because otherwise “the community obligation 
will not have been recognised.”29  The English judge Sir John Laws has written extra-
judicially of the importance of duties as well as rights:
30
 
A society whose values are defined by reference to individual rights is by that very 
fact already impoverished.  Its culture says nothing about individual duty – nothing 
about virtue … Accordingly rights must be put in their proper place.   
                                                        
24 Ibid, at 109, emphasis added. 
25 Howse v Attorney-General SC Palmerston North, A 132/75, 22 December 1977, quoted in 
Donselaar, above n 22, at 102, per Cooke J.  Emphasis added. 
26 Wilding v Attorney-General [2003] 3 NZLR 787 (CA). 
27 Ibid, at [16]. 
28 Ibid. 
29 S v Attorney-General, above n 3, at [70]. 
30 Sir John Laws “The limitations of human rights” [1998] PL 254, at 255. 




Rights and duties might simply be two sides of the same coin: a plaintiff’s right to 
physical integrity is the defendant’ duty not to hit him.31  However, it may be more 
useful to describe the protected interest in the child welfare cases as an obligation or 
duty, as the Court of Appeal in S did, rather than arguing that the action vindicates the 
child’s right to protection.  This shifts the focus onto the way the community failed in 
its obligation to take care of children, instead of children’s rights, which present 
difficulties because of children’s lack of autonomy. 32   The focus on community 
obligation reflects a widely felt sentiment in New Zealand that child abuse is 
something which the government must take responsibility for, and a sense of nation-
wide guilt at the high statistics of child abuse in New Zealand.33 
2 The public law aspect of vindication 
Vindicatory damages cases often have a public aspect to them. This is implicit in 
Wilding with the focus on the breach of NZBORA rights.  This public law aspect has 
been made more explicit in later NZBORA cases such as Taunoa and in the human 
rights damages jurisprudence overseas, which this thesis draws on in support of a 
vindicatory remedy.  In Taunoa the plaintiffs were prisoners who had been put under 
a “behavioural modification scheme”, which included unlawful solitary confinement, 
strip searching in prison corridors, and a lack of time and space to exercise.  Tipping J 
identified vindication as a distinct purpose of NZBORA damages, which focused on 
the wider context beyond the dispute between the plaintiff and defendant:34 
… when there is a breach of human rights there are two victims. First there is an 
immediate victim. The interests of that victim require the court to consider what, if 
any, compensation is due. But, because the breach also tends to undermine the rule of 
law and societal norms, society as a whole becomes a victim too.  Hence, the court 
must also consider what is necessary by way of vindication in order to protect 
society's interests in the observance of fundamental rights and freedoms. 
                                                        
31 The classic discussion of this issue is WN Hohfeld “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning” (1913) 23 Yale LJ 16. 
32 Of course, autonomy is not the only possible reason for having rights, and several authors have 
offered explanations why children have rights despite a lack of autonomy, see Michael Freeman 
“Taking Children’s Rights More Seriously” in Michael Freeman (ed) The moral status of children: 
Essays on the Rights of the Child (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1997); John Eekelaar: “The 
Importance of Thinking that Children Have Rights” in Philip Alston, Stephen Parker and John 
Seymour (eds) Children, Rights and the Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992) 221.  The 
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the Rights of the Child (opened for signature 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 
1990). 
33 See The Green Paper for Vulnerable Children  Every child thrives, belongs, achieves (2011) 
<www.msd.govt.nz>. 
34 Taunoa, above n 18, at [317]. 




This two victim explanation of vindication helps explain the child abuse cases.  When 
children suffer neglect or abuse, the wider community suffers as a secondary victim 
and has an interest in seeing the primary victim’s wrong vindicated through an award 
of damages. 
In Ward the Supreme Court of Canada also identified vindication as a distinct purpose 
of Charter damages.
35
  The plaintiff had been detained because he was suspected of 
planning to throw a pie at the Prime Minister.  He was strip-searched in breach of his 
rights under the Charter.  The Supreme Court upheld the trial judge’s award of $5000 
and identified three purposes of Charter damages: compensation, deterrence, and 
vindication.  It described the latter as follows:36 
Vindication focuses on the harm the infringement causes society … violations of 
constitutionally protected rights harm not only their particular victims, but society as 
a whole. This is because they “impair public confidence and diminish public faith in 
the efficacy of the [constitutional] protection”. While one may speak of vindication as 
underlining the seriousness of the harm done to the claimant, vindication as an object 
of constitutional damages focuses on the harm the Charter breach causes to the state 
and to society. 
D “Bothersome” Damages 
One of the reasons for developing a vindicatory remedy is to enable tort law to fulfil 
what Linden calls its ombudsmen role.
37
  Like an ombudsman, tort law can reveal 
how the plaintiff’s wrong occurred:38 
A tort suit can challenge the decision-making power of the omnipotent and 
omnipresent managers of modern society.  In a world dominated increasingly 
by distant, elite decision-makers, this watchdog role is becoming more and 
more necessary. 
Building on the analogy with the ombudsman, support for the availability of 
vindicatory damages in tort law is found in the development by the United Kingdom 
Parliamentary Commission for Administration’s development of what appears to be a 
vindicatory remedy to mark government maladministration, which the Commission 
described as “bothersome damages”. 39  They are awarded when government 
maladministration has caused exceptional distress or worry.  The damages are 
intended to mark the wrong rather than to provide compensation: as Harlow has 
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36 Ibid, [28], citing Fose, above n 18, at [82]. 
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38 Ibid, at 159. 
39 Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, Maladministration and Redress, HC 112 (1994-5). 




argued they represent a “manifestation of sympathy and solace” rather than full 
redress.40 
The Commission’s 2011 report “A Breach of Confidence” is a good example of its 
approach. 41   A number of government departments mistakenly changed Ms M’s 
address in their computer system to the new address of her ex-partner, from whom she 
had recently separated.  This led to a number of documents containing personal 
information about her finances being sent to his house.  When she complained, none 
of the departments (including HM Revenue & Customs, the Child Support Agency 
and the Department for Work and Pensions) accepted responsibility, instead directing 
her to other departments.  The Commissioner found:42  
Each of the agencies blamed another for the original mistake and took the view that, 
as the mistake had been disseminated by ‘the system’ it was not their responsibility 
and there was nothing they could do. 
Ms M, said that she felt humiliated that her ex-partner knew that she was in financial 
difficulty.43  The Commissioner held that there was maladministration and injustice, 
causing Ms M anxiety and distress.  She recommended that HM Revenue & Customs 
pay Ms M £2,000 “in recognition of all the injustice flowing from the 
maladministration identified in [the] report.”44  While this took into account costs 
incurred by Ms M as a result of the wrong, such as taking time off work to meet with 
her MP,45 the payment is not described in compensatory terms: it is to vindicate the 
wrong rather than to compensate it.  
The New Zealand ombudsmen do not seem to have developed a practice of 
recommending “bothersome” damages.  However, there is a somewhat similar head 
of damages available in New Zealand’s Human Rights Act 1993, which protects the 
right not to be discriminated against.  Section 92M(1)(c) provides for damages for  
“humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to the feelings of the complainant.”   
Such damages are similar to those awarded for breach of the rights in NZBORA, and 
should be available in tort law.  They are potentially a useful remedy through which 
New Zealand courts could recognise the wrong done to the plaintiff when the claim 
                                                        
40 Carol Harlow State Liability: Tort Law and Beyond (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004) at 123. 
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42 Ibid, at [84]. 
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would otherwise be barred in New Zealand because of the accident compensation 
scheme.  Vindicatory damages would enable tort law to fulfil its ombudsman role. 
E Can Vindication be Achieved through Litigation? 
While accepting that Parliamentary ombudsmen might mark wrongs through 
“bothersome” damages, some might argue that litigation is an inappropriate way of 
achieving vindication.  In a 2011 child abuse case against the Legal Services Agency, 
Dobson J requested that such complaints be dealt with outside the judicial process:46   
The judgments in many of the decided cases have included observations about the 
inappropriateness of these historic abuse claims being addressed in conventional 
litigation form …To the extent that many of these claimants place a priority on 
vindication of their complaints rather than financial success, then pursuit of litigation 
is likely to expose them to substantial on-going stress, in many cases the high 
prospects of failure and, for those who proceed to trial, the additional stress of having 
the accounts of their tragic pasts tested in what cannot be other than an unsympathetic 
forum. In many situations, vindication is achieved by an acknowledgement of wrong-
doing by those with responsibility for having caused the wrong in the first place. That 
is not an outcome that is achievable in litigation.  
However, while executive-controlled non-adversarial proceedings may be more 
suitable for child abuse claims, the judiciary should not abdicate its responsibility in 
providing a forum for vindicating rights against the Crown.  Where the rights are 
claimed against the state, it is constitutionally troubling to argue that plaintiffs should 
be discouraged from bringing their complaints to court, even where a better outcome 
might be obtained in a process controlled by the executive.47  The complaint is that 
the executive harmed the plaintiff (or failed to prevent the plaintiff from being 
harmed): it is therefore important to provide the opportunity of a forum which is not 
controlled by the executive, even if it is expected that most claims are dealt with in an 
alternative process.  It is not the claim of this thesis to demonstrate that litigation is 
the best place for child welfare claims.  Rather, the thesis attempts to show how a 
claim to vindicate community obligations to protect children might work.  This has an 
importance beyond cases about children, concerning non-loss based remedies more 
generally. 
                                                        
46 JMM v Legal Services Agency HC Wellington CIV-2010-485-1306, CIV-2010-485-1375, CIV-2010-
485-1630, CIV-2010-485-1740, CIV-2010-485-1961, CIV-2010-485-2527, CIV-2010-485-1559, 14 
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In New Zealand the Ministry of Social Development provides an alternative to 
litigation for abuse victims through the Care, Claims and Resolution Team.  This 
involves meetings with Social Work Advisors employed by the Ministry, and may 
result in answers to questions such as why the claimant was taken into care, a formal 
apology for a failure in care from the Ministry, and a possibility of financial redress.  
While this might meet Dobson J’s demand for a government-controlled process 
leading to “an acknowledgement of wrong-doing by those with responsibility for 
having caused the wrong” there remains an important role for the courts in forcing 
acknowledgments of wrong-doing through “vindicatory” awards of damages. 
F The Limits of Vindicatory Damages 
The possibility of vindicatory damages in tort law should not be seen as a gratuitous 
top-up for occasions when the plaintiff feels compensatory damages are inadequate, 
or as a convenient award for when the plaintiff has suffered no loss.  They should 
only be awarded where there is an important underlying right or duty which needs to 
be protected, and where the normal measure of damages is inappropriate or 
inadequate.  This is consistent with the approach to NZBORA damages, as outlined 
by Tipping J in Taunoa:
48
  
… whether more than a declaration is required to vindicate the breach is to be 
assessed primarily on the basis of [the following] factors: (1) the nature of the right 
which has been breached; and (2) the circumstances and seriousness of the breach … 
(3) the seriousness of the consequences of the breach; (4) the response of the 
defendant to the breach; and (5) any relief awarded on a related cause of action.. 
In the child welfare cases the underlying duty is the obligation to protect children.  
The duties are found in statutes which provide public authorities with special powers 
to comply with them.  For example it is the duty of the Chief Executive of Child 
Youth and Family Services in New Zealand “to take such positive and prompt action 
and steps” as will “promote the well-being of children, young persons, and their 
families and family groups”. 49  The duties reflect the obligations of the community, 
whom the public authorities represent.50  When the consequence is neglect or child 
abuse the seriousness is obvious.  The normal tort measure of damages in these cases 
is inappropriate because the loss is impossible to quantify and largely dealt with by 
social welfare, even in countries that lack New Zealand’s statutory compensation 
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scheme.  However the importance of the underlying duty and the consequences of the 
breach make vindicatory damages to mark the wrong appropriate. 
Vindicatory damages will often be unnecessary.  In most tort actions, for example, 
compensatory damages, or other remedies such as injunctions, will be sufficient to 
vindicate the right.  Sometimes an action for damages in NZBORA will be available 
if the defendant is part of the Crown.
51
  However, plaintiffs in the child welfare cases 
may struggle to find a right in NZBORA to peg their claim to.  Unlike the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (UK), NZBORA lacks a right to family life and, unlike the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), the right not to be deprived of life in s 8 is 
negative.  This makes it difficult to infer a more positive right that the plaintiff’s 
health must be protected, as developed in other jurisdictions.52  One of the important 
roles of vindicatory damages in tort law is that they allow judges to use tort actions to 
protect rights which are not part of NZBORA. 
In chapter five other tort cases are discussed in which the award might be described as 
vindicating a particular right or duty.  For example, in the wrongful birth case Rees 
the plaintiff’s sterilisation was negligent and she conceived a child. 53  The House of 
Lords awarded a “conventional award” of £15,000 to recognise the breach of the 
plaintiff’s right to choose whether or not to have children.  In Chesterv Afshar the 
House of Lords adapted the causation test in order to vindicate the plaintiff’s right to 
consent to medical treatment, when her doctor had negligently failed to warn her of a 
small risk of surgery which eventuated.54   
The right to decide whether or not to have children and the right to consent to medical 
treatment are good examples of interests which the law should vindicate though 
damages.  Others, not discussed in this thesis, include the duty to look after elderly 
persons.  By analogy with the child welfare cases analysed in this thesis, it could well 
be argued that when a residential care facility abuses its elderly residents, vindicatory 
damages should be awarded.  Like children, elderly people are vulnerable, and their 
“damage” may be especially difficult to quantify.  For example, it might be hard to 
argue that their career prospects have been damaged by the abuse suffered (an 
argument common in the child welfare cases, as discussed in chapter three). 
The precise parameters of vindicatory damages would need to be worked out as where 
new cases come before the courts.  However, the child welfare cases are a 
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paradigmatic example where they would be appropriate.  The underlying duty to look 
after children is important, the loss is unsuitable for an application of the orthodox 
compensatory doctrines (this is explored more in chapter three) and the consequences 
of the breach are serious.  In addition, there may sometimes be useful information to 
be gained about how the abuse occurred (or how the government failed to prevent it) 
which might be obtained through litigation. 
G The Accident Compensation Bar 
Vindicatory damages would be of little use in New Zealand if they were barred under 
the accident compensation scheme; it is argued in this section that the bar should not 
apply to these damages.   
The accident compensation bar is unique to New Zealand: it prevents plaintiffs from 
bringing proceedings for personal injuries that are covered by the accident 
compensation scheme.55  This scheme, which came into force in 1974, created a 
statutory compensation regime which provides compensatory payments for personal 
injuries caused by accidents.  “Accident” has been broadly defined so that it includes 
intentional wrongs such as physical abuse.56 
Court proceedings for damages for personal injuries covered by the scheme are 
barred 57  with the important exception of exemplary damages. 58   Since 1992, 
psychiatric injuries which are not the consequence of a physical injury have not been 
covered unless the psychiatric illness is caused by certain specified criminal acts.59  
These include, significantly for child abuse cases, sexual abuse, and assault on a child, 
even where there is no criminal charge or conviction.
60
   
For historical abuse occurring before the scheme came into force, there are complex 
transitional provisions which may bring the victims into the scheme.  If the abuse 
happened before 1974 but the victim received treatment for the consequential mental 
injury after 1 July 1999 then cover is available and the action is statute-barred.61  
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Compensatory damages for breach of a right in NZBORA are barred by the accident 
compensation scheme, but where it is necessary to vindicate the right by additional 
damages, these non-compensatory damages are not barred.62  This raises the question 
whether similarly vindicatory tort awards should also be barred.  Since the courts 
have been prepared to split the vindicatory aspect of NZBORA damages from the 
compensatory element, it should be possible to do the same in tort.  So far, however, 
the tendency has been to view all actions involving personal injury as barred, even 
those such as battery which it is less controversial to describe as vindicatory. 
Like exemplary and NZBORA damages, vindicatory damages in tort law should not 
be caught by the accident compensation scheme.  While accident compensation is 
focused on compensating the victim’s loss, vindicatory damages are non-
compensatory and are intended to mark a wrong.  As with exemplary63  and the 
vindicatory aspect of NZBORA damages, a vindicatory remedy wold not be intended 
to compensate loss, which is achieved through the accident compensation scheme.  
Vindicatory damages in tort law would be intended to serve similar purposes to the 
public law orientated NZBORA and English ombudsman damages.   
The fact that vindicatory damages arise from the wrong, not the consequential loss, is 
arguably consistent with the way the accident compensation bar was applied in 
Sivasubramaniam v Yarrall.64  In this case Heath J held that it is possible to apportion 
the damages for mental injury caused by the physical injury and those caused by the 
accident itself.  While the distinction between the different injuries might seem 
arbitrary, the emphasis on the difference between the accident and the personal injury 
caused by the accident is useful.  The plaintiff was a passenger in a car accident in 
which her mother had also died.  She suffered physical injuries, and Heath J struck 
out the pleadings in relation to the plaintiff’s own injuries.  However, he refused to 
strike out any trauma caused by the accident which could be separated from the 
mental injury caused by the physical injuries.  The mental injury suffered as a 
secondary victim from watching her mother die was also severable. 
Heath J acknowledged that apportioning mental injury caused by the accident and 
mental injury caused by the physical injury arising from the accident was difficult.  
However, he concluded that dual causes were common in many areas of the law and 
that the courts could not avoid this problem.  It was consistent with the Court of 
Appeal decision Brownlie, in which the plaintiffs had been negligently diagnosed that 
they did not have cancer.  They found out that they may have been misdiagnosed, 
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which was confirmed by subsequent testing.  The Court held that any mental injury 
suffered in between finding out about the negligent diagnoses and the subsequent 
confirmation was not barred by the accident compensation scheme. 
The distinction between compensatory damages for physical injury caused by the 
wrong and compensatory damages for other consequences of the wrong is open to 
criticism.  It can lead to arbitrary distinctions between, for example, the trauma the 
plaintiffs in Brownlie suffered on finding out that they may have been negligently 
misdiagnosed, and the trauma suffered when they found out that they did have cancer.  
However, the distinction between damages arising from the wrong itself and damages 
arising from the consequences of the wrong is a useful one.  The difficulty with 
Brownlie and Yarrall is that a line is drawn between different consequences which all 
stem from the same wrong.  Vindicatory damages arise from the wrong itself, not the 
consequences, and should therefore not be barred by the accident compensation 
scheme, which focuses on the subsequent loss.   
The distinction between damages for consequence, which are barred, and damages for 
the wrong itself, is supported by the legislative changes since the accident 
compensation scheme was first enacted in 1972.  In the original legislation, 
proceedings were barred for “damages arising … out of the injury or death” for which 
the victim had cover under the Act. 65  This meant that all proceedings were barred, 
whether for the wrong (the “accident”) or the resulting loss.  However, in 1992 the 
scheme was restricted.  Cover for mental injuries not caused by a physical injury was 
excluded from the scheme (with the exception of psychiatric illness caused by certain 
criminal acts) and the statutory bar was changed:66 
No proceedings for damages arising directly or indirectly out of personal injury 
covered by this Act … that is suffered by any person shall be brought in any Court in 
New Zealand independently of this Act, whether by that person or any other person, 
and whether under any rule of law or any enactment. 
Therefore the bar now applies to the harm caused by the personal injury, not the 
accident itself.  Vindicatory damages should therefore not be barred by accident 
compensation because they arise from the accident, not the personal injury, applying 
the reasoning in Yarrall.  This accords with the different purposes of the accident 
compensation scheme and vindicatory damages.  The latter are intended to mark 
wrongs, not to compensate loss.  They enable tort law to fulfil its ombudsman role, 
and are analogous to NZBORA damages which are also not barred.  Accident 
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compensation, however, is squarely focused on compensation, and does not have a 
vindicatory role like tort law. 
H Summary 
Tort law has an important role as an ombudsman, revealing the facts which led to the 
plaintiff’s wrong through discovery, and marking the wrong through damages.  One 
way in which this role can be effected is through vindicatory damages, a separate, 
non-loss based award to mark wrongs rather than to compensate them.   
The wrong in the child welfare cases often reflects a public law aspect of tort law.  
The cases often concern government action, and damages would vindicate the 
underlying duty to protect children in the same way NZBORA damages mark the 
breach of the underlying NZBORA right.  The public law aspect of the damages 
award addresses the interest of the public in having the wrong vindicated. 
Vindicatory damages do not fit with the most common role of tort damages, which is 
compensatory.  However, tort law has purposes beyond compensation, and 
vindicatory damages enable it to achieve some of these non-compensatory purposes.  
Since accident compensation is restricted to remedying loss, the scheme should not 
bar vindicatory damages in tort law, in the same way that similar awards under 
NZBORA and in cases like Yarrall are not barred. 




III Overview of the Cases 
This chapter outlines the development of the child welfare cases in New Zealand, 
England and Canada in light of the vindicatory approach outlined in chapter two.  It is 
argued that the cases are ill-suited to the compensatory principle which has ruled them 
so far. 
There are, broadly, two types of cases analysed in this thesis.  In some, it is alleged 
that the public authority failed through its own negligence to protect the plaintiff from 
abuse.  This chapter includes an analysis of the leading cases in which the courts in 
New Zealand and England have recognised a duty of care in negligence to protect 
children.  The other main type of case discussed in this thesis concerns children who 
have been abused by the employees of public authorities, for example where the 
authority runs a child care facility.  The development of vicarious liability to fit these 
cases is analysed in chapter six, and the leading cases in this area do not feature in this 
chapter.
1
  However, some of the cases discussed below, particularly the Canadian 
decisions, fall into this vicarious liability category.  They are discussed because they 
raise issues to do with the way the loss is analysed by the judges. 
A Overview of New Zealand Cases  
The child abuse cases in New Zealand fall naturally into three groups.  First, Prince2 
and B v Attorney-General,
3
 both strike out actions, established a duty of care to 
protect children at risk of harm where the relevant government department had 
received a complaint concerning the child.  Secondly, a group of cases were litigated 
at trial between 2005 and 2010.  These cases all failed, for a number of reasons but 
chiefly because of limitation period problems.  Finally, New Zealand’s Legal Services 
Agency has refused legal aid in response to these unsuccessful cases, in decisions 
which have been largely upheld in appeal to the Review Panel and the High Court.  
1 The duty of care 
In Prince, the New Zealand Court of Appeal refused to strike out a claim that the 
Department of Social Welfare had negligently failed to investigate a complaint they 
received that the plaintiff was not being looked after properly by his adoptive 
parents.
4
  At the time the case was brought the Department of Social Welfare was 
responsible for the provision of child welfare; responsibility is now with Child Youth 
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and Family Services, which is part of the Ministry of Social Development.  The focus 
of the Court’s decision in Prince was on whether there could be a duty of care.  There 
was no pre-existing relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, as there usually 
is in the arguably more classic child abuse cases analysed elsewhere in this thesis, 
where the plaintiff sues a child care facility in which he or she was abused. 
In B v Attorney-General, two girls were removed from their widower father when 
accusations were made that he was abusing them.5   This was in some ways the 
opposite of a child abuse case: the complaint was that the defendant had negligently 
failed to return the children to their father when there was no danger of abuse.  Both 
the children and the father sued, alleging that the defendant owed them a duty in the 
way the investigation was conducted after the children were removed.  The Court of 
Appeal held that the Prince duty only extended to the decision whether or not to 
investigate, not the way in which the investigation was conducted. 6   The Privy 
Council disagreed with the Court on this point, although it upheld the Court’s 
decision that no duty could be owed to the father because it would create a conflict of 
duties not to harm the father’s and the children’s best interests.7   
In both Prince and B v Attorney-General the focus was on the duty of care, and the 
problems of establishing a remedy are only hinted at.  In Prince the majority 
conceded that causation would raise “obvious difficulties” at trial,8 while Henry J in 
the minority would have struck out the alleged duty of care because, among other 
reasons, “the problems of linking the damage claimed to any breach of duty must be 
substantial, if not in many cases overwhelming”.
9
  Apart from causation, it may have 
been difficult to establish the necessary kind of injury in negligence.  It is difficult not 
to sympathise with the children in B, who through the alleged negligence of the 
defendant were delayed from being reunited with their father.  The threshold for non-
physical personal injuries is high, however: the children may have needed to establish 
at trial that they had suffered a recognised psychiatric injury, as opposed to “mere 
distress”.10 
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2 The cases at trial 
Prince and B v Attorney-General were both strike out actions: the Courts did not need 
to deal with potential problems concerning damages.  Between 2005 and 2010, four 
cases raising similar issues reached trial in the High Court of New Zealand, two of 
which continued on to the Court of Appeal.   
In 2006 Frater J delivered the High Court decision in A, in which the plaintiff sued the 
Catholic Social Services for the way she had been treated during her years at St 
Joseph’s Orphanage and School, and then later at St Mary’s College as a border.11  
Some of the pleadings failed because of accident compensation issues.  However, the 
plaintiff was unable to establish the alleged facts, except for some abuse perpetrated 
by foster parents for whom Catholic Social Services was not vicariously liable, and 
the use of force by the teachers, which fell within the standards of corporal 
punishment which were accepted at the time.  Both Frater J at first instance and 
William Young P who delivered the judgment of the Court of Appeal observed that 
the plaintiff’s complaint concerned the quality of parenting which the orphanage and 
boarding school had offered.  However, all the judges held that the defendants owed 
no duty “to maximise (or enhance) the emotional well-being” of the children within 
their care.12  The vindicatory approach in this thesis should not change the result in 
this case.  Although what is arguably a private defendant like the Catholic Social 
Services has an important duty to protect those children in its care which could be 
appropriately vindicated through tort damages, that duty was not breached in A.   
In the White case, the two plaintiffs were brothers, part of a large family whose father 
was abusive.13  Among other things he beat the children for getting caught when 
stealing on his instructions.  The Department of Social Welfare knew about the family 
and monitored them, eventually obtaining court-ordered supervision over the boys.  
The Crown accepted that the Child Welfare Branch was under a duty of care.  In the 
High Court Miller J held that this “duty to inquire” was breached during a three year 
period when the social worker in charge of the boys’ file failed to speak alone to 
them, several years later when staff at the institution where the boys were placed 
encouraged bullying and also when the staff held one of the boys, Paul, in secure 
detention for three days on his arrival.   
                                                                                                                                                              
NZLR 179 (CA), but possibly not to primary victims, see J v Crown Health Financing Agency HC 
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12 A v Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Wellington [2008] NZCA 49, [2008] 3 NZLR 289, at [118], see 
also the High Court decision, ibid, at [550]. 
13 White v Attorney-General HC Wellington CIV-1999-485-85, CIV-2001-485-864, 28 November 
2008; White v Attorney-General [2010] NZCA 139.  Leave to appeal was refused by the Supreme 
Court: W v Attorney-General [2010] NZSC 69, (2010) 19 PRNZ 921. 




Since the children were left in the care of their parents by the Child Welfare Branch 
while under supervision, the plaintiffs also pleaded vicarious liability for the 
intentional torts of their biological parents.  However, Miller J refused to extend 
vicarious liability that far, although the defendants unsurprisingly accepted vicarious 
liability for the torts of its employees at the residential institutions, where one of the 
boys was sexually assaulted.   
All the claims were subject however to a limitation defence, which the judge upheld.  
The limitation problems are beyond the scope of this thesis, (which is focused on 
damages issues) but they have been a significant feature of the child abuse cases.  For 
cases after 2011, they are dealt with under the Limitation Act 2010, but for earlier 
cases the Limitation Act 1950 still applies.  There are two main exceptions to the 
limitation period: where there is a relevant disability, and where the injury was not 
“reasonably discoverable”.   
The reasonable discoverability doctrine was first applied to building cases, in which 
latent damages to buildings had not been discovered until years afterwards.  The 
doctrine was based on the provision of the 1950 Act that limitation periods began 
when the cause of action “accrued”, together with the rule that damage is the “gist” of 
the action in negligence.14  Therefore until damage was reasonably discoverable, it 
could not be said that a cause of action in negligence had accrued, because there had 
not been any damage yet.  This doctrine was extended to victims of sexual abuse,15 
but not to victims of other, non-sexual abuse.16  While this doctrine may be open to a 
number of criticisms
17
 that is not the purpose of this thesis.  Instead, the focus is on 
some of the other problems which plaintiffs may come up against in these cases, 
which have often been overshadowed by the limitation defence. 
For some of the claims in White, such as the sexual abuse, the accident compensation 
bar also prevented the action.  Counsel tried to avoid this bar in three ways, none of 
which succeeded: by arguing that detaining Paul was false imprisonment, that the 
abuse was a gradual process disease (which is not barred by accident compensation), 
and that there was no mental illness as required by the Accident Compensation Act.  
Miller J observed of this last defence that if there was no mental illness, there was 
also no action in negligence:18 
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… the claims for damages require that the plaintiffs prove both that they 
suffered injury at the relevant times and that it caused the mental injuries that 
they complain of.  In other words, this point does not take Ms Cooper any 
further, since the affirmative defence presumes that the plaintiffs have 
otherwise made out their case. 
This argument underlines an important aspect of child abuse cases in New Zealand: if 
child abuse victims are able to establish the type of personal injury which is 
actionable in negligence, it will usually be barred by accident compensation.  This 
makes vindicatory damages, which would not be barred, crucial, because they enable 
tort law to fulfil its role in vindicating plaintiffs against the government despite the 
accident compensation bar. 
The defendants in White also argued that there was no causation: 19    
… that the plaintiffs cannot show that their unhappy lives are attributable to anything 
the Superintendent or his agents did.  [Instead, they were] attributable to genetic 
predisposition or early parental neglect or abandonment. 
This point was not addressed by the Miller J, although he observed of one of the 
plaintiffs, Earl, that he “impressed as a likeable young man whose appalling past had 
hampered his ability to achieve his potential.”20  This causation problem has become 
important in other jurisdictions in which these cases have been able to get over the 
limitation hurdle.  However, whether or not the Crown believed that the plaintiff’s 
unhappy lives were attributable to the actions of its employees, it must have felt some 
responsibility, as it made ex gratia payments to both plaintiffs as well as contributions 
to the legal aid costs.21  Subject to the limitation rules, these payments may well be 
legally justified on the basis of the vindicatory approach advanced in this thesis. 
In Knight the plaintiff alleged that he had been abused by the nurses at a state 
psychiatric hospital.22  The alleged abuse occurred when he was an adult, although the 
plaintiff had suffered earlier abuse as a child at Marylands School, for which the 
Order of St John of God who ran the school made a payment of $65,000 voluntarily in 
2003, together with an apology.  The action against the Crown23 failed on the facts, 
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although Gendall J also held obiter that the positive defences based on the Limitation 
Act and the accident compensation bar would succeed.  The loss alleged was: 24   
… post-traumatic stress disorder with significant behavioural and psychological 
dysfunction, and personality disturbance .  This is characterised by a history of sexual 
and other offending; alcohol abuse; and inability to relate to others and to live alone; 
and a dependence on welfare agencies … 
Alcohol abuse and difficulty in relating to others is sadly part of a familiar pattern in 
abuse cases.  As discussed below, this had led to difficulties in Canada in establishing 
causation.   
In 2009 Gendall J delivered another decision, J, in which the plaintiff alleged that she 
had been abused during a six year period beginning when she was 18, when she was 
admitted into Poirua psychiatric hospital.
25
  Gendall J found for the defendant for two 
reasons: the plaintiff was unable to establish most of the alleged facts, and the 
limitation defence succeeded.  However, there was a further problem which is of 
interest in this thesis: Gendall J found that the plaintiff had suffered some “unjustified 
use of force” in breach of the defendant’s duty of care, but that there was no 
recognised psychiatric injury such as post-traumatic stress disorder.
26
  This was 
problematic because, as discussed by Henaghan in relation to Prince, in negligence 
there must be damage before liability can be imposed, and the damage must fit within 
one of the recognised heads of damage.
27
  As Gendall J observed, there are limits on 
the type of damage recognised when the injury is mental illness:28 
It is generally recognised that there is a need to show some recognisable psychiatric 
injury before the necessary elements involved in the cause of action for negligence 
exist.  Grief, distress or being upset, do not give rise to any cause of action. 
However, Gendall J decided that despite the lack of a recognised psychiatric injury, 
he could and would have awarded damages for breach of the duty of care if the 
Limitation Act had not applied:
29
 
I accept that if the plaintiff’s time (whilst subject to detention) was made more 
painful or stressful than it should have been, by reason of an actionable breach of 
duty on the part of the defendant, then some remedy ought to be available.  To use 
historical terms, it would be for “pain, suffering and loss of enjoyment of life” 
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experienced then.  In negligence, it would have been reasonably foreseeable that a 
patient witnessing an assault upon another patient, would suffer distress. 
The difficulty with this approach is that it is inconsistent with a line of case law which 
establishes that “distress” is not actionable without an injury to peg it to.30  Such an 
award could be based on the approach in this thesis, however, that damages could be 
awarded for the wrong instead of attempting to compensate the loss. 
3 Legal Services Agency litigation 
In reaction to the failure of the cases at trial, the Legal Services Agency, which had 
funded all of the claims, withdrew aid in most cases.  This produced a third band of 
High Court cases, W, LAE and JMM, in which plaintiffs appealed the decisions of the 
Agency to withdraw aid.31  While the judges were critical of the unreasoned decisions 
of the Agency, the plaintiffs met with mixed success.  The main problem continued to 
be related to the limitation period, but there were important dicta about causation 
which highlighted the difficulty the compensatory principle creates in these cases.  
JMM is a good example of this. 
In JMM seven appeals were brought together in the High Court, against the Review 
Panel’s decisions supporting the Agency’s withdrawal or denial of aid from the 
plaintiffs.  Dobson J considered whether the Agency had given adequate reasons in 
support of its decision that a reasonable self-funded litigant would not continue the 
proceedings chiefly because of difficulties in establishing one of the exceptions to the 
limitation period.
32
  Although he allowed some of the appeals, the tone of his 
judgment does not augur well for the future success of the plaintiffs.  His main 
criticism of the defendants related to the lack of detail in the reasons they gave in 
support of their decisions, although he conceded that “all those responsible for 
progressing this potentially overwhelming volume of historic abuse claims … have 
indeed been overwhelmed by the sheer scale of their task.”
33
 
While the focus of the decision was on the psychiatric evidence relating to the 
limitation problem and how this had (or had not) influenced the Agency’s decision to 
withdraw aid, there are hints of an important causation problem that is likely to hinder 
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any action even if the plaintiff reaches trial.  In the first appeal considered by the 
judge, the plaintiff JMM alleged that:34 
The adverse effects of physical and psychological abuse were cited as her addiction 
to drugs, having spent time living on the streets, working as a prostitute and having 
difficulty trusting people and organisations.  She was also described as having low 
self-esteem and claustrophobia.  The Agency argued that there had been no diagnosis 
of any illness at all. 
The last sentence is significant.  It suggests that there was no injury at all which 
would satisfy a negligence claim.  Even if there had been, there were, as the Agency 
pointed out, “substantial difficulties in linking for causation purposes the subsequent 
harm complained of to the earlier abuse of which she complained.”35  This was in part 
because prior to leaving the family home, her alcoholic father had abused her, and the 
courts would need to decide whether the prior abuse had caused the “loss” (if there 
was any), and perhaps would need to apportion it. 
Most of the other appeals also raised causation problems, although they were not fully 
discussed, as the focus was on how the limitation problem affected the prospects of 
success for the purpose of deciding whether to offer legal aid.  The plaintiff GLS had 
obtained an expert opinion by a psychiatrist which “at its highest … had suggested 
that there had been ‘some causality’ between DSW abuse and his ‘adult personality 
functioning and current difficulties.’”36   
For the plaintiff MSB the Agency’s decision included an analysis of the causation 
problems, concluding that “the issue of causation would be too difficult to overcome, 
even if a ‘contribution’ test was applied.  Accordingly, legal aid was withdrawn on 
that ground as well.”  Dobson J focused on the Agency’s reliance on the limitation 
period rather than the causation problem as the main ground for denying aid, and 
refused to overturn the Review Panel’s decision for that reason alone.  However, he 
held that the conclusion on the causation aspect of the case was open to the Agency, 
and it is arguable that the appeal could have been decided on that ground alone.37 
B The English Cases 
In Canada and England there is no comprehensive accident compensation scheme so 
there might arguably be an additional incentive to make resource-rich defendants 
liable for the plaintiff’s loss, which will otherwise go uncompensated.  However, the 
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judges in these jurisdictions have struggled to conceptualise the loss, and it is 
sometimes necessary to deduct social assistance payments, suggesting that the loss 
claimed is being dealt with more appropriately by social welfare even where there is 
no accident compensation. 
1 X v Bedfordshire 
The starting point in the English child abuse cases is the House of Lords decision in X 
v Bedfordshire, although it has been heavily qualified in subsequent cases, as 
discussed below.38  There were five cases consolidated in the appeal, two of which 
concerned child abuse.  In X v Bedfordshire the facts were analogous to Prince: five 
children were badly neglected by their parents.  The childcare authorities received 
complaints from a neighbour, a grandmother, the police, a GP and a head teacher, and 
arranged meetings over four years and eight months while doing little beyond 
occasionally taking the children into temporary care to give the parents a break.  M v 
Newham was analogous to the later New Zealand case B v Attorney-General 
discussed above: it was alleged that the plaintiff was negligently separated from her 
mother on the false assumption that her mother’s partner had abused her.  
The House of Lords struck out the two child abuse cases, which alleged that the child 
welfare authorities (in England these are controlled by the local councils) owed a duty 
of care to children whom they believed were in danger of being abused.  In other 
words the Prince duty did not succeed in England.  Later, however, the House of 
Lords allowed a somewhat similar claim in Barrett where the plaintiff was a child 
who had been taken into care.
 39
  The facts were distinguished from X because they 
involved a child who had already been taken into care.40 
X v Bedfordshire was appealed to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Z 
v United Kingdom.
41
  The United Kingdom accepted in its submissions that there was 
a violation of arts 3 42  and 8 43  of the European Convention on Human Rights 
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of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others.  






 respectively the right not to be subjected to inhuman treatment and the 
right to family life.   The ECtHR held consistently with its own case law that art 3 
together with art 145 imposed a positive obligation on states to protect its citizens from 
inhuman treatment.  This was seen as especially important where vulnerable children 
were involved.   
The United Kingdom had accepted in its submissions that there were breaches of arts 
3 and 8, possibly because the European Commission of Human Rights (at the time the 
appeal court immediately beneath the ECtHR) had accepted that there was a breach of 
art 6, the right of access to the courts.  This was based on an earlier case, Osman, in 
which the ECtHR had found that striking out a cause of action was a breach of art 6.46  
In Z, the United Kingdom convinced the ECtHR that this was based on an 
“understanding of the law of negligence which has to be reviewed in the light of the 
clarifications subsequently made by the domestic courts and notably the House of 
Lords.”
47
   
Conceding the breaches of rights to family life and protection against inhuman 
treatment may therefore have been a tactical move: possibly the ability to strike out 
actions was considered more important.  However, this had important implications for 
the development of a common law duty of care in England.  The finding in Z that the 
House of Lords’ decision to strike out the pleadings in X breached rights in the ECHR 
led the English Court of Appeal to recognise a duty of care in East Berkshire, similar 
to the duty in Prince.48  This is discussed below after an analysis of the ECtHR’s 
award in Z.   
2 The European Court of Human Rights’ decision on damages 
In Z, the ECtHR awarded pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages to the plaintiffs for 
violations of arts 3, 8 and 13.  The facts had not been proven at trial, as the case was 
an appeal from a strike out action.  The Court’s reasoning in calculating damages was 
somewhat artificial, but this is not merely a reflection of the lack of evidence at trial.  
It is part of a pattern, seen clearly in the Canadian cases discussed below, in which 
courts resort to large round figures in an attempt to guess the loss which the plaintiffs 
have suffered, sometimes deducting from these figures social assistance benefits.  The 
compensatory principle does not work well in these cases. 
                                                        
44 European Convention on Human Rights (opened for signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 
3 September 1974). 
45 The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention. 
46 Osman v United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 245 (ECtHR). 
47 Z, above n 41, at 138. 
48 D v East Berkshire Community NHS Trust [2003] EWCA Civ 1151, [2004] QB 558.  




For pecuniary damages in Z, the ECtHR accepted submissions from the applicants 
that they had had their earning capacity impaired.49  One of the children, A, was 
awarded £50,000 for lost earnings as well as another £50,000 for future medical costs.  
The lack of reasoning in the judgment for the particular figure, and the large round 
identical figures for both kinds of loss suggest a considerable amount of guesswork.  
The medical costs award was identical to the applicant’s suggested minimum.  The 
difficulty of coming to a reasoned lost earnings figure is demonstrated by the 
applicant’s argument, which the ECtHR described as follows:50 
Assuming that he might otherwise have been able to obtain low-paid manual 
employment earning £15,000 per year and a normal working life to age 65, and 
taking into account uncertainties and accelerated receipt, he claimed £150,000 in loss 
of future earnings. 
While the plaintiff’s maths can be criticised as rather artificial, the ECtHR failed to 
explain why it chose the figure £50,000 rather than £150,000, leaving the feeling that 
it was somehow pulled out of the air.  The United Kingdom suggested £40,000 as an 
appropriate figure for both medical costs and lost earnings.  The final award is just 
under an average of the defendant’s and applicant’s figures.   
For non-pecuniary damages (pain and suffering), the Court awarded £32,000 to each 
plaintiff. 51  This is just under the average of £36,250 that the applicants pleaded, but 
just above the average of £25,000 the UK suggested as appropriate.  The two figures 
average out at £30,625.   
While calculating loss in such cases is always difficult, the choice of awards so close 
to an average of the applicants’ and defendant’s suggestions, which are very far apart 
to start with, is not compelling.  It suggests that the awards are not based on a 
calculation of the loss suffered at all, and are therefore inconsistent with the 
compensatory principle.  They cannot be described as redistributing loss or as 
“correcting” an injustice caused by loss flowing from the defendant’s violation of the 
plaintiffs’ rights (applying the distributive and corrective justice theories of tort law 
that were described in the last chapter).  This emphasises the need for an alternative 
theory based on vindicating the defendant’s duty to protect the plaintiff, without 
resorting to a fiction that the award is somehow compensatory. 
                                                        
49 Z, above n 41, at 102-103. 
50 Ibid, at 143. 
51 Ibid, at 130. 




3 The English development of the duty of care after Z 
In East Berkshire the English Court of Appeal concluded that the rule in X v 
Bedfordshire had been overtaken by Z.  The Court held that the fact that the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (UK) did not cover ECHR breaches before October 2000 meant that 
liability must be imposed at common law:52 
In the context of suspected child abuse, breach of a duty of care in negligence will 
frequently also amount to a violation of article 2 or article 8.  The difference, of 
course, is that those asserting that wrongful acts or omissions occurred before 
October 2000 will have no claim under the Human Rights Act … the absence of an 
alternative remedy for children who were victims of abuse before October 2000 
militates in favour of the recognition of a common law duty of care once the public 
policy reasons against this have lost their force. 
English common law is therefore now consistent with New Zealand’s and the duty of 
care which was recognised in Prince and extended in B. 
The difficulty of the compensatory principle as applied to the duty of care in Prince 
and East Berkshire manifested itself in Pierre v Doncaster Metropolitan Borough 
Council.
53
  The plaintiff established at trial that the defendant council had breached its 
duty to him when it had returned him to his parents after their neglect had led the 
council to take him to hospital.  His father had been abusive and he suffered mental 
health problems as an adult including emotional unstable personality disorder, 
agoraphobia and anxiety.  However, the judge held that these problems were 
congenital, and would have occurred without the defendant’s negligence and the 
parent’s abuse.  Therefore, the plaintiff was awarded damages for the abuse as a child 
(£25,000) but not for any effects as an adult. 
In B v London Borough of Ealing, discussed in the previous chapter, the plaintiff 
alleged that the local authority had failed to protect her from her father’s abuse.54  
However, the proceedings against the authority were stayed while the judge decided 
the quantum awarded against the second defendant, the father.  The judge awarded 
past loss of earnings of £11,000, £22,000 for future lost earnings, medical expenses 
for therapy of £2,800 (including travel) and £1,072 as the proportion of the cost of the 
excess alcohol the plaintiff had drunk as a result of the abuse.  The judge also 
awarded damages for pain and suffering, based on the following reasoning:55 
                                                        
52 East Berkshire, above n 48, at [83].  Some of the plaintiffs in East Berkshire were parents, and they 
appealed to the House of Lords: D v East Berkshire Community Health [2005] UKHL 23, [2005] 2 
AC373.  This decision does not affect the Court of Appeal finding on the duty of care to children. 
53 Pierre v Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council [2007] EWHC 2968 (QB). 
54 B v London Borough of Ealing [2008] EWHC 1262 (QB). 
55 Ibid, at [17]. 




To my mind, given the clear evidence of much more frequent abuse [than in Pierre] 
coupled with the evidence of recognisable psychiatric disorders, but at the same time 
guarding against what is sometimes referred to as ‘double recovery’ or ‘overlap’ and 
allowing for [the psychiatrist’s] view that there are a number of factors relevant to the 
claimant’s psychological symptoms and that it is difficult to be certain as to 
causation, and recalling what he says … that there appears to be a family history of 
anxiety-related difficulties in both father and siblings, taking all those matters into 
account I award a sum of £33,500. 
This brought the total to £50,372, roughly twice the award in Pierre. This partly 
reflected the judge’s opinion that abuse in B was worse than in the earlier case, 
however, the difference in award was largely due to the judge’s finding that the abuse 
was a cause of the psychological illness, which led to lost earnings and medical 
expenses.   
C Canadian Cases 
The Canadian Supreme Court has been faced with a string of cases which have tested 
the limits of the compensatory principle. 56  The Canadian cases have been usually 
been dealt with as vicarious liability for intentional torts, rather than negligence, but 
plaintiffs have continued to frame the damage under the traditional heads of loss, 
including lost earnings, as in Z.  The cases are discussed in relation to the different 
damages issues which have arisen, rather than chronologically as with the New 
Zealand and English cases. 
1 Causation and apportionment 
One difficulty in causation focused liability has been apportionment.   This is the rule 
that where damage is divisible, the defendant is liable only for that part which he or 
she caused.57  It is an extension of the “but for” test: “but for” the wrong, which part 
or how much of the damage would the plaintiff have suffered?  The application of the 
test may depend on whether the judge decides the damage is divisible.  In EDG the 
child was abused by a school janitor, and was subsequently abused by a number of 
family members.58  In Blackwater, the child had suffered abuse prior to the abuse 
which he suffered at school after being removed from his aboriginal community.59  
                                                        
56 There is an excellent summary of the Canadian Supreme Court decisions in Sheila McIntyre 
“Guardians of Privilege: The Resistance of the Supreme Court of Canada to Institutional Liability for 
Child Sexual Abuse” in Sanda Rodgers, Rakhi Ruparelia and Louise Bélanger-Hardy (eds) Critical 
Torts (LexisNexis, Markham, 2009). 
57 Wilson & Horton Ltd v Attorney-General [1997] 2 NZLR 513 (CA). 
58 EDG v Hammer 2003 SCC 52, [2003] 2 SCR 459.  
59 Blackwater v Plint 2005 SCC 58, [2005] 3 SCR 3. 




The Supreme Court reached different conclusions in each case when deciding whether 
to apportion the loss. 
In EDG the Court held that neither vicarious nor any other heads of liability were 
established.  However, it went on to consider the apportionment problem.  The 
Supreme Court applied the rule that a defendant is not excused from liability merely 
because there were other causal factors: “This principle is not confined to cases 
involving non-tortious preconditions.  It applies to any case in which the injuries 
caused by a number of factors are indivisible.”60  The trial judge’s finding that 90% of 
the damage was indivisible was a finding of fact and could not be overturned on 
appeal.61 
In Blackwater, however, the Court decided that it had to apportion the loss: 62 
Untangling the different sources of damage and loss may be nigh impossible. Yet the 
law requires that it be done, since at law a plaintiff is entitled only to be compensated 
for loss caused by the actionable wrong.  
The Court explicitly focused on tort’s role in shifting loss: “the law requires specific 
wrongful acts causally connected to damage suffered.” 63   
The Supreme Court discussed the “thin skull” rule: the defendant takes the victim as 
found.  Therefore the Court may take the prior trauma into account in deciding “the 
effect of the sexual assault on him, in his already damaged condition”.
64
  However, 
the Court must identify the damage caused by the sexual assault, not the prior trauma, 
although the trauma may have exacerbated the damage caused by the assault.  This is 
consistent with the rule that “the defendant need not put the plaintiff in a better 
position than his original position”.65  Intriguingly the Supreme Court did observe that 
“all these sources of trauma fused with subsequent experiences to create the problems 
that have beset [the plaintiff] all his life.”  Although untangling the causes was 
difficult, the law required it because “a plaintiff is entitled only to be compensated for 
loss caused by the actionable wrong.”
66
  In other words it is the focus on causation 
that forces the courts to do what “may be nigh impossible.”67   
                                                        
60 EDG, above n 58, at [31]. 
61 Ibid, at [33]. 
62 Blackwater, above n 59, at para [74], emphasis in original. 
63 Ibid, at [9]. 
64 Ibid, at [79]. 
65 Ibid, at [78]. 
66 Ibid, at [74], emphasis in original. 
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2 Future earnings 
To compensate the difficulty of holding down a job in the future as a result of the 
trauma caused by the abuse, the Supreme Court in Blackwater awarded damages for 
the loss of future earnings.  However, since there was no evidentiary record on which 
future loss of earnings could be based, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of 
Appeal that a “conventional sum” was appropriate.
68
  The “conventional sum” 
emphasises the impossibility of quantifying the loss claimed: the damages seem 
intended as a marker that the plaintiff has suffered a wrong which has compromised 
his ability to sustain employment, rather than as compensation to put him in the 
position he would have been without the wrong. 
The Supreme Court was presented with another difficult causation problem in HL.69  
In this case, the victim had suffered sexual abuse as a child, which the trial judge 
accepted led to alcohol abuse which caused him employment problems.  The main 
issue in the case was the burden of proof, whether the Saskatchewen Court of 
Appeal’s powers extended to appeal by rehearing, or merely where there was a 
palpable and overriding error (the answer depended on analysis of the controlling 
statute
70
).   
What is important for this thesis is the difficulty in determining the chain of causation, 
which split the thirteen judges who dealt with the case.  The trial judge found 
causation established and awarded damages for lost earnings, and five of the Supreme 
Court judges found that this was a question of fact which they could not overturn.  
However, the Court of Appeal judges lowered the standard of appeal to find that there 
was no causation, and four of the Supreme Court judges in dissent found that even on 
the higher standard of palpable error they would have been able to overturn the trial 
judge’s decision because there was no causation.  The difficulty of determining 
causation is revealed in the following summary of the testimony of the defence’s 
expert witness:71 
Asked whether HL would have become an alcoholic in any event, Dr Arnold stated: 
“He may have had vulnerability, but except for the exposure to the sexual abuse, may 
not have developed a substance abuse problem.  So I have to be careful when I say 
that, the risk is there, but except for that triggering event it may not have occurred.  
We don’t know. 
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69 HL v Canada (Attorney General) 2005 SCC 25, [2005] 1 SCR 401. 
70 The Court of Appeal Act SS 2000 c  C-42.1. 
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Although the alcohol abuse may also have contributed to the behaviour which led to 
the plaintiff’s time in prison, the Supreme Court unanimously held that he was not 
able to obtain damages for the foregone earnings during his time spent incarcerated, 
because that was attributed to his crimes, not to his drinking.  Like the MB case 
discussed below, social assistance benefits were subtracted from the damages.   
3 Collateral benefits 
In MB the Supreme Court was faced with the issue whether to deduct any “collateral 
benefits” received through social welfare from the “loss” suffered.72  The collateral 
benefits rule reduces damages by the amount of any benefit the plaintiff receives as a 
result of the wrong.73  There are various exceptions, including charitable benefits, 
which are exempted to avoid disincentivising charitable benevolence.    
MB concerned a child abuse victim, to whom the trial judge had awarded loss of 
income damages, less the amount she received under a state social insurance payment 
scheme.  The Supreme Court by a majority held that the Crown was not vicariously 
liable for the foster-parents’ abuse, but McLachlin CJ, delivering the judgment on this 
issue for a unanimous court, would have upheld the trial judge’s award rejecting the 
argument that the payments were consistent with the purposes of the charitable 
benefits exception.74  The Chief Justice observed that “it seems unfair to taxpayers to 
allow certain plaintiffs to recover from these funds and then receive a duplicative 
payment from a tort award.”75   
The way the different courts in MB calculated the loss has a similar sense of 
arbitrariness to the ECtHR’s decision in Z, discussed above.  The trial judge awarded 
$172,726.04 including damages for past opportunity to earn income of $10,000, 
which was calculated by deducting social welfare benefits from a gross amount of 
$132,000.  The Court of Appeal held that social assistance benefits should not be 
deducted, but confusingly substituted a rather different figure of $50,000 for past loss 
of opportunity to earn income. 76 
D Summary 
The child welfare cases are beset with difficulties under the traditional loss-based 
approach in tort law.  This approach can be criticised on a number of fronts.  First, the 
courts are unable to quantify the loss even approximately and have to resort to 
                                                        
72 MB v British Columbia 2003 SCC 53, [2003] 2 SCR 477. 
73 The leading New Zealand case is Horsburg v NZ Meat Processors Industrial Union of Workers 
[1988] 1 NZLR 698 (CA).   
74 MB, above n 72, at [30], emphasis in original. 
75 Ibid, at [33]. 
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guesswork.  Secondly, establishing causation is very difficult (as demonstrated by the 
apportionment cases).  Thirdly, this type of loss is usually barred in New Zealand 
because of the accident compensation scheme and even in Canada social assistance 
payments must be subtracted from the lost earnings damages.   
The better approach is to award damages for the wrong, rather than for the consequent 
loss.  This is best described as vindicating the community duty to look after children, 
and the failure by the public authorities as representatives of the community to 
comply with this duty. 
 




IV Applying NZBORA Reasoning in Tort Law 
Much of the support for the vindicatory approach advanced in chapter two is from 
cases concerned with damages for breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
(NZBORA), also called Baigent damages.1  In this chapter the difficulties of applying 
the reasoning in the NZBORA cases in tort law are analysed.  The chapter argues that 
although a great deal of tort law is obviously “private”, much of tort law protects the 
same kind of “public law” issues as NZBORA cases.  Therefore it is logically difficult 
to resist applying similar reasoning across both tort law and NZBORA cases. 
Leading torts scholars Beever and Lord Hoffmann have both drawn sharp a line 
between public and private law, placing tort law on one side and judicial review on 
the other.
2
  They see this line as an important factor in the development of tort law.  
For example, in chapter two, Beever’s argument that it was the private nature of tort 
law that makes exemplary damages inappropriate was analysed.3  This thesis asserts 
that this “private” conception of tort law is wrong, and that the child welfare cases 
against public authorities lie on the “public” side of the line.  In this chapter one 
aspect of this public-private divide is analysed: the approach which distinguishes 
between tort and NZBORA damages by categorising the former as private and the 
latter as public.  This chapter critiques this approach, arguing that it is not possible to 
distinguish Baigent damages from tort remedies by labelling the former “public law”, 
because part of the common law’s public law has always been within tort law.   
The main reason for attacking the private-public barrier between NZBORA and tort 
damages is that once it is removed the case for applying the NZBORA development 
of a vindicatory remedy in tort law becomes more compelling.  However, this has 
another important consequence for the way the accident compensation bar is applied.  
If damages for breach of NZBORA are not barred by accident compensation because 
they are vindicatory, neither should the vindicatory aspect of tort damages be barred.  
Just as the compensatory and vindicatory parts of NZBORA damages must now be 
separated since Wilding,4 the vindicatory aspect of a tort damages award can also 
arguably be isolated and protected from the accident compensation bar.  
                                                        
1 After the case in which they were first developed: Simpson v Attorney-General [1994] 3 NZLR 667 
(CA) [Baigent's Case], discussed below at text to footnote 16.   
2 For an example of Beever’s approach, see Allan Beever “The Structure of Aggravated and Exemplary 
Damages” (2003) 23 OJLS 87, discussed in chapter two, text to footnote 16.  For Lord Hoffmann’s 
approach see Lord Hoffmann “Reforming the Law of Public Authority Negligence” (2009) The Bar 
Council <www.barcouncil.org.uk>, at [15]; and also Carol Harlow State Liability: Tort Law and 
Beyond (Oxford University Press, 2004, Oxford) at 32-33 for a discussion of Lord Hoffmann’s 
approach to the public and private law divide.   
3 Beever, ibid. Discussed in chapter two, at text to footnote 16. 
4 Wilding v Attorney-General [2003] 3 NZLR 787 (CA), discussed in chapter two at text to footnote 26. 




A The Line between “Public” and “Private” Law 
The image of a clear line between public and private law is a useful metaphor for 
expressing an idea that there are different policies triggered by actions between 
individuals as compared to those between the state and the individual. 5   This 
difference is important, but an over-emphasis of the line between public and private 
law is apt to mislead.  In particular, it is often not possible in the common law to map 
out different causes of action in different areas on a chart, marked “private” or 
“public”.6  While some causes of action, such as judicial review or perhaps contract, 
may fit the public or private category with relative ease, others, such as tort law or 
breach of fiduciary duty (which can be used in some jurisdictions to enforce 
indigenous rights7) are less easily pinned down.  Unfortunately, tort law is sometimes 
assumed to be private law, compared to “public law” NZBORA damages.  The 
difference becomes important in the child welfare cases, where there is no obvious 
provision in NZBORA upon which to peg an action.
8
  Being able to bring an action in 
NZBORA has two important consequences: damages are explicitly “vindicatory”, and 
such an award is not subject to the accident compensation bar.  When the sharp 
division between public and private is, at least partly, dismantled, these consequences 
can more easily be applied to tort law. 
B The Debate in England 
The close relationship between tort damages and awards for breaches of human rights 
statutes and the potential for cross-fertilisation are highlighted by a debate in England 
about the relationship between tort law and the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), which 
has a specific remedies provision.  When the remedies provision was first presented in 
Bill form, Lord Lester observed that the Act created a new “public law tort.”9  This 
                                                        
5 The classic statement in New Zealand on the difference between “private” tort law and “public” 
NZBORA damages is probably Hammond J’s judgment in Manga v Attorney-General [2000] 2 
NZLR 65 (HC), at [122]. 
6 For the difficulty of separating out different parts of the common law from others according to the 
interests which they represent see Stephen Waddams Dimensions of Private Law: Categories and 
Concepts in Anglo-American Legal Reasoning (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003). 
7 Claire Charters "The Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 and Crown Fiduciary Duties to Maori: How 
does it Compare and What Have Maori Lost?" in Claire Charters and Andrew Erueti (eds) Maori 
Property Rights and the Foreshore and Seabed: The Latest Frontier (VUW Press, Wellington, 2007) 
143.  
8 See chapter two, at text to footnote 52. 
9 Lord Lester of Herne Hill QC “The Impact of the Human Rights Act on Public Law” in Jack Beatson 
(ed) Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom: Principles and Practice (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
1998) 105. 




phrase has been criticised by Lord Woolf,
10
 but it has continued to be used by Pannick 
and Lord Lester.11  The debate is superficially trivial but contains an important issue: 
how analogous are damages in tort law and human rights statutes, and can the 
reasoning in one area be applied in another?12 
One argument, forcefully presented by Varuhas, is that tort law reasoning should be 
applied when calculating damages under the Human Rights Act even where this is 
contrary to precedent from the European Court of Human Rights.13  Varuhas argues 
that this is appropriate because the intentional torts have for many years protected the 
rights in the Human Rights Act appropriately: “human rights law and torts actionable 
per se serve similar underlying vindicatory functions and protect common 
fundamental interests”.14  However Varuhas rejects the idea that negligence cases can 
be “public law” because, he argues, they are concerned with compensation rather than 
vindication: “all of negligence law stems from an underlying compensatory 
function”.
15
   
As discussed in chapter two this is not entirely accurate: while the compensatory 
principle works well for most negligence cases, it does not capture all the roles which 
tort law, including negligence, can perform.  In particular it is difficult to explain the 
child welfare cases as compensating the loss which the plaintiffs suffered as the 
consequence of the defendant’s wrongs.  A vindicatory approach, which Varuhas 
advocates for the intentional torts and the Human Rights Act, should also be applied 
to those negligence cases which engage public law concerns.  This is especially true 
when the interest which is being vindicated includes a community obligation, which 
the state as representative of the community has breached. 
                                                        
10 The Right Hon. Lord Woolf of Barnes “The Human Rights Act 1998 and Remedies” in Mads 
Andenas (ed) Judicial Review in International Perspective (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 
2000) 429. 
11 David Pannick and Anthony Lester “The impact of the Human Rights Act on private law: the 
knight’s move” (2000) 116 LQR 380.  See also Iain Steele “Public law liability – the Human Rights 
Act and beyond (2005) 64 CLR 8. 
12 The classification can be important in deciding whether a court has jurisdiction where the defendant 
is from the lex fori but is acting in his or her capacity as part of the government of the lex causae where 
the plaintiff normally resides: see R(Quark Fishing Ltd.) v Secretary of State for Foreign & 
Commonwealth Affairs [2003] EWHC 1743. 
13 The European Court of Human Rights is the final court for breaches of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (opened for signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1974), on 
which the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) is based. 
14 Jason Varuhas, "A Tort-Based Approach to Damages under the Human Rights Act 1998" (2009) 72 
MLR 750, at 765.  See also Dan Priel “A Public Role for the Intentional Torts” (2011) Social Science 
Research Network  <www.ssrn.com>, although Priel seems to argue that the public law aspect of tort 
law is a new phenomenon. The difference between per se torts and other torts is discussed in chapter 
five. 
15 Varuhas, ibid, at 769. 




Varuhas acknowledges that the emphasis on duty in negligence may make the action 
an attractive mechanism for the protection of positive human rights obligations, but 
concludes that these duties should be vindicated through an action under the Human 
Rights Act, to avoid distorting the compensatory principle.  In New Zealand this 
argument is not compelling, because NZBORA lacks the positive rights found in the 
English Human Rights Act.  Negligence may sometimes be the only way of 
vindicating positive duties in New Zealand. 
C Baigent’s Case 
The reason why the English debate on whether Human Rights Act damages are a 
“public law tort” has not had much traction in New Zealand has to do with the way 
NZBORA damages have evolved.  In 1994 the New Zealand Court of Appeal in 
Baigent’s Case developed common law damages as a remedy for breaches of 
NZBORA rights, despite the lack of any damages provision in the Act.16  The Court 
was concerned to emphasise that the damages were not a tort for which the 
government was vicariously liable, but were awarded against the Crown directly.17  
While there was important English precedent in Maharaj18 which also adopted this 
approach, the main reason for the way the New Zealand judges divorced the cause of 
action from tort law was to avoid the immunity provided by s 6(5) of the Crown 
Proceedings Act 1950.19 
In Baigent, it was alleged that police had obtained a warrant for the plaintiff’s home 
under the mistake that it was the address of a suspected drug dealer.  Although Mrs 
Baigent was not at home at the time, her son and her neighbour informed police that 
they had the wrong address, and her daughter, who was a lawyer, told police by 
telephone that the search was unlawful.  It was alleged that the police officer replied: 
“We often get it wrong, but while we are here we will have a look round anyway.”
20
  
The majority of the Court of Appeal held that any action in tort was barred by s 6(5) if 
the police officers were executing the warrant in good faith, because it was in 
pursuance to judicial proceedings.  Therefore if a mistaken but genuine belief that 
they were acting under the authority of the warrant was established at trial there 
would be no tort action available. 
All members of the Court considered that this was insufficient protection of the right 
in s 21 NZBORA: “Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or 
seizure, whether of the person, property, or correspondence or otherwise.”  New 
                                                        
16 Baigent’s Case, above n 1. 
17 Ibid, at 677 per Cooke P, and at 690-691 per Casey J. 
18 Maharaj v Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago (No 2) [1979] AC 385 (PC). 
19 Baigent’s Case, above n 1, at 708, per Gault J, dissenting. 
20 Ibid, at 672.   




Zealanders should be protected against unreasonable search and seizure by the 
government, even if in unreasonable but good faith pursuance of judicial proceedings.  
Four of the judges held that in order to protect people against such government 
actions, a direct action against the Crown could be brought for damages for breach of 
NZBORA rights.  The government would be liable through s 3(2)(c)  of the Crown 
Proceedings Act 1950 which provides for actions against the Crown based on any 
Acts which are binding on the Crown.  The fact that an action is pursuant to judicial 
proceedings is not a defence to this provision. 
Under the majority’s approach, NZBORA damages fill a perceived gap, creating a 
new, public law remedy distinct from tort law.  Gault J, in a vigorous dissent, exposed 
the myth that there had been no public law damages before the advent of NZBORA:21 
Prior to the enactment of the Bill of Rights Act the recognition of the majority of the 
declared rights and the provision of remedies had evolved in the common law.  The 
modern declarations of rights and freedoms can be seen as a progression in an 
evolutionary process rather than a departure from the common law … The dynamics 
of the common law will not cease with the enactment of the Bill of Rights Act.  There 
will continue to be the evolution of rights with consequential questions as to the 
interrelationship between the various rights recognised in the law in different ways. 
Gault J described how tort law had protected the right to bodily integrity and to 
property and how other rights such as the right to natural justice had been protected in 
administrative law.  He observed that while it was unusual in the common law for 
rights “to be defined solely in terms of the individual person’s relationship with the 
state” this did not “deny the fact that many of the rights enumerated are already 
protected in the general law.”22  Gault J’s judgment captures the way the common law 
has evolved to protect rights through various different proceedings.   
Using the public-private law divide to distinguish NZBORA and tort damages might 
encourage the view that the development of vindicatory damages for breach of 
NZBORA rights, as discussed in the last chapter, should not be applied in tort law.  
However, as Gault J demonstrated, tort law protects many of the same interests as 
NZBORA.  Both tort law and NZBORA have a role in marking wrongs between 
public authorities and individuals.  The main difference might be that while the rights 
in NZBORA are limited and an action may only be brought against the Crown, tort 
law has the potential both to vindicate rights and duties which are not part of 
NZBORA, and to vindicate wrongs between private individuals.23   
                                                        
21 Ibid, at 709.  See also Gault J’s judgment in Attorney-General v Chapman [2011] NZSC 110. 
22 Ibid, 710. 
23 This last point, that tort law can vindicate wrongs between private individuals, is not analysed in 
detail in this thesis, but it is discussed briefly in chapter five in the context of the wrongful birth cases.   




D Ashley and Dunlea 
This section looks at the way one NZBORA case, Dunlea,24 has been used in an 
English tort case, Ashley.25  This illustrates the fruitful way reasoning in human rights 
damages cases can be applied in tort actions, emphasising the public aspect of tort 
law.   
In Ashley the House of Lords was confronted with two issues: whether there was a 
purpose for assault and battery damages that was not compensatory, and whether a 
mistaken belief in an imminent danger was a sufficient threshold for self-defence.   
The police had raided the deceased’s flat at about 4.20am.  One of the policemen 
entered the deceased’s bedroom with his handgun in the “aim” position and his finger 
on the trigger.  The deceased was out of bed but naked and unarmed.  Within seconds 
he was shot in the neck.  By the time paramedics arrived at 4.33 he was not breathing 
and at 5.15 he was pronounced dead.  His father and his son both brought a number of 
causes of action, on their own behalf and on behalf of the deceased’s estate, including 
in assault and battery and for compensation under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (UK).  
The defendants agreed to pay compensatory damages, including aggravated damages, 
for most of the causes of action, but moved to have the battery and assault claims 
struck out.   
Lord Scott, in the majority, held that damages under the Fatal Accidents Act were 
only compensatory.  Therefore, even though the defendant agreed to pay all damages 
under that Act, the battery and assault claim could not be struck out because there was 
a possibility of vindicatory damages not available under the Act.
26
  His view of tort 
law was rights based:27 
Its main function is to identify and protect the rights that every person is entitled to 
assert against, and require to be respected by, others. The rights of one person, 
however, often run counter to the rights of others and the civil law, in particular the 
law of tort, must then strike a balance between the conflicting rights. … The right not 
to be physically harmed by the actions of another may conflict with the rights of other 
people to engage in activities involving the possibility of accidentally causing harm. 
The balance between these conflicting rights must be struck by the rules and 
principles of the tort of negligence. As to assault and battery and self-defence, every 
person has the right in principle not to be subjected to physical harm by the 
intentional actions of another person. But every person has the right also to protect 
himself by using reasonable force to repel an attack or to prevent an imminent attack. 
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25 Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex [2008] UKHL 25, [2008] 1 AC 962 (HL). 
26 This aspect of the case is discussed in more detail in chapter five. 
27 Ibid, at [18]. 




The rules and principles defining what does constitute legitimate self-defence must 
strike the balance between these conflicting rights.  
This passage was in the context of Lord Scott’s argument that tort law should not 
provide a defence of self-defence where there is only a mistaken though genuine 
belief in imminent danger (the standard in criminal law) because tort law is about 
balancing rights between people rather than the state punishing individuals.  The 
focus on rights, however, led him to a vindicatory approach which helped to answer 
the second issue in Ashley, whether the assault and battery claim could be struck 
out.28  Lord Scott drew on a distinction made by Thomas J in the NZBORA case 
Dunlea, between loss-based and rights-based damages. 29   Eschewing the New 
Zealand distinction between NZBORA and tort damages as “public” or “private”, 
Lord Scott was able to draw on the NZBORA approach in which damages are 
awarded for the wrong rather than the loss.  This is appropriate given tort law’s long 
history in protecting many of the same rights as NZBORA.   
Thomas J was dissenting in Dunlea, but his distinction between loss-based and rights-
based damages has since been applied by the New Zealand Supreme Court in the 
leading NZBORA case.30  The difference between the majority and Thomas J lay in 
the different approach they took to the distinction between tort and NZBORA 
damages.  It is in fact the majority judgment which offers most support for Lord 
Scott’s approach, and for the approach in this thesis. 
In Dunlea the plaintiffs were evacuated from a flat adjacent to premises in which a 
police suspect was hiding.  Two of the plaintiffs were cuff linked without being 
arrested.  Initially this was lawful but the final 15 minutes of their detention was held 
to be arbitrary, and they were awarded $15,000 and $18,000, respectively.  Three of 
the plaintiffs, who were residents of the flat, were awarded $1500 each for an 
unjustified search of their property.  The trial judge, and the majority in the Court of 
Appeal, did not distinguish between the actions for the tort of false imprisonment and 
breach of s 22 of NZBORA (the right not to be arbitrarily arrested or detained); or 
between the tort of trespass to land and breach of s 21 of NZBORA (the right to be 
secure against unreasonable search). 
The difference between the majority and Thomas J in Dunlea was whether the finding 
of breaches of NZBORA changed the quantum of the damages awards.  Thomas J 
held that because the facts involved a breach of NZBORA as well as torts such as 
false imprisonment and trespass, the damages should be higher in order to vindicate 
                                                        
28 Ibid, at [22]. 
29 Ibid, at 22.  Lord Scott also cited dicta from Thomas J’s judgment in Daniels v Thompson [1998] 3 
NZLR 22 (CA). 
30 For example in Taunoa  v Attorny-General [2007] NZSC 70, [2008] 1 NZLR 429. 




the constitutional nature of the rights in NZBORA.  This was based on a bright line 
distinction between “private” tort law and “public” NZBORA damages:31 
Damages for a private wrong do not ordinarily extend to the vindication of the right 
which has been violated.  In a tortious claim the plaintiff claims damages for the 
breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff.  It is in the nature of a private right to remedy a 
private wrong.  In a claim under the Bill of Rights the plaintiff seeks compensation 
for the breach of a right of a different character. 
In constrast, the majority recognised, like Gault J in Baigent, that tort damages had a 
similar role to damages for NZBORA and that tort law also vindicates wrongs:32 
… in the great range of cases where a claim of a breach of the Bill of Rights is made 
there will also be a claim in tort.  So, the present case is not one in which torts were 
not also established … or a tortious remedy was defeated by statutory immunities (as 
in Baigent’s Case) … On the contrary, essentially the same facts lie behind the twin 
rulings (which are significant in themselves) that the state through its officers has 
acted in breach of the rights of the plaintiffs, rights long protected by tortious 
remedies and now affirmed, along with other human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, in the Bill of Rights. 
Arguably, both the majority and Thomas J have been vindicated in later cases.  
Thomas J’s distinction between vindication and compensation continues to be 
applied, but it needs to be considered in the light of the majority’s conclusion that tort 
law has for a long time protected the rights in NZBORA, and should continue to do 
so.  In chapter five, it is argued that there is support in existing tort law for vindicatory 
damages, but Dunlea and Ashley help demonstrate that there are good reasons for 
applying the vindicatory approach in NZBORA in tort law. 
E Summary 
The reasoning in Ashley emphasises the utility of considering NZBORA and tort law 
as analogous actions: labelling the action for damages for breach of the Human Rights 
Act or NZBORA a “public law tort” captures an important truth about these damages.  
The importance for this thesis of this conclusion is that where there are rights which 
are protected by tort law but not by NZBORA, it is still possible to argue that 
Baigent-style damages, with their focus on state power, and vindication and 
deterrence as well as compensation, should be available.  This is arguably what is 
happening in the child welfare cases, both through direct liability in negligence and in 
vicarious liability for intentional torts: liability is imposed on the state for essentially 
the same reasons that the state is liable in damages through NZBORA: to vindicate 
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individual rights and community duties.  This also has important implications for the 
accident compensation bar. 
This chapter has strayed rather far from the child abuse claims.  This reflects the fact 
that there are no obvious rights in NZBORA on which children could peg an action 
alleging an affirmative duty.  In order to take advantage of the vindicatory approach 
developed in NZBORA damages, it is necessary to analyse the line between tort law 
and NZBORA actions, and to decide whether this line should prevent developments 
in NBZORA damages crossing over into tort law.  Although the line is important, it is 
not positioned conveniently between tort law and NZBORA: the common law is more 
subtle than that.  Tort law actions have been doing public law for much longer than 
NZBORA, and where a tort case raises similar public law concerns to NZBORA 
cases, a vindicatory approach is justified. 
Of course, it may be necessary to vindicate rights between private individuals which 
lack this public law aspect.  In chapter five some of these types of cases are discussed, 
for example where damages are awarded to vindicate a woman’s right to choose 
whether or not she has children, which might be compromised if a doctor negligently 
sterilises her.  The argument in this thesis is not intended to exclude the potential of 
vindicatory damages in such cases.  However, it is suggested that the public aspect to 
the child welfare cases lends weight to the argument in favour of the availability of 
such damages.  This is true even in child abuse cases where the defendant is a private 
sector owner of a child care facility, where there is arguably still a public interest in 
vindicating the wrong. 




V Support for Vindicatory Damages within Existing Tort Law 
In chapter two it was argued that vindicatory damages should be available in tort law, 
and in chapter three the child welfare cases were analysed as an example where these 
damages would be useful.  The clearest development of a vindicatory approach in 
damages awards has been in the NZBORA jurisprudence, and therefore in chapter 
four the distinction between NZBORA and tort damages was analysed.  It is 
suggested that there is nothing in the distinction to prevent the application in tort law 
of the developments in NZBORA damages. 
In this chapter, however, it is argued that there is already existing support for a 
vindicatory approach within tort law.  The chapter falls into two main parts.  In the 
first part, the difference between trespass to the person and negligence is discussed.  
In negligence, but not in trespass, “damage” (or loss) is required in order to establish 
liability as well as the remedy.  The requirement of damage may make non-loss based 
damages seem inconsistent with negligence, but it is argued that vindicatory damages 
should nevertheless be available in negligence as well as trespass to the person. 
In the second part of the chapter, the non-loss based damages presently available in 
tort law are canvassed: these are nominal, aggravated and exemplary damages.  These 
provide some support for the development of an additional head of non-loss based 
vindicatory damages, but they are insufficient by themselves to vindicate the wrongs 
underpinning the child welfare cases.   
A: Trespass to the Person and Negligence 
The child welfare cases fall into two main groups: those in which it is alleged that the 
defendant is responsible for the plaintiff’s wrong through his or her own negligence, 
and those in which it is alleged that the defendant is vicariously liable for the battery 
or assault (trespass to the person) of the abuser.1   For example, in the vicarious 
liability cases the Crown is liable to the plaintiff for the abuser’s tort, which will 
usually be in battery and assault.
2
   
In Prince, however, it was not possible to plead battery and assault because there was 
no relationship between the abuser and the defendant sufficient to establish vicarious 
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  The complaint concerned the actions of the Crown itself: whether through 
its own negligence it had failed to remove the plaintiff from his adoptive parents.4  In 
both negligence and trespass claims the result is the same: the child is harmed.  
However, in the Prince-type claim the focus is on the Crown’s own acts and 
omissions, rather than whether it is vicariously liable for someone else’s abusive acts.  
There are important differences between direct and vicarious liability addressed in 
later chapters, but the focus in this section is the difference between trespass and 
negligence and the implications of this for the remedy. 
Unlike negligence, liability for trespass to the person can be established without loss.  
For this reason these torts are said to be actionable per se.  In negligence, on the other 
hand, the notion of loss is engrained in the question of liability as well as the remedy.  
As Stapleton has written:5 
It is a truism that a fundamental requirement for a claim in negligence is that the 
plaintiff has suffered some past “damage.”  A breach of duty by the defendant is not 
enough.  The cause of action will not accrue until actionable damage occurs.  This 
damage is said to form the gist of the action. 
Including a damage requirement as part of the liability test has implications for the 
remedy.  In negligence the categories of damage which are sufficient to establish 
liability are narrowly defined, and the loss recoverable as part of the remedy is 
correspondingly limited.  In trespass, however, the lack of a requirement of damage to 
establish liability is consistent with a more flexible approach to the remedy question.   
For example, the tort of assault is established when the defendant causes the plaintiff 
to have a reasonable apprehension of danger.6  If this occurs the plaintiff has a right to 
potentially substantial damages, even though there is no personal injury.  However, in 
negligence a personal injury would need to be established, which is defined as a 
physical injury, or a recognised psychiatric illness.7 
                                                        
3 Attorney-General v Prince and Gardner [1998] 1 NZLR 262 (CA). 
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5 Jane Stapleton “The gist of negligence: Part 1 Minimal actionable damage” (1988) 104 LQR 213.   
6 T v H [1995] 3 NZLR 37 (CA), at 51. 
7 White and Others v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] 2 AC 455 (HL) p 491, Mustapha v 
Culligan of Canada Ltd 2008 SCC 27, [2008] 2 SCR 114.  In New Zealand the recognised psychiatric 
injury test applies to secondary victims, see van Soest v Residual Health Management Unit [2000] 1 
NZLR 179 (CA).  However, the test for primary victims might be different, see J v Crown Health 
Financing Agency HC Wellington CIV-2000-485-876, 8 February 2008, at 538, quoted in chapter three 
at test to footnote 29. 




The fact that liability can be established without loss emphasises the role that torts 
actionable per se play in protecting rights whether or not there is any loss, as Giliker 
has pointed out:8 
The absence of any requirement of damage indicates that these torts seek to protect 
the claimant not from purely physical harm, but perceive other interests as inviolable, 
such as personal integrity and the right to self-determination. 
This arguably introduces a vindicatory role into the remedy.  For example, if damages 
in a child abuse case are awarded for battery, it could be argued that they were not 
intended merely to compensate the loss flowing from the abuse, but also in order to 
stigmatise the wrong.  This would be consistent with the structure of the tort of 
battery, in which damage is not a requirement of liability.   
This approach was adopted by Lord Scott in the House of Lords case Ashley, as 
discussed in chapter four.9  This case provides support for the claim that tort law, or at 
least the torts of battery and assault, do include a vindicatory purpose.  The police 
officer had shot the plaintiff dead during a drug raid, but claimed self-defence to the 
tort of battery.  However, the defendants accepted liability under the Fatal Accidents 
Act 1976 (UK) in which damages were strictly compensation based.  For this reason, 
he moved to have the battery and assault pleadings struck out, because they could add 
nothing to the claims already accepted.  The House of Lords by a narrow majority 
refused to strike out the pleadings. 
There are two possible interpretations of the House of Lords’ decision not to strike 
out the pleadings for trespass.  First, it is possible that the House of Lords decided that 
separate non-compensatory damages might be awarded for trespass which were not 
available for the other causes of action.  Lord Scott, for example, emphasized the non-
compensatory aspect of vindicatory damages which he held were available for 
trespass: “Damages awarded for the purpose of vindication are essentially rights-
centred, awarded in order to demonstrate that the right in question should not have 
been infringed at all.”10 
However, in a case note on Ashley Palmer and Steele advanced a different 
interpretation.  Rather than assuming that vindicatory damages would be awarded 
separately in addition to compensatory damages under the Fatal Accidents Act, the 
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purpose of the general damages award might change if liability was also for 
trespass:11  
… the admission of liability to compensate, accompanied by denial of the trespass, 
could not at the same time perform a vindicatory role … The issue is not quantum, 
but the purpose of the damages awarded. 
In England, splitting the general damages explicitly into compensation and 
vindication is arguably unnecessary.  However, in New Zealand the difference is 
crucial because compensatory damages are usually barred by accident 
compensation. 12   As discussed in chapter two, the distinction between the two 
purposes has been made for NZBORA damages for exactly this reason.13   Both 
interpretations of Ashley offer support for the argument that the torts of battery and 
assault, at least, have a vindicatory purpose.  In New Zealand, it is necessary to 
distinguish the vindicatory aspect from the compensatory part of the general damages, 
but this might be less important in England. 
B Support for a Non-compensatory Approach in Negligence 
As outlined above, a vindicatory approach fits well with the rationale of the 
intentional torts because they are per se torts.  However, in negligence damage is a 
requirement of both liability and the remedy.  Are vindicatory damages, which are 
focused on vindicating wrongs rather than compensating loss, appropriate in 
negligence? 
There is, perhaps surprisingly, authority for such an award in the House of Lords case 
Rees.
14
  In that case the House of Lords awarded a separate award to recognise the 
wrong to the plaintiff, who had conceived a child after the defendant performed her 
sterilisation operation negligently.  There is also support for a vindicatory approach in 
the earlier House of Lords decision Chester v Ashfar, in which the plaintiff suffered a 
complication in surgery which she had not been advised of.15  In that case the House 
of Lords developed the rules of causation to vindicate the plaintiff’s rights, rather than 
making a separate award to recognise the wrong.  While the contexts of these cases 
are quite different from the child welfare cases analysed in this thesis, they are both 
useful examples of the way judges have responded to the intuitive desire to vindicate 
the plaintiff’s wrong through damages awards, even though it may be difficult to 
identify a type of “loss” which negligence can easily compensate. 
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1 Rees v Darlington 
Rees was a wrongful birth decision delivered by the House of Lords in 2003, in which 
the mother sued for a negligent sterilisation, claiming the costs of raising the healthy 
child whom she had conceived as a result of the negligent advice that her sterilisation 
operation had been successful.   In 1999 the House of Lords had held in McFarlane 
that the damages of raising a healthy child could not be recovered because they were 
not quantifiable and because it would be “morally offensive”.16  However, in 2001 the 
English Court of Appeal had allowed the extra cost of raising a disabled child.17  In 
Rees, the plaintiff was partially blind, and feared that she would not be able to raise a 
child.   
In Rees the judges took as a starting point the position that McFarlane is an exception 
to the orthodox rules of negligence.  If the normal rules of foreseeability and 
causation applied, the defendant would be liable for the cost of raising the child, 
which the sterilisation was specifically designed to prevent.
18
  However, building on 
dicta by Lord Millett in McFarlane the majority awarded a “conventional award” of 
£15,000 which each judge described slightly differently, although the overall focus 
was on the loss of autonomy which the plaintiff suffered because her decision not to 
have children was compromised.   
The Rees award is consistent with the type of vindicatory damages advanced in this 
thesis.19  However, the award is problematic because it does not fit well with typical 
awards of general damages for negligence, which are compensatory.   
Although the majority insisted that the award was a simple “gloss” on McFarlane, the 
minority drew attention to the lack of support in the case law for such a 
“conventional” sum.  Lord Hope found the “lack of any consistent or coherent ratio in 
support of the proposition in the speeches of the majority disturbing.”
20
  It was 
contrary to the normal rule of tort law that a plaintiff is entitled to be put back in the 
position she would have been but for the tort.  The damages were neither nominal, 
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 MacFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2002] 2 AC 59 (HL).  However, the High Court of Australia 
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19 For a similar analysis of Rees, Norman Witzleb and Robyn Carroll “The role of vindication in torts 
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general, nor punitive, but rather were “entirely novel” and “contrary to principle.”
21
  
Lord Steyn described it as “a radical and most important development”.22 
While the approach of the majority is favoured in this thesis, Lord Steyn’s 
observation is accurate.  An award that recognises a wrong and the denial of the 
plaintiff’s autonomy is an entirely novel head of damages in negligence.  This has led 
to some divergence in the interpretation of the Rees award.  It could be interpreted, 
consistently with the vindicatory approach favoured in this thesis, as a non-




The conventional award would not be, and would not be intended to be, 
compensatory.  It would not be the product of calculation.  But it would not be a 
nominal, let alone a derisory, award.  It would afford some measure of recognition of 
the wrong done. 
An alternative approach would be to rephrase the interest vindicated by the Rees 
award as some kind of loss.  Nolan has suggested that the award should be seen as 
compensating the plaintiff’s loss of autonomy.24  The difference between the two 
approaches is that in the first, damages are intended as recognition that the plaintiff’s 
autonomy has been undermined, and in the second, they are designed to compensate 
the plaintiff’s lost autonomy. 
This second interpretation is analysed in some detail below before concluding that the 
vindicatory interpretation should be preferred. 
2 The advantages of Nolan’s approach 
Analysing the Rees award as compensation for lost autonomy fits with the 
compensatory principle of negligence.  It is consistent with the emphasis placed by 
the judges that the damages were not for the costs of raising the child but for the 
plaintiff’s autonomy.25 
Autonomy here signifies the ability of plaintiffs to choose the lives they lead.  It is an 
interest in liberty, the freedom to make choices and to carry them out. Dworkin has 
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offered the following definition, which captures the value of a person being able to 
reach their own decision and to act on it without external control:26  
… the value of autonomy … derives from the capacity it protects: the capacity to 
express one's own character—values, commitments, convictions, and critical as well 
as experiential interests—in the life one leads. … It allows us to lead our lives rather 
than be led along them, so that each of us can be, to the extent a scheme of rights can 
make this possible, what we have made of ourselves.  
This definition of autonomy explains the interest protected in Rees: the plaintiff 
decided not to have any children, and the defendant’s negligence undermined her 
ability to act on that decision.  The decision was one which resonates with many of 
the qualities usually associated with autonomy.  It was reached after critical 
reflection: she made the decision because she had poor eyesight and thought she 
would be unable to take care of the child.   It related to her independence and her own 
sense of sovereignty: the ability to control her body’s capacity to conceive children. 
One advantage of this approach is that it might also be possible to describe the 
“damage” in the child abuse cases as a loss of autonomy.  For example the plaintiff in 
Prince argued that the failure to investigate the neglect of his adoptive parents led to 
damage which included loss “of the chance to realise his potential”.
27
  The allegation 
was effectively that he was never in control of his life: his adulthood was controlled 
by the neglect he suffered as a child.  In the Australian case Trevorrow, the plaintiff, a 
victim of that country’s controversial indigenous children policies:28 
… claimed that his removal from his natural family, and his placement with [foster 
parents], was unlawful.  He claimed that the separation from his natural mother and 
family, and the manner in which he was reunited with his natural family, all 
contributed to a loss of cultural identity, depression, alcoholism, poor health, poor 
relationships and erratic employment history. 
3 The disadvantages of this approach 
Despite the advantages of analysing the Rees award as compensating autonomy (or in 
the child welfare cases the capacity to develop autonomy) this approach has two main 
problems.  First, at least in the child abuse cases it disadvantages children who are 
autonomous.  One of the greatest difficulties with applying the compensatory 
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principle to the child abuse cases is that it distinguishes between child abuse victims 
who suffer “loss” and those that do not.  The types of loss discussed above in relation 
to the child abuse cases raise the question: have child abuse victims who do not suffer 
“depression, alcoholism, poor health, poor relationships and erratic employment 
history” suffered “loss” in the sense required by negligence?  Is it necessary to 
identify a “loss” at all in such cases? 
The second problem with Nolan’s compensatory approach is that it puts too much 
strain on the compensatory principle.  It is possible to rephrase every damages award 
in terms of loss, but the exercise is not always terribly edifying.  The compensatory 
principle is that damages put the plaintiff in the position they would have been but for 
the loss, however it is difficult to imagine how £15,000 would put the plaintiff in Rees 
in the position she would have been but for the damage to her autonomy.   
While it has long been accepted that the attempt to put the plaintiff in the same 
position they would have been but for the wrong is somewhat fictional and limited by 
the ability of damages awards to do this, describing the attack on a woman’s 
autonomy through negligent sterilisation as a compensatable loss can become farcical.  
The attraction of this interpretation of Rees lies in the temptation to fit everything 
within the existing compensation paradigm, rather than an accurate analysis of the 
award in the case.   
The better interpretation of Rees is that doctors performing sterilisations (or 
vasectomies) owe their patients duties to take care in order, partly, to protect the 
patient’s autonomy, which is exercised by the choice not to have any more children.  
This is vindicated by an award of a “conventional sum” when the duty is breached, 
but the consequent “loss” (the cost of raising the child) is not compensated.  A similar 
approach can by analogy be applied to the child welfare cases.  When the duty in 
Prince was breached the community obligations to take care of children were also 
compromised, and vindicatory damages are appropriate as a marker of the wrong, 
rather than compensation. 
4 The problem of “damage” 
However, introducing a non-compensatory damages award for negligence in the child 
abuse cases comes up against the problem identified earlier in relation to negligence, 
where damage is the “gist” of the action.  In negligence, as opposed to trespass, 
damage must be identified in order to establish liability as well as establishing 
quantum for damages.  If the award is not designed to compensate damage, then is 
there any damage which establishes liability? 




In Rees itself negligence was established because damages were awarded for the pain, 
suffering and inconvenience of the pregnancy.  Therefore, there was arguably a 
personal injury (presumably the pregnancy) which was caused by the breach of the 
doctor’s duty, which helped establish the action in negligence.  This emphasises the 
point that the damage required to establish negligence is not the same as the damages 
awarded.
29
  In Rees the damages awarded went beyond the “damage” which 
established the action. 
A similar point may be made with the child welfare cases.  Where it is alleged that a 
public authority such as New Zealand’s Child Youth and Family Services fails to 
remove a child from abusive parents, it is only those children who do suffer abuse 
who are able to claim, even under the vindicatory approach advanced in this thesis.  If 
the authority receives a complaint that a child is being abused but negligently fails to 
investigate, the child has no action if the complaint is unfounded and there is no 
abuse.  If damage was not the “gist” of the action, the breach of the duty of care 
would give rise to an action whether or not the child had suffered abuse.  This would 
be inconsistent with the underlying duty which it is argued these cases vindicate: the 
community obligation to look after children.  The community obligation is not 
breached if children are not abused or neglected.   
5 Chester v Afshar 
This section considers the 2004 House of Lords case Chester v Afshar,30 which Lord 
Scott in Ashley gave as an example of vindication in tort law.31  In Chester, decided 
before Rees, the House of Lords stretched the causation rules in order to vindicate the 
plaintiff’s right to be informed of the risks of the medical procedure which she 
consented to on the defendant’s advice.  However, rather than adapting the causation 
rules, the better approach would arguably have been to award vindicatory damages, 
applying the approach developed subsequently in Rees. 
The defendant doctor had failed to advise Miss Chester of a 1%-2% risk of surgery 
that eventuated and left her paralysed.  The trial judge found that she would have 
continued with the surgery even if she had been correctly advised, but that she would 
have thought about it more seriously and delayed the operation for a few days.  As the 
risk would have been the same on any other day, it was more likely than not that the 
risk would not have eventuated on that other day, and therefore she would not have 
suffered the injury. 
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As all the judges in the House of Lords acknowledged, this placed a great deal of 
strain on the traditional test of causation, because it was the operation, and not the 
failure to warn, which caused the damage.32  However, they also all accepted the 
importance of the duty to warn patients of any risk in surgery.  Lord Steyn said that “a 
patient’s right to an appropriate warning from a surgeon when faced with a surgery 
ought normatively to be regarded as an important right which must be given effective 
protection whenever possible.”33  The difference between the majority and minority 
seemed to lie in whether compensatory damages were an appropriate way to remedy 
the underlying duty. 
The minority criticised the remedy as too large for the wrong which the plaintiff 
suffered.  While the duty was important, it did not need to be vindicated by the entire 
cost of the paralysis which the plaintiff had suffered.  Lord Bingham held that:34   
The patient’s right to be appropriately warned is an important right [but] I do not for 
my part think that the law should seek to reinforce that right by providing for the 
payment of potentially very large damages.  
Lord Hoffmann suggested that a modest solatium might be appropriate “to vindicate 
the patient’s right to choose for herself.”35  However, he thought that it would be 
difficult to find a suitable figure and it would probably be outweighed by the costs of 
litigation.  While it might be true that vindicatory remedies are arguably not worth the 
trouble of litigation, that is a decision for the plaintiff to make, not the courts.   
Chester v Afshar emphasises the need for a specifically vindicatory remedy in the 
judiciary’s toolbox.  The approach of the House of Lords led to damages well out of 
proportion to the wrong and stretched causation principles unnecessarily.  It 
introduces a distinction between patients who are not fully informed but who would 
have had surgery on the day originally planned, and those like Miss Chester who 
would have delayed it by a few days.  While both patients in these situations would 
have similar rights breached, the duty is only “vindicated” in Miss Chester’s case.  In 
the other situation, there would be no effective remedy.36 
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C Existing Separate Awards of Non-compensatory Damages in Tort Law 
The Rees award was part of the general damages awarded to the plaintiff.  However, 
the better approach would have been to separate out such damages from the general 
damages, which are compensatory.  As argued in chapter two, they would only be 
necessary where the compensatory damages are insufficient to vindicate the wrong.   
This section analyses nominal, aggravated and exemplary damages.  These are 
separate from general damages, and there is arguably a vindicatory aspect to these 
awards.  However, while these damages offer support for the proposition that there is 
a vindicatory role within existing tort law, these are not appropriate awards for 
vindicating the underlying duty in the child welfare cases, where the defendant is 
someone other than the abuser. 
1 Nominal damages 
One obviously non-compensatory award available in some torts is nominal damages.  
These are very small sums (between £1 and £5 in England) which can be awarded 
where there is no damage, either simply to recognise the wrong, or in order to attach 
costs.37  They are available in per se torts, but it is not always clear which torts are per 
se and which are not.  Actions in trespass are per se, but not all actions in case are per 
se.38  Nominal damages are not available in negligence. 
Nominal damages are sometimes awarded in order to vindicate a wrong where there is 
no loss.  For example, in the 1944 case Constantine v Imperial Hotels Learie 
Constantine, one of the first West Indians to play in English county cricket, was 
denied lodging in a hotel for himself and his family, although he had booked in 
advance.
39
  The staff directed him to a nearby hotel owned by the same management, 
possibly in response to the complaints of American servicemen who were staying 
there and who disliked sharing accommodation with the dark skinned Constantine.   
He suffered no “loss”, because he was able to stay in an alternative accommodation.   
However, he sued for the breach of the old common law duty that required innkeepers 
to receive and lodge travellers who request their hospitality. The judge held that, 
although the action was in case, it was a per se tort.  Therefore he awarded nominal 
damages of five guineas, because otherwise the wrong would go unremedied.   
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In cases like Constantine, nominal damages act as a kind of declaration that a wrong 
has occurred, even though there is no loss.  However, in most actions on the case 
(including negligence) nominal damages are usually unavailable. 
The issue was of some importance in Watkins, in which the plaintiff, a prisoner, 
alleged misfeasance in office when the prison officers refused to give him his mail 
without reading it first.
40
  Unfortunately reading his mail was not the type of special 
damage necessary to establish the tort, which is in case, and the House of Lords held 
that the tort was not made out.  In the Court of Appeal, however, Brooke LJ argued 
that nominal damages were available when important constitutional rights were 
violated, even where the tort was case, relying on Ashby v White.41  In Ashby the 
plaintiff sued the defendant in case for preventing him from exercising his right to 
vote.  He was awarded nominal damages.  The judge in Constantine had relied on 
Ashby for the rule that nominal damages could be awarded for an action on the case. 
In the House of Lords Lord Rodger demonstrated that the rationale of Ashby could not 
have been that it concerned a constitutional right, because that would have taken the 
case beyond the court’s jurisdiction at the time.42  Instead, it should be viewed as a 
property law case, vindicating the plaintiff’s important property right (to vote). 
However, aside from the difficulty of identifying when nominal damages are 
available, they may not be sufficient to vindicate the wrong.  They might be useful as 
a peg for costs or exemplary damages but they are so small that alone they might 
seem to trivialise the wrong, rather than vindicating it.  While vindicatory damages 
should be small they must also be significant enough to make it clear that the wrong is 
taken seriously. 
2 Aggravated damages 
Although nominal damages might be too small to be vindicatory, there is no such 
limit on aggravated and exemplary damages.  In Couch (No 2) McGrath J described 
the difference between aggravated damages and exemplary damages in the following 
way:43  
Aggravated damages may be awarded to compensate for additional suffering for 
injury to feelings and dignity that results from the manner of a defendant’s conduct.  
Exemplary damages are separate and are awarded to punish and deter a wrongdoer… 
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43 Couch v Attorney-General (No 2) (on appeal from Hobson v Attorney-General) [2010] NZSC 27; 
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Aggravated damages are perhaps the most nebulous and controversial head of 
damages separate from general damages.  Unlike exemplary damages, which have 
received repeated analysis from the judiciary and have been steadily narrowed, 
aggravated damages remain unclear except for a general consensus that they are 
compensatory.44  This has the important consequence that they are therefore barred by 
the New Zealand’s accident compensation scheme when they arise directly or 
indirectly from personal injury. 45   Although there is commentary suggesting the 
damages compensate the dignity interest of the plaintiff (discussed below), which 
arguably hints at a vindicatory purpose, the overwhelming consensus that the 
damages are compensatory means they are unlikely ever to escape the accident 
compensation bar.  The importance of ensuring that vindicatory damages in tort law 
are not barred by accident compensation leads to the conclusion that they should be 
developed separately from aggravated damages. 
Several commentators have advocated that aggravated damages be judicially 
abolished.46 If aggravated damages are merely additional compensation to reflect the 
extra hurt to the defendant caused by the “aggravating” manner of the wrong, then the 
argument is convincing: this type of extra “loss” can easily be included in the general 
award of damages, and it may create difficulties trying to separate it out.  This is in 
addition to the difficulties of separating aggravated damages from exemplary 
damages.   
While there is judicial consensus that the damages are compensatory, there is little 
agreement on what is being compensated.  The passage quoted above by McGrath J 
summarises the traditional understanding as focusing on the hurt feelings which the 
plaintiff subjectively suffered.47  However, Beever and Murphy have given a more 
sophisticated analysis which would give rise to an objective conception of aggravated 
damages.48  Under this analysis, aggravated damages are awarded to vindicate the 
plaintiff’s “dignity interest”.   
Under Beever’s and Murphy’s analysis, the dignity interest is the interest people have 
as rights-holders: when plaintiffs are treated as if they have no rights, their dignity is 
undermined.  The quality of being human is what justifies rights, therefore when a 
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defendant treats a plaintiff as having no rights their dignity as a human being is 
compromised.  Beever summarises this argument as follows: “The wrong is an injury 
to the victim’s moral dignity that results from the defendant’s denial that the victim is 
entitled to respect as a moral person.”   
Beever expands on this using three categories of wrong devised by the German 
philosopher Hegel, two of which, he argues, involve harm to the dignity interest.  The 
first is where the wrongdoer treats the victim’s rights with contempt, even though 
acknowledging that he or she is a rights-holder.  The second category is where the 
rights-holder is treated as if he or she has no rights at all, but rather “as a mere 
thing.”49  Both Murphy and Beever argue that the difference between this type of 
behaviour and an “ordinary” wrong is found in the intention of the defendant: “even a 
dog can tell the difference between being stumbled over and being kicked.”  For 
Murphy, dignity:50 
 …entails the irreducible, intrinsic worth of each human being simply by virtue of 
their personhood [Treating them without dignity] is treating them as though they were 
somehow worth less than oneself, or simply worthless.”  
In many ways, this conception of aggravated damages can be described as having a 
vindicatory function.  It involves awarding damages when the defendant treats the 
plaintiff’s rights with contempt, and serves as a reminder that the plaintiff is a rights 
holder and should be treated as such with respect.  However, this is not the same as 
the vindicatory damages advanced in this thesis.  Beever’s and Murphy’s theory 
focuses on how the defendant treats the plaintiff as a rights holder.  However, in the 
child welfare cases the underlying wrong which needs to be vindicated is the 
community duty to take care of children.  It is difficult to describe a public authority 
who negligently fails to investigate a complaint of child abuse as treating the child’s 
rights with contempt.  Nor can an authority which unknowingly and without 
negligence employs a paedophile to look after children be said to treat the rights of 
the children in its care dismissively.   
3 Exemplary damages 
Exemplary damages might sometimes serve a vindicatory purpose.51  In both of the 
two decisions delivered by New Zealand Supreme Court in Couch, Elias CJ delivered 
minority judgments in which she developed a theory of exemplary damages which 
would embrace a role for vindication.  Susan Couch had been severely beaten by a 
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parolee who was working with her, and she sued the Attorney-General alleging that 
the parole officer was negligent when releasing the attacker, Bell, and placing him in 
an inappropriate work environment.  It was not clear whether the proceedings alleged 
direct negligence or vicarious liability.  In the first decision the Supreme Court 
unanimously refused to strike out the proceedings, holding that it was arguably that 
there was a duty of care.
52
  However Elias CJ and Anderson J dissented in approach.  
In the second decision, the Court went on to consider in what situations exemplary 
damages were available.53  The majority held that they were available to punish the 
defendant, but only if there was subjective recklessness. 
Elias CJ took a rather different approach, arguing that exemplary damages could be 
utilised by the courts for all the non-compensatory purposes of tort law.  She outlined 
this approach in the first Couch decision: “a stand-alone claim for exemplary damages 
may serve the non-compensatory ends of tort liability and is necessary to respond to 
‘the community’s sense of justice’.
54
  These purposes would include vindication: 
“Exemplary damages in such circumstances may meet the non-compensatory ends of 




However, the majority’s decision that exemplary damages are only available where 
there is subjective recklessness makes it difficult for them to be awarded against the 
Crown, which in New Zealand is only liable in tort vicariously.56  Since vicarious 
liability is based on an employment relationship between the defendant and the 
wrongdoer, and is not triggered by any fault on the defendant’s part, the defendant 
can never be described as subjectively reckless.57  Therefore it is extremely unlikely 
that the Crown could ever be liable for exemplary damages.  This is important 
because exemplary damages are the only damages not currently barred by accident 
compensation in New Zealand.  Therefore where the Crown is responsible for an 
accident causing personal injury, there is no tort remedy.   
The real difference between the minority and majority in Couch may have been the 
place they saw for tort law in regulating the relationship between the state and the 
individual.
58
  In the second Couch decision the majority emphasised a private law 
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conception of tort law.
59
  Elias CJ’s description of exemplary damages in contrast 
reflected a wider role for torts, which might include public interests:60 
Exemplary damages … are available only when the amount required to make good 
the plaintiff’s loss and any additional affront to him (properly reflected in aggravated 
damages) is unequal to mark the affront to community values occasioned by the 
defendant’s conduct.”  
She emphasised that tort law was not simply a “loss distribution mechanism,”61  and 
favoured a more flexible test for exemplary damages where the allegation was that a 
public authority failed to discharge its statutory functions properly:
62
 
… in modern society, in which the public may reasonably rely on the discharge of 
responsibilities by those entrusted with public power and resources, it may be that 
inaction which amounts to shrugging off responsibility in some circumstances is as 
accurately described as high-handed or arbitrary even if the harm that eventuates is 
not consciously foreseen. 
Elias CJ’s conception of a public law role for exemplary damages is consistent to 
some extent with the English approach to exemplary damages.  In England, Lord 
Devlin’s speech in Rookes v Barnard remains the leading authority in this area.63  
Lord Devlin confined the situations in which exemplary damages could be awarded to 
three categories, one of which was where exemplary damages are necessary “in 
restraining the arbitrary and outrageous use of executive power.”64 
Rookes v Barnard itself was not a case involving government power, but Lord Devlin 
gave as an example of this category the 1763 decision Wilkes v Wood.65  In that case 
the plaintiff’s house had been searched and his papers removed under a general 
warrant and he brought proceedings in trespass.  Pratt CJ instructed the jury that:66 
Damages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as 
a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the future, and as a 
proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself. 
While Elias CJ’s more public law approach to tort law is consistent with the argument 
in this thesis, it is not suggested here that all the non-compensatory ends of tort law 
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should be subsumed within exemplary damages.  Vindication is a distinct purpose, 
although it may at times overlap with punishment.  It may be necessary when both 
exemplary and vindicatory damages are awarded to adjust the amount to reflect the 
possibility of overlap.  However, the two heads of damages are not the same: 
vindication looks not just at the behaviour of the defendant and whether this merits 
punishment, but at the wrong as a whole and whether this needs to be marked by 
damages.   
D Summary 
While non-compensatory vindicatory damages might be somewhat controversial in 
tort law, the discussion in this chapter demonstrates that they are not entirely novel.  
Nominal, aggravated and exemplary damages are non-compensatory, and although it 
is not suggested that they satisfy the need in tort law for a separate vindicatory award, 
they have a vindicatory flavour. 
Cases like Rees and Chester v Afshar illustrate a vindicatory purpose within 
negligence.  The approach in Rees, in which non-compensatory damages were 
awarded in recognition of the wrong to the plaintiff and reflected the damage to her 
autonomy interest, is consistent with the approach advanced in this thesis.  Therefore 
while vindicatory damages might be unusual in tort law, there is an existing 
foundation on which they can be developed. 




VI Vicarious Liability 
This thesis began with the assertion that the compensatory principle cannot explain 
the child protection cases.  The first half of this thesis included an analysis of the 
damages issues which arise in these cases, and then proceeded to advance an 
alternative vindicatory approach, in which the remedy is for the wrong, not the 
consequence.  This remedy would not be calculated by the amount of loss suffered. 
In the remaining chapters the focus is on liability issues.  The courts have developed 
tort doctrines in the child protection cases by recognising duties of care where there is 
a failure to exercise a statutory power, and by stretching the doctrine of vicarious 
liability to include intentional wrongs such as sexual abuse.  This thesis argues that 
vindicatory damages are appropriate whether liability is direct or vicarious, and that 
some of the developments in the liability issues might be explained by the vindicatory 
approach outlined in the earlier chapters.    
As emphasised at the beginning of the thesis, the child welfare cases involve liability 
for third party wrongs.  This may happen in two ways.  The plaintiff may bring 
proceedings directly alleging that the Crown’s own negligence failed to prevent the 
abuse, or (more commonly) the plaintiff may use a doctrine such as vicarious liability 
to attribute the abuser’s torts to the Crown.  In chapters seven and eight the focus is 
on the issues arising from direct negligence actions.  This chapter is about vicarious 
liability. 
Vicarious liability traditionally arises where an employee commits a tort within the 
scope of his or her employment.  For example, an employer may be liable vicariously 
for a truck driver in his employ who negligently drives into another motorist while 
delivering merchandise for the employer.  The development of vicarious liability 
reflects the fact that the employer is more likely to be able to bear the cost of the 
accident than the wrongdoer, and that as the employer derives some advantage from 
the employee’s activity it is fair that the risk of that activity should be allocated to the 
employer.  The issue discussed in this chapter is whether the vicarious liability 
doctrine can also accommodate a vindicatory purpose: should vindicatory damages be 
awarded against a defendant who is only vicariously liable?   
A The Argument Against Vindicatory Damages for Vicarious Liability 
There is an important characteristic of vicarious liability that points away from the 
availability of non-loss based damages.  Vicarious liability effectively attributes the 
tortfeasor’s wrong to the defendant whether or not the defendant is at fault: liability is 
strict.  While it might be appropriate to force a faultless employer to pay for the loss 
of a victim who is equally innocent when the real wrongdoer is impecunious, forcing 




the defendant to pay non-loss based damages is less easily justified.  For this reason, 
New Zealand courts have held that exemplary damages, which are not loss-based but 
are intended to punish the defendant, should not be awarded vicariously.  In Couch 
(No 2) Tipping J observed:1 
When one person is acting on behalf of another, the wrong is seen for the purposes of 
compensation as having been committed both by that person and by the other. But the 
policy behind awarding compensatory damages against a person on the basis of vicarious 
liability does not mean that exemplary damages should be similarly awarded. There is no 
policy basis for punishing someone for the conduct of another unless the first person’s 
conduct itself also qualifies for punishment. People should not be vicariously liable for 
punishment on account of the conduct of someone else just because that conduct renders 
them liable to compensate the plaintiff. 
B Two Counter-arguments 
In this chapter two possible solutions are suggested in response to the problem 
involved in awarding non loss-based damages vicariously.  First, it is argued that the 
claim that vicarious liability is not based on fault is exaggerated.  Courts in Canada 
and England have imposed liability on the owners of residential child care facilities 
where employees have abused the children in the defendant’s care, partly because the 
defendant itself owed a duty to the child.2  In other words, the defendant’s liability is 
triggered not by its relationship with the employee, but by its own independent duty 
of care to the plaintiff.  Vindicatory damages might be appropriate in such cases to 
recognise the breach of the defendant’s duty.   
There is a second possible argument, however.  Stevens and Murphy have both 
argued that liability in the child welfare cases should be based on breach of a non-
delegable duty, not vicarious liability. 3   This approach is based on a distinction 
between vicarious liability which arises when the defendant is an employer of the 
tortfeasor, and non-delegable duties which are triggered by the relationship between 
the defendant and the victim.  A non-delegable duty arises when the defendant 
assumes responsibility for the plaintiff’s welfare. 
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For example, the owner of a crèche may be vicariously liable for the negligence of his 
or her employees if they injure a child.  The owner may also have a non-delegable 
duty to take care of the child which would be breached if the child was injured by a 
stranger as well as by an employee.4  Liability arises because of the responsibility the 
defendant has assumed to the child, not because of the relationship with the employee. 
In both arguments, liability is imposed because of the relationship between the 
defendant and plaintiff, not because of the relationship between the defendant and the 
wrongdoer.  Since liability is triggered by the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff, 
vindicatory damages are appropriate even though the employer did not personally 
cause the wrong.   The difference between the two arguments is that in the first, the 
cases where the defendant has its own duty to the plaintiff are seen as a subset of 
vicarious liability.  In Murphy’s and Stevens’ approach these cases would form a 
separate cause of action.  In this thesis it is this second approach which is preferred, 
but the alternative first argument may be more realistic in light of the case law in this 
area. 
C The Child Welfare Cases and Fault 
Vicarious liability typically arises in the child welfare cases where the defendant runs 
a child care facility and an employee abuses a child in the defendant’s care.  For 
example, in Blackwater v Plint the plaintiff had been removed from his aboriginal 
community and placed in a special school run by the government of Canada and the 
United Church of Canada, where he had been physically and sexually abused.  In 
2005, the case reached the Supreme Court.5 
The church and the government were both held vicariously liable for their employee’s 
torts.  The issue was whether liability could be apportioned unequally.  The trial judge 
apportioned the damages 75% to the Crown and 25% to the church.  The Crown 
argued that, if vicarious liability was truly no-fault liability, it was impossible to 
apportion liability unequally.  The Supreme Court was forced to concede that 
vicarious liability implied some fault, and that this justified greater liability on the 
part of the Crown because the trial judge had found that the Crown was in a better 
position to control the tortfeasor.  On whether vicarious liability was no-fault, 
McLachlin CJ, writing for the Court, observed:
6
 
The most compelling view is that while vicarious liability is a no-fault offence in the 
sense that the employer need not have participated in or even have authorised the 
employee’s particular act of wrongdoing in another sense it implies fault … the 
                                                        
4 This example is based on a similar one used by Stevens, above n 3, at 364. 
5 Blackwater v Plint 2005 SCC 58, [2005] 3 SCR 3. 
6 Ibid, at [69]. 




degree of fault may vary depending on the level of supervision.  Parties may be more 
or less vicariously liable for an offence, depending on their level of supervision and 
direct contact. 
The conclusion that vicarious liability in the child welfare cases implies some fault is 
the result of developments in vicarious liability which began with the 1999 Supreme 
Court of Canada decision Bazley.
7
  In that case, and in subsequent decisions from the 
House of Lords and the New Zealand Court of Appeal, the courts began to emphasise 
the relationship between the defendant and plaintiff when imposing vicarious liability, 
rather than the relationship between the defendant and wrongdoer, which is the focus 
of the original test. 
D The Original Test: the Relationship between the Defendant and Wrongdoer 
In Bazley, the tortfeasor Curry had been employed by the defendant non-profit 
organisation in its residential care facilities for children between the ages of six and 
twelve.  He had been required to interact with the plaintiff as a parent would do, 
which included bathing and tucking in at bedtime.   Like most child abuse victims, 
Bazley found that the abuser was not worth suing, and turned to the employer instead.  
However, Bazley had an obvious difficulty in establishing vicarious liability against 
his abuser’s employer.  Vicarious liability requires that the wrong is within the scope 
of the employment.  It is difficult to conceive of child abuse as within any legitimate 
employment contract.  The scope of employment test is set out in more detail before a 
discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision, in which they held the employer 
vicariously liable. 
The traditional vicarious liability test is in two parts: there must be a relationship of 
employer and employee (or master and servant), and the employee must have 
committed the wrong in the course of his employment.  While the scope of the 
employment rule caused problems in cases like Bazley, the first rule has also been 
distorted in New Zealand by imposing liability on the Crown for the torts of foster 
parents, who are not employees.8   
In this chapter the second limb of the test (scope of the employment) is analysed 
before a discussion of the employment relationship limb.  This is because the first 
cases to establish vicarious liability successfully for child abuse involved tortfeasors 
who were obviously employees.  Therefore it was only the second limb, the “scope of 
the employment” requirement, which required analysis.  Later cases such as the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal decision S v Attorney-General, in which the alleged abuse 
                                                        
7 Bazley, above n 2. 
8 S v Attorney-General [2003] 3 NZLR 450 (CA). 




involved foster parents, focused on the first limb of the vicarious liability test, but did 
so against the background of the earlier cases.9 
Although cases like S v Attorney-General involve the government as defendant, 
which is the main focus of this thesis, in a number of the cases discussed below, 
including Bazley, the defendants are private sector charities.  Because of the way the 
test developed, it is not possible to discuss only those cases brought against public 
authorities.  However, it is easy to imagine similar facts arising where the defendant is 
a public authority. 
E Course of Employment 
Traditionally, employers were only liable for their employee’s torts if they were 
within the scope of employment.  Beginning with the Canadian Supreme Court 
decision Bazley in 1999 the appellate courts in Canada, England and New Zealand 
have developed vicarious liability in order to allow child abuse victims to sue.  The 
modern development focuses on the relationship of the defendant and victim, making 
damages which vindicate the defendant’s duty appropriate. 
The second limb of the vicarious liability test is the “Salmond test”.  It comes from 
Salmond’s textbook on tort law, first published in 1906.  The test is as follows:
10
 
A master is not responsible for a wrongful act done by his servant unless it is done in 
the course of his employment.  It is deemed to be so done if it is either (a) a wrongful 
act authorised by the master, or (b) a wrongful and unauthorised mode of doing some 
act authorised by the master. 
The difficulty of the course of employment test for child abuse cases is, as discussed 
above, that it is difficult to describe deliberate abuse as within the course of 
employment, or as an unauthorised mode of doing an authorised act.11  This difficulty 
is a reflection of the fact that liability arises from the relationship between the 
defendant and wrongdoer.  This relationship both triggers vicarious liability and limits 
its scope: the employer will be liable only for wrongs within the relationship from 
which the liability arises.  This can be compared to liability for non-delegable duties, 
in which the scope of the duty is determined by what the defendant assumed 
responsibility for. 
                                                        
9 S v Attorney-General, ibid.  
10 John W Salmond The Law of Torts (1st, Stevens and Haynes, London, 1907)  at 83, emphasis in 
original. 
11 Lister, above n 2, at [68]. 




1 Bazley and Jacobi 
In 1999 the Supreme Court of Canada confronted this issue in the child abuse context 
in two cases, Bazley and Jacobi.12  By this time the law was clear from a line of 
authority following the 1912 case Lloyd that employers could be liable for their 
employee’s theft of property.13  The Supreme Court assumed that Lloyd was decided 
upon vicarious liability and concluded that it would be wrong to hold employers liable 
for their employee’s thefts but not their abuse of children: “Surely a distinction is not 
to be drawn attributing a higher standard to the way society looks after its jewellery 
than its children.”
14
  However, as discussed below it is not clear that Lloyd was based 
on vicarious liability, and it is arguable that Bazley should have been decided upon a 
different basis, such as non-delegable duties. 
The Supreme Court handed down a single judgment in Bazley delivered by 
McLachlin J, which purported to follow the Salmond test but effectively overhauled it 
by reformulating the test as whether there was a close connection between the 
opportunity which the employer has created and the wrong which the employee 
committed (the enterprise risk test).15 McLachlin J held that the defendant in Bazley 
had materially increased the risk of child abuse by placing Curry in a position of 
parent-like responsibility with vulnerable children, in situations of intimacy.16   
The Supreme Court released a second decision on the same day as Bazley, in which it 
decided by a majority of four to three not to impose vicarious liability.  In Jacobi v 
Griffiths the Vernon Boys’ and Girls’ Club was, unlike the Foundation in Bazley, a 
recreational rather than a residential facility.  Children attended for sports and other 
activities after school and on Saturdays.  There were occasional outings.  The Club 
employed Griffiths as its Programme Director, whose task it was to organise the 
activities and outings.  The plaintiffs, Joy and Randy, were siblings, and attended the 
Club to play hockey and participate in gymnastics.  They were both abused by 
Griffiths, who pleaded guilty to criminal charges before the civil proceedings, 
although all of the abuse took place away from school premises and (except for one 
incident) outside school hours.   
It is difficult to distinguish Bazley and Jacobi based on the enterprise risk test.  In 
both cases it is hard to see how the provision of child care facilities for children like 
                                                        
12 Bazley, above n 2; Jacobi v Griffiths [1999] 2 SCR 570. 
13 Lloyd v Grace, Smith & Co [1912] AC 716 (HL). 
14 Bazley, above n 2, at [24]. 
15 Ibid, at [41]. 
16 Ibid, at [58]. 




Bazley increased the risk of child abuse, as Neyers and David Stevens has pointed 
out:17 
It does not make sense to say that the existence of any particular institution increases the 
risk of paedophilia … since the alternative to the institution is the street.  Surely the 
children are more vulnerable and the paedophile more empowered if they are left on the 
street. 
Bazley is based on an assumption that vicarious liability can be imposed for an 
employee’s intentional wrongs, applying cases such as Lloyd.  However, as suggested 
in the next section, Lloyd should be analysed as an example of liability for breach of a 
non-delegable duty.  Such an approach would also explain the difference in result 
between Bazley and Jacobi. 
2 Lloyd and non-delegable duties 
In Lloyd a firm of solicitors was held liable for the dishonesty of their clerk, who had 
persuaded a client to transfer property to him, which he used to his own advantage.  
The modern importance of Lloyd is its value as precedent for the rule that employers 
can be liable for the intentional torts of their employees.  However, controversy 
surrounds the argument that this case is an example of vicarious liability, as opposed 
to agency or liability for breach of non-delegable duty.   




It was long supposed that where the fraud or other wilful wrongdoing of the servant 
was committed for his own benefit and not on his master’s behalf, his master was not 
responsible.  It has now been decided by the House of Lords, however, in Lloyd v 
Grace Smith & Co that this is not the case … 
                                                        
17 Jason W Neyers and David Stevens “Vicarious Liability in the Charity Sector: an Examination of 
Bazley v Curry and Re Christian Brothers of Ireland in Canada” (2005) 42 Can Bus LJ 371, at 402, 
arguing that there should have been no liability in Bazley because it discourages charities without 
whom the plaintiffs would have been in a worse position.  For an argument that there should have been 
liability in both Bazley and Jacobi see Sheila McIntyre “Guardians of Privilege: The Resistance of the 
Supreme Court of Canada to Institutional Liability for Child Sexual Abuse” in Sanda Rodgers, Rakhi 
Ruparelia and Louise Bélanger-Hardy (eds) Critical Torts (LexisNexis, Markham, 2009). 
18 John W Salmond The Law of Torts (4th ed, Stevens and Haynes, London, 1916) at 99, cf the third 
edition (1912) at 93, which was published before Lloyd.  However, see the note by Frederick Pollock 
on the case at (1913) 29 LQR 10, which emphasises the agency aspects and the relationship of the 
plaintiff and defendant.  See also Pettersson v Royal Oak Hotel Ltd [1948] NZLR 136 (CA) where a 
customer threw a glass at a bar attendant and the attendant threw part of it back at him, negligently 
injuring another customer (the plaintiff).  The Court of Appeal held that the employer was vicariously 
liable although the attendant was motivated by personal resentment.  Lloyd was cited as authority for 
this in the oral argument.  However, it is not clear that this case would be decided the same way today: 
Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (5th ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2009) at 1048. 




In a 1964 case Lord Denning appears to have treated the case as one of agency.
19
  
However, Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency seems to treat the case as an example of 
vicarious liability, but acknowledges that “in common speech” the clerk might be 
“more appropriately described as [an] agent”.20   
Modern torts scholars have argued that Lloyd should be seen as an example of 
liability for breach of non-delegable duty.
21
  On this interpretation liability would be 
based on the interaction between the solicitor and the client, rather than any 
employment or agency relationship between the solicitor and the clerk.   
This analysis can be elaborated using Cane’s distinction between relational liability 
and outcome liability.22  Relational liability is based on the relationship between the 
defendant and the wrongdoer, while outcome liability is triggered when the defendant 
guarantees an outcome to the plaintiff (or that an outcome will not happen).  Under 
outcome based liability it does not matter whether or not the defendant’s agent or 
employee committed the wrong, or whether the defendant caused the wrong: liability 
is based on the defendant’s assumption of responsibility that an outcome will (or will 
not) occur.  The defendant is at fault for not preventing the wrong. 
3 Lewis and independent contractors 
Non-delegable duties are typically used to impose liability on defendants for the 
wrongs of independent contractors, because vicarious liability is traditionally only 
available for the wrongs of employees.  However, non-delegable duties should not be 
seen as a gap-filler designed to prevent defendants escaping liability by contracting 
out; rather, they are distinct from vicarious liability because they are based on the 
relationship between the defendant and plaintiff, not that between defendant and 
tortfeasor. 
For example, in the Canadian case Lewis, the Ministry of Transportation and 
Highways engaged a contractor to remove the rocks from a cliff bordering a highway 
which they were responsible for repairing.23  The work was done negligently, and one 
of the remaining rocks fell and killed a passing motorist.  Because the work was done 
by contractors, not employees, the Ministry was not vicariously liable. 
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20 Peter Watts and FMB Reynolds Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency (19th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 
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21 See Neyers, above n 17, at 394; Murphy, above n 3, at 376. 
22 Peter Cane The Anatomy of Tort Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) at 46.  Note though 
that Cane suggested that outcome liability was very rare in the common law, at 49. 
23 Lewis (Guardian ad litem of) v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1145. 




The Supreme Court held that the Ministry had a non-delegable duty: once it had 
decided to do the repair work on the cliff, it was liable for any negligence whether this 
was done by an employee or an independent contractor.  The Ministry derived its 
powers to repair the road from statute, and the non-delegable duty arose from the 
statutory framework.  Cory J said:24 
The imposition of personal liability on the Ministry for its contractor’s failure to 
discharge the duty to take due care ancillary to the Ministry’s statutory power flows 
from this section and the overall general scheme of the applicable statutes. 
Liability for breach of the non-delegable duty was triggered by the relationship 




To determine whether a non-delegable duty should be imposed, the Court should 
examine the relationship between the parties and ask whether that relationship 
possesses elements that make it appropriate to hold the defendant liable for the 
negligence of its independent contractor. 
The focus on the relationship between the defendant and plaintiff distinguishes Lewis 
from cases of vicarious liability.  In vicarious liability, the plaintiff may have no idea 
who the defendant is because they are dealing with the employer.  Where there is a 
non-delegable duty it is the wrongdoer who may be unknown.  As Cory J pointed out, 
users of the highway rely on the Ministry to repair the highway.26  However, they may 
not know who the Ministry engaged to do the work. 
4 Bazley and Jacobi explained with non-delegable duties 
While the risk enterprise test cannot explain cases such as Bazley because it is not 
obvious that the risk to children is increased when charities provide residential care 
facilities for emotionally troubled children, the result may be more readily explained 
with the non-delegable duty analysis described in relation to Lloyd and Lewis.  On this 
analysis, liability would be imposed where the defendant had assumed responsibility 
to the plaintiff and the wrong which occurred was within the scope of the duty.  The 
defendant in Bazley assumed responsibility for the care of the plaintiff; it guaranteed 
the outcome that Bazley would be safe while on its premises.  Therefore it is liable 
when that outcome does not occur. 
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As Stevens has argued, the non-delegable explanation of Lloyd also explains the result 
in Jacobi:27 
… the Supreme Court of Canada in Bazley v Curry reached the right result for the 
wrong reasons … it stretches credulity to suggest that running a non-profit residential 
care home for emotionally troubled children increases the risk of children being 
abused … if the claims in Bazley and Jacobi had been seen as based upon voluntarily 
assumed duties that care would be taken of the children, the difference in result is 
readily explicable.  The scope of the duty undertaken must be ascertained.  What was 
the club in Jacobi undertaking to do?  There was an undertaking that care would be 
taken of the children at the club, but they are not assuming a duty to care for the child 
once he or she goes home. 
5 Lister and assumption of responsibility 
Stevens’ argument is especially compelling when applied to the House of Lords case 
Lister, in which the judges applied the “close-connection” test from Bazley but 
explicitly introduced ideas to do with assumption of responsibility.  In Lister the 
warden at a boarding school for boys had abused one of the children in his care.  Like 
the home in Bazley, the facilities were residential, and it was meant to feel like a 
home rather than an extension of school.  The House of Lords adopted what it saw as 
the ratio of Bazley and Jacobi, the connection between the tort and the authorised 
action.  The judges argued that this was consistent with the real Salmond test, by 
returning to the first edition of Salmond for the following passage:
28
 
… a master … is liable even for acts which he has not authorised, provided they are 
so connected with acts which he has authorised, that they may rightly be regarded as 
modes. 
Lord Steyn observed: “Salmond’s explanation is the germ of the close connection test 
adumbrated by the Canadian Supreme Court in Bazley.”
29
 
Most of the Law Lords in Lister also discussed the duty which the defendants owed to 
the plaintiffs.  Lord Steyn observed that “It becomes possible [under the Lister 
approach] to consider the question of vicarious liability on the basis that the employer 
undertook to care for the boys through the services of the warden…”30  Lord Clyde 
observed that Bazley illustrates a “situation where the employer has assumed a 
relationship to the plaintiff.” 31   
                                                        
27 Stevens, above n 3, at 361-362; emphasis in original. 
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30 Inid, at 227 per Lord Steyn. 
31 Inid, at [46] emphasis added; see also Lord Hutton at [54]. 




The emphasis on assumption of responsibility and the voluntary undertakings by the 
defendant is consistent with the non-delegable duty approach advocated by Stevens 
and Murphy.  The focus is on the relationship between the defendant and plaintiff, as 
in liability for breach of a non-delegable duty, rather than on the relationship between 
the defendant and wrongdoer.  The duty is consistent with Cane’s “outcome liability” 
in which the defendant is liable because it failed to ensure that the plaintiff would be 
kept safe, even though it had assumed responsibility for this outcome. 
In child abuse cases like Bazley and Lister vicarious liability is problematic because 
the abuse is not within the scope of the course of employment.  However, the 
defendants in both cases assumed responsibility to ensure the children in their care 
were looked after, and this duty was breached when the children were abused, even 
though the defendants did not cause the abuse through their own negligence.  
Therefore liability for breach of a non-delegable duty is appropriate.  Vindicatory 
damages are appropriate in such cases because liability is based on the defendant’s 
own duty. It is misleading to describe such liability as not based on fault. 
F Stretching the Employment Relationship: S v Attorney-General 
As discussed at the beginning of the chapter, establishing vicarious liability for 
intentional wrongs is the second part of a two-limb test: the plaintiff must also 
establish that the tortfeasor and the defendant were in an employment relationship.   
In July 2003 the New Zealand Court of Appeal in S v Attorney-General unanimously 
imposed vicarious liability on the Crown for the torts of foster parents although there 
was no employment relationship and no remuneration.
32
  However, the judges 
differed in their reasoning.  The majority held that foster parents were agents of the 
Crown and that this established vicarious liability in the same way as an employment 
relationship.  Tipping J, in the minority, preferred to see foster parents as a sui generis 
class for which the defendants could be held liable.33 
This section argues that the agency analysis is not compelling.  Although agency is 
one way of making the defendant liable for the wrongs of a third party, it is distinct 
from vicarious liability.  Crown liability for foster parents is best explained as arising 
from the responsibility the Crown assumes when it takes children into its care and 
then places them with foster parents, consistent with the non-delegable duty analysis 
discussed above.  Liability vindicates the Crown’s duty to ensure the children’s 
wellbeing.   
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1 Is agency an established ground of vicarious liability? 
In his 1967 monograph on vicarious liability, Atiyah wrote: “there is no more 
controverted proposition than that a principal is generally liable for the torts of an 
agent committed within the scope of his authority.”34  Since then the controversy 
seems to have been resolved in favour of a bright line between agency and vicarious 
liability, with the New Zealand Court of Appeal in S v Attorney-General a striking 
exception.35   
Unlike vicarious liability, where liability is secondary, agency imposes primary 
liability on a principal.  Agency arises when one person:
 36
 
… manifests assent that the other should act on his behalf so as to affect his relations 
with third parties, and the other of whom similarly manifests assent so to act or so 
acts pursuant to the manifestation.  
Liability is primary because the agent acts on behalf of the principal, as Stevens has 
pointed out: “If someone is authorised to make a statement on my behalf, the 
statement is mine regardless of whether the words come out of my mouth.”37  This 
difference between primary and secondary liability makes assuming a general 
principle of vicarious liability for principals and the torts of their agents problematic.  
It is better to treat agency and vicarious liability as distinct doctrines, both of which 
attribute liability to the defendant for the wrongs of a third party, either an employee 
or an agent.38   
Agency concepts have been utilised in two situations of vicarious liability: the motor-
car cases and the fraud cases.  This does not provide support for the Court of Appeal’s 
reasoning in S v Attorney-General, however.  Neither of these situations suggests that 
there is a general principle of vicarious liability for principals and the torts of their 
agents which could apply to the abuse cases. 
(a) Motor-car cases 
Quasi-agency relationships were used for a while in a line of motor car accident cases, 
in which the driver of a car was said to be the owner’s agent, and the owner was made 
vicariously liable.  Giliker has pointed out that this was probably because the owner 
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398, Paula Giliker Vicarious Liability in Tort: A Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2010) at 110. 
36 Bowstead, above n 20, at 1. 
37 Robert Stevens “Why do agents ‘drop out’?” [2005] LMCLQ 101, at 103. 
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was more likely to be insured than the driver, and that this doctrine has become 
redundant in England now that third-party motor car insurance is mandatory:39 
… the policy justification for using agency to extend vicarious liability to the loan of 
motor vehicles has virtually disappeared.  It remains an odd remnant of the common 
law, originating in horse and buggy cases and developing, in the twentieth century, to 
respond to the needs of victims of motor vehicle accidents.  As such, it adds little to 
our understanding of the principles of vicarious laibility, save the willingness of the 
common law courts to extend the benefits of vicarious liability regardless of principle 
(and legal coherence) to achieve the aims of social justice. 
(b) Fraud cases 
The other kind of vicarious liability cases in which agency concepts have been used 
are fraud, such as Lloyd discussed above.40  Giliker has argued that agency concepts 
are relevant to fraud because the tort involves victim participation.  It must be 
reasonable for the plaintiff to rely on the employee’s deception:
 41
  
Thus, where the victim relies on statements which he knows or believes to be made by an 
employee acting outside the scope of his actual or apparent authority, then the courts will 
refuse to impose vicarious liability. 
However, the introduction of the agency concept of authority is only relevant to the 
scope of the employer’s vicarious liability for the employee’s tort: it does not extend 
the vicarious liability doctrine to principals and agents.  There is no justification for 
imposing vicarious liability generally on all principals for the torts of their agents 
within the scope of their authority.  The majority’s approach in S v Attorney-General 
should therefore be rejected, whether or not foster parents can be described as agents.  
Nor is Tipping J’s approach, which would deem foster parents and the Crown as a sui 
generis form of vicarious liability, preferable: once liability is imposed on 
relationships beyond employment, it becomes impossible to draw the line anywhere. 
2 Non-delegable duties applied to S v Attorney-General 
Instead of viewing Crown liability for foster parents as vicarious, the better analysis is 
that the Crown has a non-delegable duty to take care of children.  This is consistent 
with the reasoning (but not the ratio) in S, which focused on the relationship of the 
employer and victim, rather than that between the employer and the wrongdoer.  The 
majority observed:42 
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The Superintendent had a duty imposed upon him by statute to take care of the 
children. He was obliged to fulfil that duty by placing them in suitable private homes 
where there was supposed to be adherence to practices in accordance with a 
Departmental manual and continued Departmental monitoring. The Department had a 
right of inspection and a right to remove any child at any time. The children were 
said, in the words of the long title to the Child Welfare Act, to be “specially under the 
protection of the State”. That protection cannot have been intended to diminish when 
a fostering arrangement was made. 
The importance of establishing vicarious liability rather than a non-delegable duty 
based on assumption of duty may have been that the Crown is only liable in tort law 
vicariously.  However, as observed in the analysis of Baigent in chapter four, it is 
possible to sue the Crown for primary liability under an Act under s 3(2)(b) of the 
Crown Proceedings Act 1950: “Any wrong or injury for which the Crown is liable in 
tort under this Act or under any other Act which is binding on the Crown”.  As 
discussed above in relation to Lewis, non-delegable duties have been imposed in 
Canada on public authorities where they have statutory duties.43  It is arguable that 
non-delegable duties could be imposed on the Crown to enforce the “duty imposed 
upon [it] by statute”, consistently with the reasoning in S v Attorney-General.  
However, this argument has not been accepted in Canada, as discussed below. 
3 KLB, EDG and non-delegable duties 
In Canada, the Supreme Court in 2003 released two decisions on Crown liability for 
child abuse.  In KLB it considered the same issue as the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
in S, but reached the opposite conclusion, holding that the Crown was not vicariously 
liable for the torts of foster parents (the oral submissions were heard before S, but the 
decision was delivered afterwards).44  The plaintiff was one of four children whose 
parents were unable to care for them: the father was an abusive alcoholic and the 
family lived in extreme poverty.  The children were placed together with two different 
foster parents, one after the other.  There was direct negligence in the placements, as 
the Ministry should have known that the foster parents were likely to be abusive, as 
indeed turned out to be the case.  In one family, KLB was sexually abused by one of 
the parents’ adopted sons.   
The Supreme Court applied the traditional employment test of control when 
determining whether there was the kind of relationship which gave rise to vicarious 
liability.  It emphasised the degree of independence and lack of oversight which foster 
parents have in the way they care for their foster children.  While the Court did not 
hold that only employment relationships could ground vicarious liability, it contrasted 
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the relationship of foster parents and the Crown with the relationship in the House of 
Lords case Lister: 45  
In that case, the warden was clearly an employee acting on behalf of the company … 
The warden received a salary, instead of the cost-recovery payments made per child 
to foster parents. 
In EDG the Supreme Court found against the plaintiff’s claim for damages against the 
Crown and the Board of Trustees of the school where she had been assaulted by the 
night janitor.  The Court analysed whether the Board could be liable for breach of a 
non-delegable statutory duty in the School Act 1979 (BC) but held against the 
plaintiff:46 
None of the general duties gives school boards full responsibility for students’ welfare 
while on school premises, in the way that the statutes in Lewis gave the Ministry full 
responsibility for overseeing maintenance projects and for ensuring that workers 
exercised reasonable care.  Consequently, the Act does not appear to impose a general 
non-delegable duty upon school boards to ensure that children are kept safe while on 
school premises, such as would render the Board liable for abuse of a child by an 
employee on school premises. 
EDG can be distinguished from S v Attorney-General because it involved a school 
board while S was concerned with children who had been taken into care by the 
Crown and placed with foster parents.  However, the reasoning in EDG is arguably 
inconsistent with Lewis, in which a non-delegable duty was recognised not because of 
the scope of the statutory duty (which was very general 47 ) but because of the 
relationship between the statutory authority and the plaintiff.  Where the defendant 
takes a child into care in the exercise of its statutory powers, it arguably puts itself in 
the same position as the defendant in Lewis, because the plaintiff in both situations is 
forced to rely on the defendant for protection.  In both KLB and EDG the Supreme 
Court failed to ask the right question: what responsibility did the defendant assume 
for the child’s wellbeing?  In S v Attorney-General the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
arguably reached the right result, although the reasoning is open to criticism. 
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The minister shall direct the construction, maintenance and repair of all government buildings, 
highways and public works in progress, or constructed or maintained at the expense of the 
Province, and which are under his control.   
See the discussion in Stevens, above n 3, at 349. 




4 Extending the sui generis agency test 
Since S v Attorney-General in 2003, New Zealand courts have refused to expand 
vicarious liability further, perhaps because the reasoning in S v Attorney-General is 
difficult to apply.  In S the relationship between the Crown and foster parents was 
classed as an “unusual, indeed unique” class of agency, but the Court gave no hints as 
to how far the unique class was intended to stretch.  If S is analysed as a non-
delegable duty, the question becomes whether the defendant has assumed 
responsibility for the child’s welfare, and the scope of the liability is dependent on the 
breadth of the responsibility assumed.  This test is arguably easier to apply than the 
vague “sui generis agency” test. 
For example, in White, Miller J refused to extend the rule in S to include the 
relationship between the Crown and the children’s biological parents.48  The children 
had been made state wards by court order but had been returned to their parents.  
Miller J observed that:49 
… they were not appointed in the sense that they were selected by the Director-
General from a pool of available foster parents.  Rather, Mrs White was the plaintiffs’ 
mother and there were no viable alternatives to placing them in her care. 
Miller J applied the agency test in S, asking whether “the plaintiffs or the wider 
community would consider that Mrs White and Mr Vincent were acting on [the 
Director-General’s] behalf.”  The question may have been answered differently if 
Miller J had focused on whether the Directory-General had assumed responsibility for 
the children’s safety.   
G Summary 
If the child abuse cases were truly vicarious in the orthodox non-fault sense a 
vindicatory approach would be inappropriate: it would force the defendant to 
vindicate a wrong which it did not commit.  However, the better analysis of the cases 
is that the defendants are under non-delegable duties.  Therefore vindicatory damages 
may be appropriate in order to vindicate the breach of the defendant’s duty, 
emphasising the relationship between the defendant and plaintiff, which would not 
necessarily be present if liability were truly vicarious. 
If the non-delegable duty analysis is not accepted, then it should be acknowledged 
that there are now two types of vicarious liability.  Where the traditional “no-fault” 
                                                        
48 White v Attorney-General HC Wellington CIV-1999-485-85, CIV-2001-485-864, 28 November 
2008.  The Court of Appeal did not decide the issue: White v Attorney-General [2010] NZCA 139. 
49 Ibid, at [373].  The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal: W v Attorney-General [2010] NZSC 69, 
(2010) 19 PRNZ 921. 




vicarious liability is imposed, non-loss based damages are inappropriate.  However, 
where the modern kind of vicarious liability is imposed, as in Lister, Bazley and S, 
vindicatory damages should be available to mark the breach of the defendant’s duty to 
the plaintiff. 
 




VII The Omissions Rule 
In chapter six the focus was on cases where public authorities are held vicariously 
liable for the wrongs of their employees or other third parties who commit torts, for 
example foster parents.  This chapter and the one that follows are concerned with 
direct liability, where the public authority is held liable for its own negligence.1  The 
emphasis is much more focused on liability rather than on damages, but the 
vindicatory approach is used to help explain the developments of the negligence rules 
in the child welfare cases in both England and New Zealand.   
The type of case analysed in this chapter and in chapter eight typically concerns a 
public authority which, it is alleged, failed to exercise its statutory power to protect 
the plaintiff from a third party.  The third party may be a stranger to the authority.  
For example, New Zealand’s Child Youth and Family Services (CYFS) might receive 
a complaint that a child is being abused by his or her parents.  CYFS may have never 
met the parents or the child, but through its negligence in dealing with the complaint, 
it may fail to exercise a statutory power to investigate and the child may therefore 
continue to suffer abuse which CYFS could have prevented.2   
Tipping J in Couch identified three issues which often arise when there is an 




The law has traditionally been cautious about imposing a duty of care in cases of 
omission as opposed to commission; in cases where a public authority is performing a 
role for the benefit of the community as a whole; and in cases where it is the actions 
of a third party rather than those of the defendant that are the immediate cause of the 
loss or harm suffered by the plaintiff. 
The first issue, whether liability can be imposed for omissions, is the subject of this 
chapter.  The second issue (whether statutory powers are imposed for the public 
benefit and therefore cannot sound in private law damages) is dealt with in the 
following chapter.  The third issue which Tipping J mentions is not given separate 
treatment because it is the subject of the entire thesis; it underpins the discussion of all 
the other issues.   
                                                        
1 For discussion of whether the Crown can be sued directly in negligence, see chapter two, at the text to 
footnote 4. 
2 This set of facts is similar to X v Bedfordshire [1995] 2 AC 663 (HL). 
3 Couch v Attorney-General (on appeal from Hobson v Attorney-General) [2008] 3 NZSC 45; [2008] 3 
NZLR 725 at [80]. 




A The Equality Principle 
The first two problems identified by Tipping J relate to an important concept in the 
common law called the equality principle.   This principle is that the Crown should be 
subject to the same law as private individuals.  Therefore, if private individuals are 
not liable for omissions (the first issue identified by Tipping J), it follows that public 
authorities should not be liable for omissions either.  This rule, which is usually 
associated with Dicey,
4
 was explained more recently in the following way by the 
High Court of Australia in 2009:5 
… the claim that the [defendants] were repositories of a statutory power and that the 
scope of the asserted duty of care related to the discretion whether or not to exercise 
that power does not place the case into a distinct field of actionable tort. 
Therefore the executive is subject to all the same liabilities as private individuals, but 
no more.6    In the following two chapters it is argued that the equality principle has 
been overtaken by the developments in negligence in the child abuse cases.  The 
equality principle cannot explain the results in Prince and D v East Berkshire.  The 
rejection of the principle can be explained as a necessary prerequisite to vindicating 
the underlying community duty to protect children. 
B The General Rule against Omissions 
In the common law defendants are not usually liable for omissions.  Jane Stapleton 
describes the difference between doing something and failing to do something as the 
only truly fundamental principle in negligence:7 
In negligence only two … concerns are trumps: the one underlying the rule that I am 
liable if I carelessly bump a stranger into a pool; and the one underlying the rule that I 
am not liable if I fail to try to rescue a stranger drowning in a pool. 
Failing to do something is usually described as an omission or non-feasance.  In the 
child abuse cases the allegation is often that the defendant failed to confer a benefit.  
In the classic example of failing to rescue a drowning child, the stranger faces no 
liability unless he or she falls into one of a number of exceptions, usually based on a 
special relationship with the child (for example a parent or caregiver).   
                                                        
4 Albert V Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th ed, Macmillan, 1915) at 
114. 
5 Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215 (HC) at 48; see also Elias CJ and Anderson J in 
Couch (No 1) above n 3 at [55]. 
6 Peter W Hogg and Patrick J Monahan in Liability of the Crown (3ed, Carswell, Scarbourgh, 2000) 
argue that this rule continues to provide a satisfactory explanation of state liability.  
7 Jane Stapleton “The golden thread at the heart of tort law: Protection of the vulnerable” (2003) 24 
ABR 1, at 5. 




C The Difficulty of Distinguishing between an Act and an Omission 
The difference between an act or omission is not always easy to identify.  The 
difficulty can be seen in the New Zealand Court of Appeal decisions in Prince8 and B 
v Attorney-General.
9
  In Prince, the Department of Social Welfare
10
 had received a 
complaint that the plaintiff was neglected.  It was alleged that they had negligently 
failed to investigate the complaint.  The Court of Appeal rejected any suggestion that 
the claim could be struck out because it alleged a pure omission:
11
  
… in terms of the pleadings the case cannot be characterised as one of total failure to 
consider the alleged complaint - the allegation is of failure to investigate the 
complaint ``adequately or at all''. There is no basis for determining striking out on the 
footing that it is necessarily a pure omission case … It cannot be predicated that the 
department made any particular decision in relation to the complaint … 
Richardson P’s analysis highlights the difficulty of distinguishing between an 
omission and an act when an authority has received a complaint.  They must do 
something with the complaint itself, and even if they decide to do nothing the 
decision-making process itself could conceivably be described as an act.  Realistically 
though it is hard to see how the allegation could be described as anything other than 
an omission: the plaintiff complained that the Department had passively received a 
complaint without doing anything about it.   
Tipping J, a member of the Court of Appeal in both Prince and B, acknowledged the 
artificiality of this analysis in the latter case:
12
 
In Prince, the central allegation was that the department, negligently and in breach of 
its duty of care, had failed to make any, or any adequate, investigation of a complaint 
about the way Mr Prince was being looked after by his parents. The central allegation 
in the statement of claim was short and simple - ``DSW did nothing''. The case must 
be read in that light. 
Therefore Prince should be analysed as an exception to the general rule against 
omissions unless there is a pre-existing relationship.  As argued below, the rationales 
underpinning the omissions rule do not have much relevance to cases like Prince 
where the defendant is the state or a local council.  Where the defendant is a statutory 
authority specifically created to prevent child abuse in fulfilment of the obligations of 
                                                        
8 Attorney-General v Prince and Gardner [1998] 1 NZLR 262 (CA) 
9 B v Attorney-General [2004] 3 NZLR 145 (PC).   
10 The precursor to Child Youth and Family Services, see chapter three, text to footnote 4. 
11 Prince, above n 8, at 281. 
12 B v Attorney-General [1999] 2 NZLR 296 (CA) at 307 




the community which it represents, its failures may sometimes need to be vindicated 
whether they are acts or omissions. 
D Exceptions to the General Rule 
The courts have always recognised exceptions to the general rule against affirmative 
duties.  These have traditionally been explained by a pre-existing relationship, usually 
based on an assumption of responsibility, as Pollock wrote:13 
Some already existing relation of duty must be established, which relation will be 
found in most cases, though not in all, to depend on a foregoing voluntary act of the 
party held liable.  He was not in the first instance bound to do anything at all; but by 
some independent motion of his own he has given hostages, so to speak, to the law.  
Thus I am not compelled to be a parent; but if I am one, I must maintain my children. 
This was the rationale of the 1966 New Zealand Court of Appeal decision in 
McCallion v Dodd, in which a two-parent two-child family were walking along the 
road and the mother and one of the children were struck down by a vehicle.14  The 
Court of Appeal held that the father had a duty in that case even though he was 
carrying the other child, and the son who was struck down was holding the mother’s 
hand.  The mother’s deafness convinced the Court that the father retained a duty to 
take care of the child on the road.  The majority held that the parents owed an 
affirmative duty to protect the child because there was a pre-existing relationship 
based on assumption of responsibility: “[T]he true basis of [the father’s] duty lies in 
the assumption by the parent of the responsibility on the occasion.  That assumption is 
the foundation of the liability.”15 
In some of the public authority liability cases for child abuse there is a pre-existing 
relationship available on which an affirmative duty can be based.  For example in the 
English case Barrett the plaintiff had been removed from his parents shortly after his 
birth and placed in the care of various foster parents and state-owned care facilities.16  
He alleged that negligence on the part of the state had ruined his life in various ways.  
The House of Lords refused to strike out the pleadings, recognising that there might 
be an affirmative duty of care.  The defendant had taken the child into its care, so it is 
possible to reconcile the alleged affirmative duty with the omissions rule because it 
fits within the exception based on assumption of responsibility.  However, in Prince 
there was no such pre-existing relationship.  
                                                        
13 Sir Frederick Pollock  The Law of Torts: A treatise on the principles of obligations arising from civil 
wrongs in the common law (13th ed, London, Stevens & Sons Ltd, 1929) at 415. 
14 McCallion v Dodd and Another [1966] NZLR 710 (CA). 
15 Ibid, at 729, per McCarthy J; Turner J cited Hedley Byrne and Co Ltd v Heller and Partners Ltd. 
[1964] AC 463 (HL). 
16 Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 550 (HL). 




Other situations in which liability for omissions have been imposed were considered 
by Lord Goff in Smith v Littlewoods.17  The defendants owned a cinema adjacent to 
the plaintiffs’ property.  Vandals broke in and started a fire which damaged the 
plaintiffs’ buildings.  While the House of Lords was unanimous in dismissing the 
cause of action only Lord Goff based his decision on the rationale that the common 
law does not impose liability for failure to prevent harm.
18
  He held that there was no 
general principle that liability for omissions could be imposed, even where there is 
foreseeability.19  Based on this starting point, he identified a number of categories in 
which the judges had made exceptions and allowed liability for omissions.  While he 
was in the minority in his approach, his speech has become an important authority for 
the omissions rule and its exceptions.20   
The categories identified by Lord Goff included: assumption of responsibility, 
vicarious liability, where the defendant is an occupier, where there is a special 
relationship between the defendant and the third party based on control, and where the 
defendant “negligently causes or permits to be created a source of danger”.21  There 
are dicta in Lord Goff’s speech that suggests that liability can be imposed merely on 
the basis that the authority knew of the danger, which could be analogised with child 
welfare cases where the defendant knew that the child was in danger of being abused 
even though there was no pre-existing relationship.22  However, these passages seem 
to be restricted to situations in which the source of danger is on the defendant’s land.  
Ultimately it is difficult to glean from any of Lord Goff’s categories, or those 
suggested in the textbooks, any support for an affirmative duty to protect children 
from third party harm.  This reflects, in part, the difficulty of imposing a duty on a 
relationship that arises only because of statute, when the common law is based on a 
refusal to recognise separate public authority duties of care which are not identical to 
those owed by private individuals. 
                                                        
17 Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] AC 241 (HL). 
18 Cf Lord MacKay’s speech, ibid at 261, applying a general rule of reasonable foreseeability of harm.  
See also Lord Brandon of Oakbrookat at 250.  The difference in reasoning may be attributable to the 
fact that the case was an appeal from Scotland, where the distinction between acts and omissions is not 
applied in the same way as in England: Elspeth Reid “Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd (1985)” in 
Charles Mitchell and Paul Mitchell (eds) Landmark Cases in the Law of Tort (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
2010) 251. 
19 Smith v Littlewoods, above n 17, at 272. 
20 It is endorsed by the leading textbooks in this area, see for example Michael A Jones (ed) Clerk & 
Lindsell on Torts (20th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2010) at 446; Christopher Walton (ed) 
Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence (London, Thomas Reuters, 2010) at 44. 
21
Smith v Littlewoods, above n 19, at 272 
22 Ibid, at 274 and 275. 




E The Rationales Underpinning the Rule 
There are two main rationales underpinning the omissions rule which are presented in 
the case law.  First, this rule has been identified with the common law’s promotion of 
individual autonomy.23  A more recent justification is concerned with efficiency.  It is 
said that imposing liability for omissions does not lead to an efficient allocation of 
resources.  Both of these justifications were identified by Lord Hoffmann in Stovin v 
Wise:24 
One can put the matter in political, moral or economic terms. In political terms it is 
less of an invasion of an individual's freedom for the law to require him to consider 
the safety of others in his actions than to impose upon him a duty to rescue or protect 
…  In economic terms, the efficient allocation of resources usually requires an 
activity should bear its own costs. If it benefits from being able to impose some of its 
costs on other people (what economists call 'externalities,') the market is distorted 
because the activity appears cheaper than it really is. So liability to pay compensation 
for loss caused by negligent conduct acts as a deterrent against increasing the cost of 
the activity to the community and reduces externalities. But there is no similar 
justification for requiring a person who is not doing anything to spend money on 
behalf of someone else. 
Both rationales fit awkwardly when applied to cases like Prince and East Berkshire. 
The concern in these cases is not so much shifting loss between parties (much of this 
is already done through social assistance programmes25) but about vindicating rights, 
and therefore questions about efficiency are unhelpful.  Nor are concerns about 
autonomy useful: public authorities are representative of the community, and lack an 
interest in their own autonomy.  The equality principle presents difficulties in these 
cases because the interests of public and private defendants do not equate. 
F The Autonomy Rationale 
One rationale for the rule against affirmative duties is based on a recognition that 
there can be no right to protection from strangers, because it restricts the stranger’s 
right to autonomy.  Stevens has written in defence of a rights-based theory in which 
tort law is conceptualised as a way of providing compensation whenever the 
defendant interferes with the plaintiff’s rights.  Under this approach the judges should 
develop the law to strike a balance between the rights of the plaintiff and the 
                                                        
23 Todd, Stephen (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (5th ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2009) at 164; 
Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, above n 20, at 447. 
24 Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923 (HL) at 943. 
25 Discussed in chapter two. 




defendant.  The plaintiff’s rights are limited by the defendant’s right to live as he 
chooses, to live autonomously.  Stevens describes it this way:26 
The claim rights which we have which are good against the rest of the world are of a 
negative kind.  I can exclude you from my property, you may not touch me without 
consent, and you may not harm my reputation.  I cannot compel you to repair my car, 
cure my illness, or speak well of me.  All of us have a liberty to choose to behave as 
we please, so long as we do not infringe the rights of others.  We do not have rights 
good against the rest of the world to compel others to come to our assistance.  A 
modern day priest and Levite would not infringe any rights of the man stripped of his 
raiment when they walk on by on the other side. 
The starting position of the common law is based upon a premium placed upon our 
freedom to choose how we live our lives … the failure to confer a benefit upon 
someone else does not, alone, constitute the infringement of a right. 
The reason, according to Stevens, that the common law does not protect rights to have 
benefits conferred is, under this rights-based approach, that the defendant should be 
free to choose how to live his or her life.  This interest of the defendant’s reflects an 
emphasis in the common law on autonomy.
27
   
Beever has also presented a theory of tort law which would exclude liability for 
omissions.28  Both Beever and Stevens argue that liability cannot be imposed unless 
the defendant violates the rights of the plaintiff or fails to confer a benefit for which 
he or she has voluntarily assumed responsibility.  However, they frame the argument 
slightly differently.  Stevens starts with the defendant’s autonomy and then argues 
that this must be protected by not imposing affirmative duties on people unless they 
voluntarily assume responsibility.  Beever’s starting point is the relationship between 
the plaintiff and defendant:
29
 
In determining wrongdoing, then, the focus is on the personal interaction between the 
wrongdoer and the wrong-sufferer.  The focus is not on the consequences of the 
wrongdoer’s action for society as a whole.  The injustice committed by the 
wrongdoer is an instance of personal wrongdoing and the injustice suffered by the 
wrong-sufferer has a claim in corrective justice only if the wrongdoer violated her 
right, and she can claim from the wrongdoer only if her right was violated by that 
particular wrongdoer. 
                                                        
26 Robert Stevens Torts and Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) at 9. 
27 Cf Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra, above n 5, where the plaintiff’s autonomy is used as a justification for 
refusing to recognise a duty of care to protect him from self-harm. 
28 Allan Beever Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2007) although he 
prefers to call this non-feasance. 
29 Ibid at 45, emphasis in original. 




Beever argues that where the defendant violates the plaintiff’s rights, for instance by 
abusing the child, there is a personal interaction in which one person violates the 
rights of another, which corrective justice requires to be corrected.  There is also a 
violation of a right if one person assumes a responsibility to another and then fails to 
fulfil that obligation.  However, where a stranger fails to rescue a drowning child, 
there is no relationship or personal interaction to trigger liability:
30
  
Because the child did not fall into the water because of any wrongdoing of mine, 
there is no justification in corrective justice to hold that I now owe him an obligation 
to rescue him.   
A duty would not be required “to correct anything [the stranger] had done to the 
child.”
31
  The end point for both Stevens and Beever is the independence of the 
defendant, although Stevens emphasises the defendant’s right to autonomy, while 
Beever focuses more on the fact that the defendant has had no personal interaction 
with the plaintiff. 
In the context of public authority liability, there are two main difficulties with a 
rationale that relies on the defendant’s autonomy.  First, it is that it is not clear that 
public authorities have any.  As Fleming has pointed out:32 
From a policy point of view, it is arguable that the sacrifice of individual liberty, 
implicit in affirmative duties on private individuals, has no counterpart in the case of 
public authorities specifically entrusted with powers and resources for the sake of 
public health and safety.   
While it might be important to protect the freedom of private individuals to choose 
whether or not to rescue, reflecting an emphasis on the capacity for self-reflection and 
choice, public authorities are created to represent the public, not to choose whether or 
not to engage in altruistic behaviour.  If the voting public have chosen (loosely 
speaking) to entrust an authority with power to protect children, it is difficult to 
conclude that there should be much autonomous freedom left to the authority to 
decide whether or not to protect children in danger of abuse or neglect. 
In the 2008 New Zealand Supreme Court decision Couch, Elias CJ made a similar 
argument.
33
  The majority refused to strike out the allegation that the Crown through 
the parole board had negligently placed Bell in employment in the plaintiff’s work 
place, holding that there could be a duty of care if the plaintiff was part of a group that 
                                                        
30 Ibid at 221. 
31 Ibid at 221emphasis added.  
32  John G Fleming The Law of Torts (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, 1992, 8th ed, London) at 158.  The 
passage does not appear in the ninth edition. 
33 Couch, above n 3. 




was at “special risk”.
34
  Elias CJ delivered the reasons for herself and Anderson J, also 
refusing to strike out the proceedings but dissenting in approach.  She observed that 
the Probation Services could not be treated like other, non-public defendants, because 
it lacked the freedom to choose whether or not to exercise its power to control 
probationees:35 
… the Probation Service could not be a bystander.  It was obliged to undertake the 
supervision which was its statutory duty.  It had no discretion whether or not to 
supervise. 
Elias CJ and Anderson J held that if defendants were liable for failing to confer a 
benefit when they had assumed a responsibility to do so, public authorities should be 
liable if a statute had imposed responsibility upon them:
 36
  
If voluntary assumption of responsibility can give rise to sufficient proximity, it 
would seem odd if statutory imposition of responsibility is wholly irrelevant to the 
judgment whether there is a duty of care.  We do not think it can be. 
The second problem with the Stevens’ and Beever’s models is that they only make 
sense of tort law as long as it is thought of as solely private law.  Beever explicitly 
eschews any notion of community obligation: “In corrective justice …  the focus is on 
the relationship between the parties rather than on the parties as solitary individuals 
or as members of a wider community.”37  As long as public authorities act in ways 
similar to those of private individuals, this theory of tort law presents no problem.  
For example, some of the child welfare cases can be explained by a pre-existing 
relationship, as when the authority takes children into care and places them in 
institutions which it operates.   
The difficulty is where tort law is used in a more obviously public law way, as where 
the complaint is that the authority failed to exercise a statutory power to protect a 
victim of child abuse (the allegation in Prince and East Berkshire).  As Beever 
acknowledges, this is inconsistent with his theory.  However, Beever is too quick to 
discount the importance in tort law of the defendant’s relationship with the wider 
community.  When the defendant is a public authority like Child Youth and Family 
Services (or the Probation Services) it is unrealistic to treat them like private 
individuals and to ignore the community obligations.  In the child welfare cases 
against the Crown, the defendant is representative of the community and its wrongs 
are breaches of the community’s obligations to the plaintiff.  As the New Zealand 
                                                        
34 Ibid, at [112]. 
35 Couch, above n 3, at [58]. 
36 Ibid, at [62] 
37 Allan Beever, above n 28, at 46. 




Court of Appeal said in S, without liability, “the community obligation will not be 
recognised.”38 
The idea that tort law is only private law is shared by Lord Hoffmann.  His writing is 
based on a view that contrasts public law with tort law.  On this approach, the equality 
principle is a logical corollary of the view that tort law is private law, because public 
authorities are only liable when a private defendant in the same position would be 
liable:39 
… public bodies owe no duty of care by virtue only of the fact that they have 
statutory powers or public law duties.  An actual relationship with the claimant, such 
as would give rise to a duty of care on the part of a private body, is required. 
Lord Hoffmann delivered the majority judgment in Stovin v Wise, in which he relied 
on the omissions rule in holding that the defendant highway authority was not liable 
for the way it exercised its statutory powers.40   In Stovin v Wise, the defendant 
highway authority had decided to do something about a dangerous intersection.  There 
was a tall bank which prevented drivers moving into the traffic from seeing other cars.  
There was correspondence with British Rail, who owned the land on which the bank 
stood, but the matter was not pursued.  An accident occurred, and the defendant 
joined the authority as a third party, alleging that it had negligently failed to exercise 
its statutory power. 
While Lord Hoffmann ensured that the defendant authority was treated the same way 
as any private individual would be in tort law, Lord Nicholls in the minority was less 
concerned with bright lines between public and private law but more with ensuring 
that victims of accidents were not left without a remedy.   Lord Nicholls’ 
preparedness to extend tort law to compensate accident victims recognises the special 
position of public authorities, who may be able to prevent the plaintiff’s loss because 
of powers which private defendants do not have.  However, such an approach is 
arguably inappropriate in cases where the conventional heads of loss are already 
partly remedied through social assistance programmes or compulsory insurance 
schemes (as with traffic accidents).  As Carol Harlow has argued, imposing liability 
where insurance is ubiquitous opens “the ‘deep coffers’ of the state to financial 
marauders, primarily private insurers, sharks lurking unseen in the deep waters 
                                                        
38 S v Attorney-General [2003] 3 NZLR 450 (CA) at [70]. 
39 Lord Hoffmann “Reforming the Law of Public Authority Negligence” (2009) The Bar Council 
<www.barcouncil.org.uk>, at [15]; see also Carol Harlow State Liability: Tort Law and Beyond 
(Oxford University Press, 2004, Oxford) at 32-33 for a discussion of Lord Hoffmann’s approach to the 
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  Even where the loss is already compensated in this way, 
however, it might be necessary to vindicate the wrong through a non-loss based 
remedy in order to recognise the defendant’s failure to prevent the harm despite its 
special statutory powers bestowed for this specific purpose. 
G The Loss Distribution Rationale and Cost-benefit Analyses 
As Lord Hoffmann acknowledged, autonomy is not the only rationale for the 
immunity from liability for omissions.
42
  An alternative rationale is that imposing 
liability for a failure to act does not incentivise an efficient allocation of resources.    
Lord Nicholls in the minority discussed the efficiency rationale of the omissions rule 
in the following passage:43 
Liability for omissions gives rise to a problem not present with liability for careless 
acts.  He who wishes to act must act carefully or not at all.  A producer of ginger beer 
must adopt a safe manufacturing process.  If this would be uneconomic, he ought not 
to carry on the business.  With liability for omissions, however, a person is not 
offered a choice.  The law compels him to act when left to himself he might do 
nothing. 
Lord Nicholls’ description of the economics rationale blurs into the more traditional 
justification discussed above concerning the defendant’s autonomy.  If a duty to act is 
imposed, the defendant has no opportunity to carry out a cost benefit analysis whether 
the enterprise costs more than the profit obtained (with public bodies there is no 
profit, of course, but there is a lost opportunity to do other things with the money).  
The focus remains on the defendant’s capacity to choose, glossed over with words 
such as “uneconomic” and “externalities”.44   
Lord Nicholls dictum is not necessarily an accurate description of his own approach, 
however.  His speech read as a whole suggests that rather than adopting an “invisible 
hand” approach in which it is assumed that rationale agents will reach efficient 
outcomes if they are forced by tort law to absorb their costs, judges should ask the 
bigger question whether imposing liability leads to an appropriate allocation of loss: 
“Leaving the loss to lie where it falls is not always an acceptable outcome.” 45  
However, a loss distribution approach to tort law assumes that there is a loss to begin 
with, and in Stovin there was compulsory third party insurance for drivers of vehicles 
to compensate the loss.46  A hand out from the highway authority was unnecessary.  A 
                                                        
41 Ibid, at 22, citing T Weir “ Governmental Liability” [1989] PL 40. 
42 Stovin v Wise, above n 24, at 945. 
43 Ibid, at 933, emphasis added. 
44 Ibid, at 933 and 944. 
45 Ibid, at 933.  
46 Ibid, at 958, although Nicholls discussed this too, as noted by Harlow, above n 39, at 40. 




similar difficulty arises with the child welfare cases, in which much of the loss 
claimed is already covered, and dealt with better, under social welfare. 
Lord Nicholls may also have been influenced by a deterrent purpose in tort law: 
imposing liability may encourage the authority to do its job better.47  In S v Attorney-
General Blanchard J anticipated that imposing vicarious liability on the Crown for 
child abuse by foster parents:
48
 
… may provide an incentive for the State to take even greater precautions in the 
future for the protection of children in its care by way of vetting and monitoring of 
foster parents. 
Whether tort law is effective as a deterrent is another thesis in itself.  However, as 
McLay has pointed out, child abuse cases are usually concerned with historic events, 
and the present practices of the defendant will most likely have changed by the time 
litigation is brought: “To defend such claims, it [is] necessary to go to rest homes 
rather than to the department to obtain evidence. 
49
  
Law and economics scholars have asked whether imposing liability for omissions will 
encourage people to confer benefits.  Landes and Posner, in their article on this 
subject, begin with the assumption that rescuing drowning people should be 
encouraged, and then create a utility function which they differentiate to decide 
whether rescuers under a legal duty to rescue if they are near an accident will do so in 
order to maximise their utility.50  Such an approach is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
but it may be questioned whether it applies very well to public authorities.  Some 
considerations, such as Landes’ and Posner’s concern that if liability is imposed for 
failure to rescue people will avoid places where accidents are likely, is probably not a 
relevant factor for authorities who cannot easily remove themselves from the sector.  
Lord Hoffmann has extra-judicially made calls for a different kind of cost-benefit 
analysis, in which the cost of imposing an affirmative duty on public authorities and 
the consequent litigation are balanced against the lost opportunity to spend the money 
on other public goods.  In a speech to the United Kingdom Bar Council, he described 
how he spoke to the Chief Educational Psychologist of Leicestershire County Council 
                                                        
47 Carol Harlow, above n 39, at 40-41. 
48 S v Attorney-General, above n 38, at [71]. 
49 Geoff McLay “Remedies for Breaches of ‘Public’ Obligation: The Equality Principle Meets the 
Welfare State and the New Constitutionalism” in Jeff Berryman and Rick Bigwood The Law of 
Remedies: New Directions in the Common Law (Irwin Law, 2010, Toronto) at 406. 
50 William M Landes and Richard A Posner “Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: 
An Economic Study of Law and Altruism” (1978) 7 LJS 83. 




about the effect of the House of Lords’ decision in Phelps.
51
  In that case, it was held 
that an authority’s educational psychologists owed duties of care to children whom 
they interviewed, and that breach of these duties could lead to damages for vicarious 
liability.  After the decision the Leicestershire Council was faced with 58 claims, all 
of which were resisted.  Two went to court, although one was abandoned at the door 
of the courtroom and the other collapsed during trial.  “At considerable expense, the 
LEAs succeeded in defending themselves.” 52   One of the main difficulties was 
causation:53 
There are … problems of causation: whether the child’s problems were caused by 
dyslexia rather than disruptive behaviour; what kind of treatment would have been 
possible within the options open to a school with many other children to teach and 
finally, whether it would have made any difference to the child’s subsequent life.  It 
is almost impossible to prove on a balance of probability that if the child had received 
a different form of teaching, he would have become a model and prosperous citizen 
instead of the drug-addicted petty criminal whom the judge sees in the witness box. 
Part of the “cost” in such an analysis is the wasted litigation because of the difficulty 
in proving causation.  The child welfare cases are no different from the education 
cases in this respect: even where the plaintiff is able to show breach of duty, the 
courts find themselves in severe difficulties trying to apportion the “damage” suffered 
by the plaintiff (which usually includes problems such as alcohol abuse, broken 
relationships and patchy employment history) and having to deduct social assistance 
payments.
54
  The better approach as advanced in this thesis is to award non-loss based 
damages which vindicate the breach of the duty, rather than attempting to compensate 
some kind of fictional “loss”.  If this approach is adopted, the cost of litigation is not 
“wasted”: it serves a usesful purpose in marking the underlying wrong that the state 
failed to protect the plaintiff, and establishing (through discovery) how this occurred.   
The application of the omissions rule in the highway cases and its absence in the child 
welfare cases may reflect a sense that in the latter cases compensation through social 
welfare is perhaps insufficient to mark the wrong.  Where the wrong is a traffic 
accident, the focus is on the amount of loss and who should pay for it.  The omissions 
rule leads to an acceptable result because the loss is paid for by insurance companies.  
The child welfare cases, however, engage questions of community responsibility and 
the relationship between the state and individuals.  Loss is not the sole concern.  In 
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54 As discussed in chapter three. 




order to vindicate the wrong, the courts have ignored the equality principle, which 
would have led to an unacceptable result.   
H Does the End Justify the Means? 
The two main rationales for the omissions rule are autonomy and efficiency.  Neither 
of these applies when the defendant is a public authority.  However, there is one 
justification of the omissions rule which explicitly recognises that public authorities 
are not like private defendants.  This rationale is based not on a distinction between 
acts and failures to confer benefits, but on the way the rule indirectly furthers other 
purposes of tort liability.  For example, Booth and Squires have argued that the 
omissions rule could be used to protect the state from limitless liability.55  In some 
situations, the number of people who could potentially be protected from harm 
through an exercise of the defendant’s statutory power might be limitless.   
The difficulty with such an approach is that the omissions rule is based on a 
distinction between positive acts and failures to act, not on a distinction between 
limited and unlimited liability.  This concern is easily weighed up as part of the policy 
or “fair, just and reasonable” stage of the duty of care test, as the Canadian Supreme 




A rule based on a distinction between positive acts and failures to act is difficult to 
defend when applied to public authorities.  A loss distribution approach may lead 
judges to impose liability on the Crown if the health care system is perceived as 
inadequate:
57
 the cost suffered by accident victims is arguably best carried by the 
broad shoulders of tax payers.58  However, where the loss is already insured, or where 
it is covered by social assistance, a distribution of loss approach becomes redundant.  
Stevens’ and Beever’s models of tort law on the other hand, with their emphasis on 
the defendant’s autonomy, struggle with public authorities as defendants, because 
they are already required by statute to confer benefits.  There in no “choice” is the 
sense captured by an autonomy interest. 
The best way to answer the question as to whether liability should be imposed for an 
omission may be to look at the underlying rights and duties involved.  If the cases are 
concerned with shifting loss, are the victims already compensated in some way, for 
                                                        
55 Cherie Booth QC and Dan Squires The Negligence Liability of Public Authorities (Oxford University 
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56 R v Imperial Tobacco Canada [2011] SCC 42. 
57 Carol Harlow, above n 39, at 21. 
58 John G Fleming The Law of Torts (9th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1998) at 210. 




example through insurance or social assistance?  Or even if the loss is already 
compensated, for example under an accident compensation scheme, is there 
something beyond the loss that needs to be remedied?  In the child welfare cases, the 
underlying community duty is so important that arguably its negligent failure needs to 
be vindicated through an award of damages beyond the loss suffered.  Where the 
community duty was breached because the defendant failed to exercise a statutory 
power, this may require courts to ignore the omissions rule and the equality principle. 
 




VIII Statutory Powers and Duties 
This chapter, like the previous one, considers an issue which commonly arises when 
establishing a duty of care in negligence against a public authority, and analyses how 
a vindicatory approach might help to understand the developments in this area.  The 
focus is on whether tort law can be used to vindicate a breach of a statutory duty, or a 
negligent exercise of a statutory power. 
There is a group of scholars and judges in England who have taken a conservative 
position on this issue.  This group, which includes Lord Hoffmann and Nolan, can be 
identified from the way its members sing the praises of the 1934 case East Suffolk, 




The East Suffolk approach relies on a bright line distinction between “private” tort law 
and “public” judicial review.  Breaches of statutory duties and the unlawful exercise 
of statutory power are said to be public law wrongs and are therefore susceptible to 
judicial review but not to an action in tort, with three exceptions.  First, where there is 
a pre-existing relationship, for example where there has been an assumption of 
responsibility.  Secondly, where the authority negligently exercises its statutory power 
so that it puts the plaintiff in a worse position than if it had done nothing.  The third 
exception is a separate tort: a statutory duty may give rise to the tort of breach of 
statutory duty if the courts can infer that Parliament intended the duty to be 
actionable.   If none of these exceptions are established there can be no liability in tort 
law however because, according to the East Suffolk approach, unless Parliament says 
otherwise statutory powers and duties are presumed to be enacted for the public 
benefit, not for the benefit of individuals.   
However, there is an alternative approach, which in this chapter is labelled the Anns 
approach.  Scholars like Cornford and judges like Lord Nicholls have favoured the 
1978 case Anns in opposition to those who prefer East Suffolk.
2
  Under this less 
conservative approach, public authorities can be liable in negligence for the way they 
exercise statutory power, even though there is no Parliamentary intention that the 
plaintiff should be able to sue, and even though the defendant would not be liable 
under the orthodox rules of negligence.  This chapter argues in favour of the Anns 
approach. 
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Drawing a bright line distinction between statutes in the general public interest and 
those intended by Parliament to be actionable in damages is simplistic.  The child 
welfare legislation in New Zealand provides a good example of the difficulties 
experienced under this approach.  In the Child, Young Persons and Their Families Act 
1989 the Chief Executive is under a duty “to take such positive and prompt action and 
steps” as will “promote the well-being of children …”  It is not clear that Parliament 
intended the duty to be actionable in negligence when it is breached, but nor can it be 
said that the statute is in the public interest to the exclusion of private interests.  The 
long title, for example, provides that the Act is “to advance … the well-being of 
children” among other things.   
When the duty to protect children is breached, both the general public and the private 
interests of the child are affected.  Similarly, when a statutory power to protect 
children is exercised negligently (or negligently not exercised at all) and children 
suffer, both the children and the general public have an interest in seeing the wrong 
vindicated. The fact that the community has an interest in seeing children taken care 
of makes it more important, not less important, that children who suffer abuse or 
neglect through the negligence of those entrusted with statutory power to prevent it 
are armed with a remedy.  As Tipping J said in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 (NZBORA) case Taunoa, the general public is also a victim, which suffers 
alongside the primary victim of the wrong.3 
A The East Suffolk or Private Law Approach 
Until the House of Lords decision in Anns in 1977 (discussed later) East Suffolk was 
the leading authority for the proposition that there could be no liability for the way in 
which a statutory power was exercised, unless one of the three exceptions discussed 
above was established.4  The plaintiffs had a farm that bordered the tidal part of the 
river Deben.  The land was protected by a wall maintained by the defendants.  They 
had the power, under s 34 of the Land Drainage Act 1930, to repair the wall.5  The 
wall broke down in the face of severe flooding, and the Board used insufficient men, 
with insufficient skill and insufficient materials, taking well over 100 days to repair 
the wall.  In the meantime the river continued to flood the plaintiffs’ land. 
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The House of Lords held that although a breach of an explicit and mandatory 
statutory duty might give rise to an action in damages, the negligent exercise of a 
statutory power was different.  The plaintiffs must prove that they suffered more 
damage than if the defendants had done nothing.  For example, where there was a 
power to light streets, the statutory authority might be liable for causing a fire, but not 
if they merely failed to light the street and someone injured themselves in the dark.
6
 
More important than the reasoning in East Suffolk is the conservative approach the 
House of Lords took in the case to the development of liability in negligence for the 
way in which the statutory power was exercised.
7
  In the last twenty years judges like 
Lord Hoffmann have used East Suffolk as a peg on which to attach their own 
conception of public authority liability. 
The modern East Suffolk approach relies on a very sharp divide between judicial 
review and tort law.  Statutory duties and powers are seen as focused on the general 
public interest.  Therefore the courts should ensure that those entrusted with statutory 
duties and powers act within the purposes of the legislation.  This is done through 
judicial review, which is focused on the lawfulness of a decision or exercise of power, 
rather than directly on the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant:
8
   
It is manifest in the remedies available to the courts when considering an application, 
that judicial review focuses on the legality of a decision.  The orders challenge the 
validity of the original decision, rather than seeking to provide for compensation to be 
paid to an individual. 
For example those exercising statutory power must ignore irrelevant considerations in 
the exercise of their discretion, and they must not exercise it irrationally.  Because the 
statutory duty or power is in the general public interest and the courts will only 
interfere in order to ensure that the defendant acts lawfully, there is no monetary 
remedy in judicial review for plaintiffs who suffer loss caused by the unlawful (in the 
judicial review sense) exercise of a statutory power, unless it is actionable under the 
“private law” (where there is a nuisance or a breach of contract, for example).   
In its project on administrative redress, the English Law Commission asked for 
responses to its argument that damages should be more widely available for public 
law wrongs.  One of the main criticisms it received was based on this distinction 
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between statutes which are in the general public interest, and private law rights in 
tort:9 
There were some consultees who disagreed vigorously with the proposal that a wider 
availability of monetary remedies could or should be introduced in judicial review 
cases.  They opposed the suggestion to allow individuals to claim damages where no 
private right had been infringed.  Such responses drew a sharp distinction between the 
rights that arise from a public duty, which are owed to the world at large, and private 
rights that are protected in tort. 
The East Suffolk approach was applied in the House of Lords case O’Rourke, in 
which the claimant alleged that his local council had breached its duty under the 
Housing Act to provide him with accommodation.  Lord Hoffmann, delivering the 
only speech in the House of Lords, distinguished duties “intended for the protection 
of a limited class of people” and those which are conferred for the wider public 
benefit:10 
Public money is spent on housing the homeless not merely for the private benefit of 
people who find themselves homeless but on grounds of general public interest: 
because, for example, proper housing means that people will be less likely to suffer 
illness, turn to crime or require the attention of other social services. 
This approach means that if a public authority fails to confer a benefit (such as an 
investigation into an allegation of child abuse) when exercising a statutory power, the 
failure is not actionable because the power is said to be in the general interest.  There 
are three exceptions to the general rule that an exercise of statutory power will not be 
actionable in negligence even where it is unlawful in the public law sense, and causes 
loss to the plaintiff.  These were mentioned above briefly but are discussed here in 
more detail. 
First, there are times when the authority may bring itself into a relationship with the 
plaintiff, from which a private law action may arise.
11
  This is because, as mentioned 
above, it is assumed that statutory power does not exempt authorities from liability in 
“private law” unless it does so expressly.   
Secondly, if the exercise of a statutory power puts the plaintiff in a worse position 
than he or she would have been if the authority had done nothing, then an action may 
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lie for negligence.  The East Suffolk case is the best example of this exception: if the 
defendants had done nothing at all, the land would have been flooded anyway. This is, 
in some ways, merely an extension of the first exception: it is designed to put 
defendants with statutory powers in the same position as private individuals, who are 
also liable if they put the plaintiff in a worse position than if they had done nothing.  
The rule is more specific to public authorities, however, and it is usually thought of as 
separate. 
Thirdly, there are some statutory duties in which it can be inferred that Parliament 
intended there to be an action for damages if a breach of the duty caused the plaintiff 
loss, which will lead to a claim for the tort of breach of statutory duty.  The leading 
authority for this tort in England is X v Bedfordshire, in which the House of Lords 
struck out allegations that statutory duties to safeguard children and to take them into 
care could be actionable under the tort of breach of statutory duty.  Lord Browne-
Wilkinson set out the test as follows:
12
 
The basic proposition is that in the ordinary case a breach of statutory duty does not, 
by itself give rise to any private law cause of action.  However, a private law cause of 
action will arise if it can be shown, as a matter of construction of the statute, that the 
statutory duty was imposed for the protection of a limited class of the public and that 
Parliament intended to confer on members of that class a private right of action for 
breach of the duty … If the statute provides no other remedy for its breach and the 
Parliamentary intention to protect a limited class is shown, that indicates that there 
may be a private right of action since otherwise there is no method of securing the 
protection the statute was intended to confer. 
Keith Stanton has described this test as involving a mix of presumptions (the 
existence of a remedy within the statute and the protection of a limited class of the 
public) and a general test based on inferred Parliamentary intention.
13
  The breach of 
statutory duty tort is an exception to the general rule that breaches of statutory duties 
are not actionable because the duty is in the general interest.  It arises only where it 
can be said that the statutory duty is intended to be in the private as opposed to the 
public interest, as an exception to the assumption that statutory duties are usually in 
the public interest.  
In X v Bedfordshire, the House of Lords recognised that the statute at issue was 
intended to confer benefits on a limited class (children), but held that the duties in the 
statute were too discretionary to establish the tort of breach of statutory duty:
14
 
                                                        
12 X v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633 (HL).  Other parts of the case have been qualified 
in subsequent decisions, see the discussion in chapter three, text to footnote 38. 
13 Keith, Stanton, and others Statutory Torts (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2003) at 25. 
14 X v Bedfordshire, above n 12, at 731. 




It is true that the legislation was introduced primarily for the protection of a limited 
class, namely children at risk … But in my view those are the only pointers in favour 
of imputing to Parliament an intention to create a private law cause of action. When 
one turns to the actual words used in the primary legislation to create the statutory 
duties relied upon in my judgment they are inconsistent with any intention to create a 
private law cause of action … all the statutory provisions [are] made dependent upon 
the subjective judgment of the local authority. To treat such duties as being more than 
public law duties is impossible.  
Lord Brown-Wilkinson’s application of this test emphasises the problem of Lord 
Hoffmann’s approach in O’Rourke: not all statutory duties in which the tort of breach 
of statutory duty is not established are necessarily in the public interest to the 
exclusion of a private interest.  Child welfare legislation is enacted in the interest of 
children, yet the legislation does not give rise to an action in breach of statutory duty.  
Therefore if child welfare legislation does not give rise to an action in negligence, it 
cannot be for the reason that it is exclusively in the public interest.   
In addition to the breach of statutory duty tort where the focus is on implied 
Parliamentary intention, some statutes expressly provide for damages if the authority 
fails to confer a benefit upon the plaintiff.15 
B An Alternative, Public Law Orientated Approach 
This thesis argues that breaches of statutory duties to investigate allegations of child 
abuse should be actionable in damages, both in negligence and in the separate breach 
of statutory duty tort.  The vindicatory approach draws on the public interest in having 
wrongs vindicated as support for recognising an action in damages for the public law 
wrong.  The fact that it is in the general public interest for children not to suffer abuse 
is given as a reason for recognising a duty sounding in damages.  Lord Hoffmann 
might see it as a reason against imposing a duty.  The vindicatory approach is 
consistent with the approach to damages for breach of NZBORA in which it is said 




In his book Towards a Public Law of Torts Cornford has written against the private 
law approach outlined above, which excludes actionable duties owed to private 
individuals for breaches of public law which are assumed to be in the public 
interest:17 
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… one of the functions of public law is to protect the interest of individuals.  This 
being so, we may think of norms of public law as, in certain circumstances, giving 
rise to duties to individuals.  Such individuals will have, correspondingly, a species of 
entitlement and breach of the duties owed to them will put public authorities under an 
obligation to repair the harm that results. 
Cornford argues that if a public law wrong (by which he means a decision which can 
be set aside on an application for judicial review) causes harm to the private interest, 
then this should be compensated.  Otherwise plaintiffs who are able to bring judicial 
review proceedings are put in a better position than plaintiffs who only discover the 
public law wrong later when they have already suffered loss and it is too late to retake 
the decision.  The logic could of course be applied either to the availability of a 
damages award in judicial review proceedings, or to developing tort damages for the 
negligent exercise or failure to exercise statutory power. 
Unlike Cornford, however, this thesis adopts an explicitly vindicatory approach rather 
than relying on more traditional corrective justice concerns. This thesis does not deal 
directly with the separate issue whether loss suffered through the negligent exercise of 
a statutory power should be compensated.  The focus is on the narrow issue whether 
the failure to confer a benefit which would not exist but for the statute should be 
vindicated even though the statute might be in the general interest.  The importance of 
Cornford’s approach for this thesis is his support for the use of damages in tort law to 
remedy public law wrongs.   
Cornford, like others who adopt a flexible approach to imposing liability in 
negligence for the way a statutory power is exercised, has evinced a preference for the 
1977 House of Lords case Anns, as opposed to East Suffolk, discussed above. 18  The 
significance of Anns is discussed below.  First, however, the approach in New 
Zealand is analysed. 
C The New Zealand Approach: an Uneasy Compromise 
The approach in the New Zealand child welfare cases appears to sit mid-way between 
the conservative approach of Lord Hoffmann and the more radical argument of 
Cornford.  In Prince the alleged duty of care was to exercise a power to investigate 
any complaints received that a child (such as the plaintiff) was suffering abuse.  The 
Court of Appeal concentrated on a duty in the statute which required the Director-
General to take positive action to prevent child abuse, including where appropriate a 
prompt inquiry.19 
                                                        
18 Ibid, at 178. 
19 See Attorney-General v Prince and Gardner [1998] 1 NZLR 262 (CA) at 279.  The relevant part of 
the legislation is in s 5 of The Children and Young Persons Act 1974: 




The cause of action would not arise were it not for the statute: therefore under the 
private law approach the duty should only be actionable under one of the three 
exceptions outlined above.  However, as emphasised in chapter six, the failure to 
protect a child from third party danger does not involve an assumption of 
responsibility, so there is no relationship which would usually give rise to a typical 
private law cause of action.  A pleading of breach of statutory duty was struck out by 
the High Court and was not appealed.20  Nor can it be said that the defendant authority 
made the situation worse for the plaintiff than if it had done nothing, since the 
allegation was that the defendant had in fact done nothing.
21
 
The Court of Appeal got around this problem by relying on a rule which has since 
been removed from English law by the House of Lords in Gorringe (discussed 
below).  Where the statutory duty (as opposed to a power) is intended to confer a 
benefit to an identifiable class, a common law duty of care can be imposed in 
negligence.  However, there must be a statutory duty: a discretionary power is not 
enough. 
Richardson P thought that the statutory power to arrange for an investigation was a 
matter of “obligation, not the exercise of discretionary power.”
22
 The statute included 
words such as “duty” and “shall”.  However, Henaghan has argued that the statute is 
more discretionary than the Court was willing to concede.  He pointed out that s 5 
only provides that the Director-General shall take “positive action and such steps 




The approach of the Court was to read down the statutory duty so that it is specific 
and non-discretionary enough to support a parallel common law duty.  The better 
                                                                                                                                                              
Duty of Director-General to undertake preventive work —  
(1) It shall be the duty of the Director-General to take positive action and such steps under 
this Act as in his opinion may assist in preventing children or young persons from being 
exposed to unnecessary suffering or deprivation or from becoming seriously disturbed or 
from committing offences. 
(2)  In pursuance of the duty imposed on him by subsection (1) of this section the 
Director-General shall arrange –  
(a)  For prompt inquiry where he knows or has reason to suspect that any child or 
young person is –  
(i)  Suffering or likely to suffer from ill-treatment or from inadequate 
care or control; or 
(ii)  By reason of his behaviour, causing serious concern to his parents, 
guardians, or teachers … 
20 Prince v Attorney-General [1996] 3 NZLR 733 (HC) at 747; Prince (CA), ibid, at 265. 
21 See chapter six, in which it is demonstrated that this case was about an omission.  
22 Prince, above n 19, at 283.   
23 Mark Henaghan “Editorial: Suing for an appalling childhood” (1997) 2 BFLJ 174. 




approach, which would be consistent with Cornford’s argument, is to recognise that 
the duty is a general discretionary duty, but to accept that when this is exercised 
negligently there a public law wrong which is actionable in private law.  This does 
less mischief to the words of the statute.   
Prince concerned the 1974 legislation.  The powers under that Act are now set out 
under the Child, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989, and plaintiffs alleging 
negligent failure to exercise powers under that Act may come up against slightly 
different problems peculiar to that legislation.  First, however, the situation of 
plaintiffs pleading failures to exercise power under the even older, Child Welfare Act 
1925 must be considered. 
1 The 1925 Act 
In White, two brothers alleged among other things that the Child Welfare Agency had 
failed to inquire into the possibility that they were being abused by their father.24  In 
1966 they were placed under Court-ordered supervision, although they continued to 
be looked after by their father.  Miller J in the High Court held that this put the 
Agency under a duty of inquiry, which was breached when they failed to speak to the 
boys alone.  The claim failed for other reasons, but the significance of the recognition 
of a duty of care is that although it could be explained as based upon the assumption 
of responsibility established by the Court-ordered supervision, Miller J seems to have 
simply held that the Prince duty applied to the 1925 Act, even though there were no 
positive duties in the Act, unlike the 1974 legislation.  The approach is possibly 
consistent with Cornford’s thesis: the failure to speak to the boys alone was arguably 
a negligent exercise of statutory power which should be actionable in damages if it 
causes loss.   
2 The 1989 Act 
The Court of Appeal in Prince also briefly considered the Children, Young Persons, 
and Their Families Act 1989:25 
The philosophy and thrust of the 1989 legislation are different. Significantly s 5 of 
the 1974 Act has been replaced by diffuse and diluted investigation provisions far 
different from the positive duties under s 5. 
The focus of the judges was on the degree of discretion involved in the statutory duty: 
consistent with the rule discussed above, the approach of the Court was to identify a 
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clear statutory duty with not much discretion on which to hang a common law duty 
sounding in damages.  The difference in “philosophy and thrust” between the 1974 
and 1989 Acts includes a shift in focus to a greater emphasis on community and 
family, intended to reflect Maori emphasis on the importance of whanau.26  




This language if anything is more positive than the 1974 Act, and if the majority 
decision of the Court of Appeal is to be consistent in their reasoning it must also be 
seen as creating an obligation on the Department [under the 1989 Act]. 
The difficulty with the Court’s observations (which were obiter) is not that the duties 
in the 1989 are not diffuse (they are) but that this can also be said of the 1974 Act: it 
is difficult to distinguish the 1989 Act as involving more discretion.  The better 
approach would have been simply to recognise that a discretionary duty is actionable, 
rather than trying to read down the statutory discretion in the 1974 Act in order to peg 
a common law duty onto it.  It would then be a matter of judgment in each particular 
case whether the specific statutory duty or power should be actionable. 
D The Disagreement about Anns and the Private Law Remedy for a Public Law 
Breach 
The debate concerning public law wrongs outlined above is highlighted by the 
controversy surrounding two House of Lords cases, East Suffolk (discussed above) 
and Anns.  In the Anns approach, public authorities can be liable for failing to exercise 
a power or for negligently exercise it, but under the East Suffolk approach they are 
only liable if they make the situation worse, there is an assumption of responsibility or 
it can be inferred that Parliament intended breach of the duty to be actionable. 
1 Anns v Merton London Borough 
Anns was the famous font of the building inspection cases: the House of Lords 
refused to strike out an action alleging that the negligent inspection of a house had led 
to the plaintiff purchasing a house which breached building regulations.28   If the 
plaintiff could establish at trial that there had been an inspection (an exercise of a 
power rather than the failure to exercise it) the local council would be liable for any 
                                                        
26 See the discussion of the 1989 Act in Bill Atkin and Geoff McLay “Suing Child Welfare Agencies: 
A Comparative View from New Zealand”in John Dewar and Stephen Parker (eds)  Family Law: 
processes practices pressures (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2003) 161, at 175 ff. 
27 Henaghan, above n 23, at 175.   
28 Anns, above n 2.  This aspect has been overruled in England: Murphy v Brentwood District Council 
[1991] 1 AC 398(HL).  However it is still good law in New Zealand: North Shore City Council v Body 
Corporate 188529 [2010] NZSC 158, [2011] 2 NZLR 289 [Sunset Terraces]. 




negligence in the way the inspection had been conducted.
29
  The result was contrary 
to the East Suffolk rule: if there had been no investigation the plaintiff would have 
been no better off than if there was a negligent inspection.  
In Stovin v Wise, Lord Nicholls in the minority contrasted East Suffolk and Anns in 
the following way:30 
Before 1978 the accepted law was that the council could be under no common law 
liability for failing to act.  A simple failure to exercise a statutory power did not give 
rise to a common law claim for damages: see East Suffolk … The decision in Anns … 
liberated the law from this unacceptable yoke. 
This is not strictly accurate.  Neither Anns nor East Suffolk concerned the failure to 
exercise a power, but rather the allegedly negligent exercise of a power.  However, 
Anns and East Suffolk arguably stand for two contrasting ideals beyond their actual 
ratios.  East Suffolk is seen as a clear example of the way tort law does not support 
actions for breach of a statutory duty or an unlawful exercise of statutory power, with 
the three exceptions mentioned earlier.  Anns stands in contrast as a symbol of the 
approach in which public law wrongs are actionable in negligence in damages.  
Cornford, for example, applauds Lord Nicholls in Stovin for keeping “alive the spirit 
of Anns”.31 
2 Stovin v Wise and Gorringe 
The approach which East Suffolk is said to stand for was resurrected in two cases, 
Stovin v Wise and Gorringe, in both of which the defendants were highway 
authorities.  In Stovin, the council had failed to remove a tall bank which prevented 
drivers moving into the traffic from seeing other cars.32  In Gorringe, a driver was 
speeding around a corner at the crest of a hill when she drove into a bus: she alleged 
that the highway authority was at fault for not writing the letters SLOW on the 
approach to the corner.33   
The cases concerned powers and duties under the Highways Act 1980 (UK).  The Act 
makes the authorities liable to private parties for non-repair of the highways.  The Act 
expressly provides that some of its provisions are actionable by private individuals 
when breached.  This is an example of a statute in which duties are explicitly owed to 
private individuals as well as to the general public.   
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30 Stovin v Wise, above n 2, at 931. 
31 Cornford, above n 2, at 178. 
32 Stovin, above n 2. 
33 Gorringe, above n 10. 




However, the omissions in Stovin and Gorringe were not failures to repair.
34
  
Therefore in Stovin it was alleged that the defendant had failed to exercise its power 
to serve a notice on the owner of the land on which the bank stood.35  The majority 
held that the authority could only be liable if they made the road more dangerous by 
exercising the power than if it had done nothing, for instance by leaving debris behind 
on the road, creating a hazard.   
In Gorringe, the allegation did not concern a statutory power but a failure to comply 
with a duty in the Road Traffic Act 1988 (UK) to “carry out a programme of 
measures designed to promote road safety”.
36
  The House of Lords, however, 
extended the rule in East Suffolk to statutory duties as well as powers.37  If the tort of 
breach of statutory duty could not be established, then there must be a pre-existing 
relationship (such as assumption of responsibility) or the authority must have made 
the situation worse by doing something than if it had done nothing.  Therefore the rule 
relied on in Prince that a statutory duty (as opposed to a power) could sound in 
negligence (as opposed to the breach of statutory duty tort) was effectively abolished 
in England, although whether this has been followed in New Zealand is not clear.   
The supporters of East Suffolk see its resurrection as an affirmation of a theory of tort 
law in which public authorities should be liable only when a similarly placed private 
individual would also be liable or where Parliament has expressly or impliedly said 
so.  Otherwise the existence of a statutory duty or power will only be subject to 
judicial review, in which the lawfulness of any act or omission can be scrutinised, but 
no private duty of care will be recognised.  Lord Hoffmann, for example, has said 
extra-judicially that Stovin v Wise and Gorringe re-established the law as it had been 
before Anns, as it had been in the halcyon days of East Suffolk:38 
There is no doubt that many academic writers regret what they always call “the 
retreat from Anns” … So did some forward-looking judges.  The Canadians in 
particular thought that Anns was an excellent decision and that public authorities 
should be liable in negligence for not exercising statutory powers when the courts 
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37 Nolan, above n 1. 
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thought it would have been reasonable for them to do so.  But that is not the law in 
England. 
Nolan has also argued that Gorringe brought tort law back to the position in East 
Suffolk.  Even in the presence of a statutory power or duty, there can only be liability 
for the same reasons as under private law: where the defendant makes the situation 
worse, where there is an assumption of duty or where there is the separate tort of 
breach of statutory duty.39  Nolan has criticised the English Court of Appeal decision 
in East Berkshire, which recognised a duty of care to protect children at risk of abuse 
as an unfortunate exception to this position.40  This decision brought English law into 
line with the duty of care recognised in New Zealand since Prince, but as Nolan 
points out it is inconsistent with the current English approach associated in this thesis 
with East Suffolk.  In Prince and East Berkshire, there were no pre-existing 
relationships, and the authorities’ negligence did not put the child abuse victims in a 
worse position in the East Suffolk sense.  They merely failed to put the plaintiff in a 
better position.  Nolan suggests that the Court of Appeal’s decision was based on an 
approach which favours policy over principle:41 
The most likely explanation for these apparent discontinuities is the fact that judicial 
reasoning in duty of care cases is increasingly dominated by arguments of public 
policy … increasingly judges and commentators think in terms of police cases, social 
services cases, highways cases and so forth, rather than conceiving of negligence law 
– or even the negligence liability of public authorities – as a unified whole. 
However context does matter: the child abuse cases should be treated differently 
from, say, the highway cases, because there is the extra aspect of the community duty 
to protect children which needs to be vindicated.  In the East Suffolk approach the 
argument that the statutory duties reflect community duties points against a “private” 
cause of action.  Under the vindicatory approach, however, tort law as embraced as an 
important part of the public law, and the “public” aspect of the statutory duty is seen 
as support for the imposition of liability. 
E The East Suffolk Approach and Parliamentary Intention 
In Gorringe, the East Suffolk rule was extended to statutory duties as well as statutory 
powers.  This is consistent with a shift from distinguishing powers and duties to a new 
distinction between narrow duties for the benefit of a limited class, and everything 
else, including statutory powers and also wider duties, sometimes called “target 
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  The narrow duties are actionable, either because it can be inferred that 
Parliament intended breach of the duty to sound in damages, or more usually because 
Parliament has expressly said so.  “Target duties” on the other hand are only 
susceptible to judicial review on this approach. 
This approach to what could loosely be described as “statutory torts” (where either the 
statute includes a damages section or the breach of statutory duty tort is established) 
relies on Parliamentary intention to decide whether a statutory duty actionable: if an 
intention cannot be discerned, the duty is assumed to be exclusively in the general 
interest.  As discussed above, the test for the breach of statutory duty tort is whether 
there is a Parliamentary intention to confer a remedy in damages, which is more likely 
where there is no remedy provided in the statute and where the statutory duty is owed 
to a clearly defined class of plaintiffs.43  The bright line distinction between “statutory 
torts” and all other statutory duties and powers has led in England to an approach in 
which it is assumed that Parliament intended there to be no remedy if a “statutory 
tort” is not established.  Lord Scott adopted this approach in Gorringe:44  
In my opinion, if a statutory duty does not give rise to a private right to sue for 
breach, the duty cannot create a duty of care that would not have been owed at 
common law if the statute were not there. If the policy of the statute is not consistent 
with the creation of a statutory liability to pay compensation for damage caused by a 
breach of the statutory duty, the same policy would, in my opinion, exclude the use of 
the statutory duty in order to create a common law duty of care that would be broken 
by a failure to perform the statutory duty.  
There are two problems with this reasoning.  The first is that the lack of an intention 
to provide compensation is not the same as an intention not to provide compensation.  
The second, more fundamental problem is that it relies on the Parliamentary intention 
test for the tort of breach of statutory duty.  Fleming criticised an approach which 
purports to find an implied intention where Parliament has not included a remedy 
provision as:45 
… a barefaced fiction because, consonant with accepted canons of statutory 
interpretation, the legislature’s silence on the question of civil liability rather points to 
the conclusion that it either did not have it in mind or deliberately omitted to provide 
for it.   
                                                        
42 For more on the term “target duty” see Catherine Callaghan “What is a ‘Target Duty’?” (2000) 5 JR 
184. 
43 X v Bedfordshire, above n 12. 
44 Gorringe, above n 10, at [71] See also Lord Hoffmann’s speech in the same case at [32], where he 
made a similar point but perhaps without being quite so absolute. 
45 John G Fleming The Law of Torts (9th ed, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, London, 1998) at 128. 




This difficulty led the Supreme Court of Canada to abolish the tort.
46
   
The distinction between actionable duties and “target duties” is also problematic 
because there is no obvious compelling reason for making narrow duties actionable as 
opposed to “target duties”: it is as possible to suffer loss as a consequence of a breach 
of a “target duty” as it is to suffer loss when a narrow duty is breached.  An important 
general duty might require vindication just as much as a narrowly defined but 
relatively trivial duty.   
In New Zealand the position of the tort of breach of statutory duty is unclear.  It has 
been argued that the New Zealand courts do not see much merit in the tort,
47
 however 
it has resurfaced in Altimarloch.48  The tort is not usually necessary, as almost all 
personal injury cases (including those with which the tort is most associated, 
workplace injury) are covered by New Zealand’s accident compensation scheme.49  
The tort is possibly not so much abolished in New Zealand as largely redundant.   
F Vindicating the Negligent Exercise of Statutory Power through Tort Law 
Where a public authority is sued not for loss, however, but to vindicate a wrong, the 
breach of statutory duty tort might have some use.  For example, in Prince the 
allegation was that the public authority breached its duty to initiate a prompt inquiry 
into the complaint it received that the plaintiff was being abused by his adoptive 
parents.  This was a breach of the defendant’s statutory duties.  If the breach of 
statutory duty tort had been established, that might have included a vindicatory 
purpose, to which vindicatory damages arguably could have been attached.   
The breach of statutory duty tort might be a useful vindicatory cause of action in tort 
law.  However, it has not been a popular tort with judges: the House of Lords struck it 
out in Bedfordshire, it is largely obsolete in New Zealand, and it has been judicially 
abolished in Canada. 
The alternative approach is to vindicate the negligent exercise of statutory power to 
protect children through the tort of negligence.  This is contrary to the East Suffolk 
approach, favoured by Lord Hoffmann and Nolan.  The East Suffolk approach does 
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 The Queen v Saskatchewan Wheat Pool [1983] 1 SCR 205. 
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not seem to have been adopted in New Zealand,
50
 and there are good reasons for this, 
as the discussion above has tried to demonstrate.  The approach assumes that statutes 
in the general interest should not be actionable in damages by private individuals.  
However, the general public may have an interest in seeing a wrong vindicated 
through an award of damages to the plaintiff.  This is true of the child abuse cases, 
where the statutes are both in the general interest and include duties to a limited class 
of plaintiffs.  To return to Tipping J’s dictum in Taunoa, both the immediate victim, 
and the general public have an interest in seeing the negligent exercise of statutory 
power vindicated. 
G Justiciability 
The final part of this chapter considers what might be described as an alternative way 
of dealing with an issue which runs through the debates outlined above: whether it is 
appropriate for courts to deal at all with allegations about the way public authorities 
exercise statutory power.  It is sometimes said that before the courts will decide 
whether there is a duty of care against a public authority, there is a prior hurdle to be 
passed over called “justiciability”.  A case is justiciable if the issues are appropriate 
ones for the judiciary to consider; in other words the issues are not too political or 
outside the courts’ competency.   
To some extent the justiciability approach has been overtaken by the positions, 
discussed above.  However, justiciability is still sometimes argued as a separate point 
to the duty issue in public authority cases, and the policy and operational decisions 
test which is part of the justiciability approach is still applied (although possibly as a 
policy factor at the second stage of the Anns test).  It also retains support in the 
textbooks on public authority liability as a separate stage in the analysis.51  It is 
therefore analysed in a separate section of its own, with special emphasis on how a 
vindicatory approach might alter the focus of the justiciability tests.   
1 The rationales 
There are two main rationales for the justiciability rule. The first concerns 
Parliamentary sovereignty.  Where an act or omission can be described as within the 
defendant’s statutory discretion, it can be argued that Parliament made a sovereign 
decision to entrust the decision to that specific authority, and it is not for the judiciary 
                                                        
50 There is of course no explicit rejection of the approach, but even the relatively conservative majority 
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51 Cherie Booth QC and Dan Squires The Negligence Liability of Public Authorities (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2006), at ch 2; Stanton, above n 13, at ch 3, see for example the discussion at 103. 




to scrutinise the defendant and effectively second-guess Parliament.
52
  The other 
rationale is concerned with competency: there are some issues which the judiciary is 
not very good at determining, and there may be institutions better able to deal with the 
matter. 
In 2010 the English Court of Appeal was confronted with a justiciability argument in 
Connor v Surrey County Council.
 53
  It was alleged that the defendant council had 
failed to intervene effectively in the plaintiff head teacher’s dispute with her board of 
trustees.  The defendant argued that this concerned an exercise of a statutory 
discretion which was not justiciable, and Laws LJ dealt with this part of the law of 
negligence at length.  He identified both the rationales described above and held that 
it is the second which currently holds sway: “The competence of the court, rather than 
the authority of the legislature, is made the test of what is justiciable by way of a 
private law claim.”54  This was a “pragmatic” test based on the competency of the 
court and the sorts of policies involved in the claim: “There are policies and policies.  
The courts may be more, or less, competent to decide on the merits of some than on 
the merits of others.”55 
In New Zealand, justiciability does not appear to be a separate stage of inquiry prior 
to the duty of care issue.  However, the same pragmatic concern whether the issue is 
one which the courts are able to adjudicate is likely to be relevant to the second stage 
of the Anns test, whether there are any policy considerations which point away from a 
duty of care.  For example, New Zealand judges continue to take into account whether 
the alleged negligence is a matter of high policy (which is not justiciable) or merely 
an administrative blunder.56  This distinction (discussed in more detail below) is part 
of the justiciable approach in England.   
2 The different tests 
In asking the question whether a matter is suitable for judicial determination, judges 
have applied two main tests.  The first is the policy-operational test, which as 
mentioned above continues to be used in New Zealand.  The second is whether the 
alleged negligence was Wednesbury unreasonable and therefore outside the statutory 
discretion. This test was at one stage favoured by Lord Hoffmann.57 
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The starting point for consideration of these tests is usually Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s 
judgment in X v Bedfordshire.  Unfortunately, the judgment is “dense”58 and more of 
a discussion than a setting out of clearly defined rules.   
3 The policy-operational test 
Lord Brown Wilkinson first applied the policy/operational test.  He held that the 
allegations in X v Bedfordshire “would not require the court to consider policy matters 
which are not justiciable.”  He described the non-justiciable policy issues in this 
way:59 
In deciding whether or not this requirement is satisfied, the court has to assess the 
relevant factors taken into account by the authority in exercising the discretion.  Since 
what are under consideration are discretionary powers conferred on public bodies for 
public purposes the relevant factors will often include policy matters, for example 
social policy, the allocation of finite financial resources between the different calls 
made upon them or … the balance between pursuing desirable social aims as against 
the risk to the public inherent in so doing.  It is established that the courts cannot 
enter upon the assessment of such “policy” matters. 
The scarce allocation of resources is usually seen as a textbook example of a non-
justiciable policy issue.  If the plaintiff’s allegation is that the Crown’s under-funding 
caused a failure in the system which prevented the plaintiff being rescued from 
abusive parents, the claim is likely to fail as raising non-justiciable issues.  However, 
the allegation in such cases is usually more concrete than that.  In White, for example, 
Miller J found that the social workers had failed to speak to children alone when they 
were under court ordered supervision.  There may have been an underlying problem 
with the resources available to the defendant, but it will often be possible to cast this 
as operational negligence. 
In Couch, Elias CJ and Anderson J (dissenting in approach) made a similar point.  It 
was alleged that but for the Parole Board’s negligence parolee Bell would not have 
attacked the plaintiff.  In their joint decision, Elias CJ and Anderson J suggested that 
what may at first seem like an attack on the government’s resource allocation policy 




Counsel for the Attorney-General has throughout acknowledged that the probation 
supervision of Bell was deficient. The general picture of an underresourced and 
overwhelmed Probation Service, described by the statement of claim, has not been 
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resisted … For the purposes of considering fault or any policy reasons why liability 
may not ultimately be appropriate, it cannot be assumed that the state of the office 
was a result of high policy assessment of priorities (which might be a consideration 
against duty of care or its breach, depending on the view taken of the statutory 
obligation) rather than administrative blunders (which may raise no such concerns of 
policy or excuse). 
Such blunders are appropriately vindicated through litigation, since discovery can 
help to reveal what went wrong.  However, discovery is less likely to disclose 
government decisions concerning the allocation of resources for public authorities 
such as child welfare services. 
4 Wednesbury unreasonableness 
The second main justiciability test is whether the act or omission is so unreasonable, 
applying the Wednesbury threshold, that it cannot be said to be within the statutory 
power created by Parliament.  The standard of Wednesbury unreasonableness is 
controversial: the label comes from the case Associated Provincial Picture Houses 
Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation
61
 in which Lord Greene MR observed that a decision 
may be set aside in judicial review if it could be said that no reasonable statutory 
authority would have made the decision.  The example he gave of a teacher dismissed 
for having red hair suggests a very high standard.   
The rationale of the rule’s application in negligence actions is that if the alleged 
negligence is within the discretion of the statute, the statute provides a defence.  Lord 
Brown-Wilkinson in X v Bedfordshire put it this way:62    
Where Parliament has conferred a statutory discretion on a public authority, it is for 
that authority, not for the courts, to exercise the discretion: nothing which the 
authority does within the ambit of the discretion can be actionable at common law.  
However, the application of the high standard in Wednesbury can lead to overkill.  
When Parliament confers a discretion through statute, it does not follow that 
Parliament also intends the statute to provide a defence for everything which can be 
described as within the statutory discretion in judicial review terms but negligent in 
tort law terms.  Perhaps for this reason, the test has not been used by judges much 
since X v Bedfordshire with the notable exception of Lord Hoffmann.63 
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Lord Hoffmann applied the Wednesbury test in Stovin v Wise. In Stovin Lord 
Hoffmann held that the allegation that the defendant had failed to exercise its 
statutory power to make the road safer was not actionable because it was an omission 
and there was no pre-existing duty between the plaintiff and defendant.  However, he 
went on to hold that the negligence was not actionable because it was not public law 
unreasonable and therefore not beyond the discretion of the authority.  This assumes 
that a public authority can be liable for a failure to exercise a statutory power even 
though there is no pre-existing relationship or the tort of breach of statutory duty, an 
assumption Lord Hoffmann was quick to recant in the later case Gorringe:
64
 
… misunderstanding seems to have arisen because the majority judgment [in Stovin] 
goes on to discuss, in the alternative, what the nature of such a duty might have been 
if there had been one. It suggests that it would have given rise to liability only if it 
would have been irrational in a public law sense not to exercise the statutory power to 
do the work. And it deals with this alternative argument by concluding that, on the 
facts, there had been no breach even of such a duty. The suggestion that there might 
exceptionally be a case in which a breach of a public law duty could found a private 
law right of action has proved controversial and it may have been ill-advised to 
speculate upon such matters. 
On this approach Wednesbury unreasonableness is never relevant.  If the tort of 
breach of statutory duty is not established, there is no pre-existing relationship and the 
defendant does not make the plaintiff worse off in the East Suffolk sense, the 
defendant will not be liable whether or not their decision is a breach of public law.   
Other judges have also distanced themselves from the severe Wednesbury standard.  
In Barrett (decided in between Stovin and Gorringe), Lord Hutton limited the 
Wednesbury unreasonableness test to complaints that a statutory power was not 
exercised.
65
  Barrett was another strike out action in which the plaintiff had been 
removed from his parents shortly after his birth and placed in the care of various 
foster parents and state-owned care facilities.  The defendant argued that its decision 
could not be said to be Wednesbury unreasonable, relying on the dicta in Stovin v 
Wise by Lord Hoffmann.  Lord Hutton held that as Stovin was concerned with the 
failure to exercise a statutory power, it was not relevant to Barrett, in which the 
complaint was about the way the power was exercised.  Justiciability would therefore 
only apply to omissions, rather than where it is alleged that the defendant exercised 
the statutory power in a way that caused the plaintiff loss.  Lord Steyn repeated part of 
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Lord Hutton’s speech in his own reasons in Gorringe, observing that these had 
“qualified” Lord Hoffmann’s introduction of the Wednesbury standard in Stovin.66 
The current status of the Wednesbury test is therefore unclear in England.  Where 
there is a pre-existing relationship or the defendant makes the plaintiff worse off in 
the East Suffolk sense, then the test is not applicable.  For example, in Connor the 
defendant local body was liable because it was the plaintiff’s employer: they had a 
pre-existing relationship which meant that the defendant owed the plaintiff a common 
law duty in the way it exercised its statutory authority.  However, in general there 
seems to be a retreat from the stringent requirement of Wednesbury, and disinterest in 
applying public law standards in tort law. 
H Summary 
The Wednesbury test seems unpopular with judges in both England and New Zealand, 
perhaps because it sets an overly high standard.  The policy operational test, however, 
continues to be used, for example by Elias CJ and Anderson J in Couch.  It can be a 
useful tool in attempting to answer the question whether an allegation is beyond the 
competence of the courts.  This is most likely where the pleadings concern the 
allocation of scarce resources.  If the complaint concerns funding, litigation is 
unlikely to be able to vindicate the underlying wrong.  The allegation can, however, 
usually be rephrased as an administrative blunder.  Such wrongs are well within the 
competence of the courts. 
Aside from the justiciability test, this chapter has been chiefly concerned with the 
conservative East Suffolk approach to liability for the way statutory power is 
exercised.  This approach considers that statutes are in the public interest, and that this 
excludes private individuals having an interest which is actionable in damages.  Under 
the vindicatory approach, however, the public interest is seen as a reason for making 
public authorities liable, not a reason against liability.  In the child welfare cases, 
while the children are the immediate victims and have a private interest in seeing their 
wrongs vindicated, the wider public also has an interest in making sure that the breach 
of the community obligation to look after children is recognised. 
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This thesis has argued that vindicatory damages should be available in tort law, 
including negligence, to mark wrongs where compensatory damages are insufficient 
to vindicate the wrong or because they are impossible to quantify in any meaningful 
way.  The child welfare cases were analysed as an example of this.  The plaintiffs 
have framed their loss in these cases by emphasising their lack of employment, their 
alcohol addictions and sometimes by pleading a history of broken relationships.  
Although these may well be the result of the child abuse which the plaintiffs want to 
hold the government responsible for, it has usually been possible for the defendants to 
point to other possible causes of the plaintiffs’ sad lives.  Apart from the difficulty of 
disentangling the multiple possible causes, quantifying the loss is inevitably artificial 
because of the nature of the loss itself.  Lack of employment, for example, is usually 
dealt with through social welfare assistance.  However, although judges may be 
unable to quantify the plaintiffs’ loss, the courts might usefully be able to mark the 
wrong suffered through an award of vindicatory damages, which would also enable 
the facts leading to the wrong to emerge through the litigation process. 
Part of the focus in this thesis has been on how vindicatory damages reflect a public 
law aspect to the damages award.  Where the government is the defendant and the 
wrong concerns constitutional rights, as in actions for breach of the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA), or where there is a wider community obligation, like 
the duty to take care of children in the negligence cases, the public has an interest in 
seeing the wrong vindicated.  Vindicatory damages in these cases serve a wider 
purpose in addition to remedying the immediate victim: society as a whole benefits 
from having the wrong vindicated.   
This thesis has focused on government liability, but wrongs between private 
individuals may also require vindication.  The wrongful birth cases already provide a 
good example of this, where the plaintiff’s autonomy interest (which includes the 
decision not to have any more children) is undermined by the defendant’s negligence.  
In many of the child welfare cases the defendant might not be a public authority but a 
private sector child care institution, but it might still be appropriate to mark the 
defendant’s responsibility through vindicatory damages.  A further example is elder 
abuse, which might also engage wider community obligations although the defendant 
might be in either the public or the private sector. 
In many of the cases analysed in this thesis, it was alleged that the Crown was 
vicariously liable for its employees or foster parents.  While vindicatory damages for 
vicarious liability might seem incongruous because liability is imposed whether or not 
the defendant is at fault, an analysis of the child welfare cases suggests that the courts 




do not ignore the relationship of the plaintiff and defendant when imposing vicarious 
liability.  It was argued in chapter six that these would be better framed as liability for 
breach of a non-delegable duty, but in the alternative that where liability is imposed 
because of the relationship between the defendant and plaintiff, this could form a 
subset of vicarious liability, in which vindicatory damages would be appropriate.   
In other cases liability is imposed for the defendant’s own negligence, for example 
where the Crown negligently fails to investigate a complaint it receives that a child 
has been abused or is in danger of being abused.  In these cases, distinct issues arise 
concerning liability for omissions and liability for the way a statutory power is 
exercised (or a statutory duty is breached).  It was argued in chapters seven and eight 
that thinking of liability as vindicating a wrong rather than shifting loss may help in 
understanding the way negligence has been developed to accommodate these cases.   
Making public authorities liable for a failure to exercise a statutory power puts them 
in a different position from private individuals, who are usually not liable for 
omissions in order to protect their autonomy, and who typically lack special statutory 
powers.  Although according to the equality principle public authorities and private 
individuals should to be subject to exactly the same tortious liabilities, Prince and 
East Suffolk suggest that this principle is not always applied.  One explanation is that 
public authorities are representative of the wider community, whose duties to protect 
children are breached when the authorities fail to exercise their powers.  Although the 
statutes which provide these powers are intended to benefit a specific class (the 
children), the general public also has in interest in seeing the statutory duties 
complied with.  For example it is the duty of the Chief Executive of Child Youth and 
Family Services in New Zealand “to take such positive and prompt action and steps” 
as will “promote the well-being of children, young persons, and their families and 
family groups”.  This duty is intended to protect the interests of children, but it is also 
in the interest of the wider community. 
Vindicatory damages are a well recognised part of NZBORA remedies, but they are 
more controversial when applied in tort law.  However, not all awards in tort law are 
compensatory, as nominal, aggravated and exemplary damages demonstrate.  These 
all have an element of vindication to them, although they are not identical to the 
separate vindicatory damages award advanced in this thesis.  Like vindicatory 
damages in NZBORA, they should not be barred in New Zealand by the accident 
compensation scheme. 
Whether vindicatory damages would be available would depend on the underlying 
right or duty, the consequences of the wrong and whether other remedies were 
sufficient to provide vindication.  Quantifying the damages will not be easy, but a 




body of cases should build up gradually over time to provide appropriate guidance.  
Although determining quantum will be an issue, the current practice of calculating the 
plaintiff’s loss based on evidence such as lost income leads judges into difficulties 
that are better avoided.  Calculating vindicatory damages is made easier by the 
growing body of damages cases for human rights statutes, which judges will be able 
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